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This thesis develops an account of the right of peoples to participate in global governance affecting 
them. It starts by exploring at a conceptual level the principle of self-determination in international 
law and its associated rights, showing that the law of self-determination has evolved in a remedial and 
relational way to address situations of the dominance of peoples by states. The thesis outlines the rise 
of international organizations and global governance and the accompanying shift of regulatory 
authority from the national to the global level, and demonstrates that the activities of international 
organizations can profoundly affect peoples’ rights and interests. On this basis, it argues that a new 
remedy is required: a right of peoples to participate in global governance activities affecting them, 
with correlative obligations held by states and international organizations. The thesis explores the 
scope and limitations of the proposed right. 
The thesis shows that, doctrinally speaking, positive international law lends some, limited support to 
the existence of the proposed right, but that, ultimately, a right of peoples to participate in global 
governance is not (yet) part of positive international law. The thesis draws on empirical research 
regarding the practice of international organizations and states to assess the extent to which the 
proposed right constrains the behaviour of international organizations and states acting through them, 
creating an extensive map of practice. It explores a myriad of instances of mechanisms, policies, and 
practices adopted by international organizations enabling peoples to be heard in processes affecting 
them, suggesting that there is an emerging standard of conduct corresponding to the proposed right 
and obligations.  It will suggest that this practice is in part motivated by a belief that the participation 
of peoples in matters concerning them enables international organizations to more effectively carry 
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‘I am going to Geneva, and I suppose many stones have been placed in my path.’ 
- Levi General (“Deskaheh”), ‘I Am Going to Geneva’ (1923) 48 
 
‘I think that we’ve got to see that a riot is the language of the unheard.’ 






1. The Main Claims of the Thesis 
Self-determination is a foundational principle of the international legal order. It is also highly 
controversial and heavily contested: debates abound as to its legal status, content, and scope. This 
work bypasses many of the classic debates: whether the right to self-determination applies internally 
or externally, whether it supports remedial secession, the definition of a “people”. Rather, this study 
takes as its starting point a claim that self-determination grounds a right of peoples to participation in 
the international legal order on matters affecting them. Frequently asserted by the global indigenous 
peoples’ movement, as well as by scholars writing about indigenous peoples and international law, 
this claim has not yet been subjected to full study. This thesis, therefore, aims to test the claim. 
This thesis will argue that, in theory, there are grounds for the existence of a collective right of 
peoples to participate in global governance, derived from the right of self-determination. Through an 
assessment of the practice of states and international organizations (“IOs”), it will suggest that while 
this right cannot yet be said to have hardened into a rule of customary international law (“CIL”), there 
is a widespread practice forming a norm by which peoples have a legitimate expectation to participate 
in intergovernmental and global processes concerning them. 
The thesis will conceptualise the law of self-determination as dynamic, multi-faceted, relational, and 
remedial in nature. It will develop a theoretical construction of the proposed right and corresponding 
obligations of states and IOs. It will suggest this conception is justified by a structural relationship 
between IOs and states, on one hand, and peoples, on the other, whereby IOs and states acting through 
them exercise public authority over peoples in a way that can affect a people’s ability to self-
determine. It will outline the scope, implementation, and limitations of the proposed right. It will 
show how, doctrinally speaking, positive international law lends some, limited support to the 
existence of the proposed right, but that, ultimately, that a right of peoples to participate in global 
governance is not (yet) part of positive international law. 
The thesis will draw on empirical research regarding the practice of IOs and states to assess the extent 
to which the proposed right constrains the behaviour of IOs and states acting through them, creating 
an extensive map of practice. It will explore a myriad of instances of mechanisms, policies, and 
practices adopted by IOs enabling peoples to be heard in processes affecting them, suggesting that 
there is an emerging standard of conduct corresponding to the proposed right and obligations.  It will 
suggest that this myriad practice is in part motivated by a belief that the participation of peoples in 




The original contribution of this thesis is to provide a new perspective on the participatory facet of the 
law of self-determination. While it is not the first piece of work to suggest that peoples have a right to 
participate in the international legal order, it extends the scope of the claim beyond indigenous 
peoples to all peoples with a right to self-determination, and is the first to provide a rigorous 
theoretical justification. It bypasses the standard dichotomy of internal and external self-determination 
to shed light on the right as it applies between peoples and IOs. The thesis identifies a new right that 
attaches to the principle of self-determination, beyond the internal-external axis: the right to 
participate in global governance. The thesis also makes a novel contribution by collecting and 
analysing the existing practice with regard to the participation of peoples in global governance. Until 
now it has not been understood to what extent the practice of the international community aligns with 
the claimed right to participate. In the context of ongoing efforts by indigenous peoples for enhanced 
participatory status at the United Nations (“UN”) and beyond, this study sheds light on the legal 
foundations of the claim, as well as the extent to which it already shapes practice. 
2. Methodology 
The thesis employs a tripartite methodology. The first two chapters are predominantly theoretical, 
drawing on the theory behind the law of self-determination as well as political philosophy, for ‘[i]t is 
neither useful nor ultimately possible to work with international law in abstraction from descriptive 
theories about…normative views about the principles of justice which should govern international 
conduct’.1 It is grounded in an ethical perspective regarding procedural justice, the protection of 
minority rights, and the limitations of classical liberalism.2 
Chapter Three takes a doctrinal approach. I consider it important to “reality-check” the theoretical 
construction against the extent which it is supported in the positive international law; put in another 
way, doctrine is the language that most international lawyers speak, and so if the proposed right is to 
have effect, it must be able to be expressed in these terms. As Will Kymlicka put it, in the context of 
the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights, ‘[f]or better or worse, it is predominantly non-aboriginal 
judges and politicians who have the ultimate power to protect and enforce aboriginal rights, and so it 
is important to find a justification of them that such people can understand’.3 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven are empirical in nature. In part, this approach flows from the 
doctrinal framework expressed in Chapter 3: an examination of practice, and whether that practice is 
accepted as law, is relevant for the purposes of determining whether a rule of CIL exists. In addition, 
these chapters draw broader insights from the available data, for this is another sense in which the 
proposed right may be tested against reality: to what extent does it affect or constrain the conduct of 
                                                             
1 Koskenniemi (2005) 1. 
2 See Chapter 2, 3.2. 
3 Kymlicka (1989) 154. 
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IOs and states, in reality? To what extent does it correspond to a standard of behaviour? These 
questions are explored through an assessment of the available information.  
3. Clarifying the Scope of the Thesis 
Before commencing the substantive analysis, it is necessary to clarify exactly what this thesis is, and 
is not, attempting to achieve. First, it concerns the rights of peoples, rather than the rights of 
minorities or other groups.4 It does not attempt a rigorous definition of the term “peoples”, a matter 
which it approaches in a spirit of constructivism.5 Nor does it purport to make claims about the 
participation of individuals, civil society, or non-governmental organisations in global governance; it 
does not, for example, suggest that the participation of peoples should, morally or legally speaking, 
take priority over the participation of others. By framing the study through the lens of the self-
determination of peoples, it situates the study apart from the literature on non-state actor participation.  
While the choices made in the presentation of the empirical work will be explained more in the 
introduction to Chapter 4, at the outset it should be noted that the study does not purport to 
exhaustively include all instances of the participation of peoples in affairs concerning them at the 
international level. The ambition is more restricted: to demonstrate that sufficient practice exists to 
establish a pattern such that peoples can be said to have a legitimate expectation regarding 
participation.  
4. The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis proceeds in seven chapters. Chapter One develops an account of the law of self-
determination as dynamic, multifaceted, relational and remedial. Self-determination is a principle that, 
over time, has provided a foundation for the development of various legal rules concerning the 
relations between peoples and states; those rules have tended to emerge in a remedial manner. By 
dynamic and multifaceted, it is mean that self-determination is an ongoing process, and while the core 
meaning of self-determination has endured—that all peoples should be able to control their own 
destinies under conditions of equality—a variety of legal rules have come to be associated with the 
umbrella principle. By relational, it will be argued that self-determination has concerned the relations 
between self-determining peoples and states—specifically, relations of domination or subjugation by 
states of peoples. By remedial, the chapter will advance the argument that in the ongoing process of 
self-determination, specific rules have emerged to remedy sui generis violations of the principle. 
“Remedial” is not used here in the sense of “remedial secession”—that is, the idea that a state’s 
failure to allow a people to exercise internal self-determination justifies secession. Rather, under a 
remedial account, just as decolonization procedures were not the substance of the right, but rather 
                                                             
4 Although the proposed right may have relevance for minorities to the extent that they can be included within 
the scope of the rights-holders: see Chapter 2, 4.2. 
5 See Chapter 2, 4.2. 
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measures to remedy what the international community had come to recognise as a violation of the 
rights of colonised peoples, so too are more recently emergent rules regarding the self-determination 
of indigenous peoples. The implication is that if relations change or new relations emerge in a manner 
affecting the ability of peoples to self-determine, this would justify a remedy in the form of the 
addition of a new rule to the existing bundle.  
Building on this account, Chapter Two contends that it is not only peoples’ relations with states that 
are relevant to the law and exercise of self-determination. In addition, the relationships between 
peoples and IOs, states acting collectively through such organizations, and other global governance 
bodies are at play. Such global actors can occupy a position of dominance over peoples, in a way that 
poses both radical emancipatory potential, and the risk of adversely affecting peoples’ ability to self-
determine. The chapter outlines the rise of IOs, the expansion of their powers, and the shift in public 
authority from the national to the international level. It explores the structural relation between IOs 
and peoples by reference to activities of IOs that adversely affect peoples, drawing on the notion of 
dominance as the power of the former to interfere with the latter without regard to their interests or 
views. Chapter Two then assesses the extent to which existing forms of internal self-determination, as 
well as civil society participation, assist in remedying the problem, finding them lacking. Although an 
ability to participate at the domestic level can sometimes mean that a state can effectively represent 
the interests of an affected people at the international level, that is not necessarily the case. Nor do 
individual rights to participate in global governance, or the law of the participation of civil society, 
assist. Although individual and civil society participation serves a number of broader intrinsic and 
instrumental aims, an emphasis on individual rights tends to obscure the valid claims of groups—so if 
there is only an individual right to participate, the interests of peoples will be systematically sidelined. 
Moreover, peoples are often not structured as civil society organisations and may find it difficult to 
participate through mechanisms designed for the latter.  
Chapter Two proposes that in order to remedy the threat to the ongoing exercise of self-determination 
posed by the structural dominance of IOs, and states acting through such organisations and global 
governance bodies, over peoples, the law of self-determination should develop to add a further legal 
rule to the bundle. In other words, the law of self-determination justifies a right of peoples to 
participate in global governance. In one sense, this could be regarded as the external dimension of the 
right of peoples to participate in political decision-making at the national level. However, it is distinct 
from “external self-determination” in the sense of territorial measures such as secession and other 
forms of autonomy, and indeed in another sense bypasses the internal-external dichotomy altogether 
as it is concerned with the relations between peoples and IOs, rather than peoples and states, although 
states may play an intermediary role. The chapter then explores the identity of the rights-holders, as 
well as the question of who may represent the rights-holders. Drawing on the notion of rights and 
obligations as correlative, it proposes that both states and IOs hold obligations correlative to the right 
6 
 
to participate: obligations to promote and enable participation, respectively. It examines the 
implementation of the right, including justified limitations upon its scope, arguing that the level of 
participation required depends on factors such as the extent to which a people’s fundamental rights 
and interests are affected by a given matter, and whether other third parties have a legitimate interest 
in the matter.  
In contrast to Chapter Two, which focuses on the law as it ought to be, and in this sense suggests a 
direction in which the law might evolve, Chapter Three turns to the law as it is, exploring whether and 
to what extent doctrinal support exists for such a right. It tests the theoretical construction against 
doctrinal reality through the canon of international instruments and jurisprudence on self-
determination, the practice of treaty bodies and regional human rights courts, and instruments on 
indigenous peoples’ rights including on free, prior and informed consent. It finds that there is 
considerable support for a participatory aspect of self-determination, and some support in soft law for 
a right to participate at the international level, particularly for indigenous peoples. However, it cannot 
be said that there is clear or unequivocal support for the right as proposed. In addition, it is difficult to 
find a basis for imposing an obligation on IOs. The chapter explores the law of jus cogens, which may 
in theory ground such an obligation, but finds that it is unlikely that the right of self-determination is 
jus cogens in all its aspects. Rules of CIL can also, in theory, form the basis for an obligation of IOs, 
and this chapter argues that in addition to being bound by custom, IOs can contribute to its formation. 
It sets out the relevant considerations for determining whether the right of peoples to participate in 
global governance has crystallised into a rule of custom. 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven turn to examine the practice of IOs with regard to the participation 
of peoples in matters affecting them. Collectively, they argue that while it is unlikely that a rule of 
CIL has formed, there is nonetheless a norm corresponding to the proposed right. “Norm” is meant 
here not in the sense of a legal norm or rule strictly speaking, but rather in the constructivist sense of a 
standard of conduct adhered to by a community of actors creating a shared expectation about 
appropriate behaviour.6 There is widespread practice whereby states and IOs promote and enable 
peoples to participate in matters concerning them, through policies and mechanisms established for 
the purpose as well as in ad hoc instances. The practice is not uniform or universal; negative examples 
where no participation occurs in a situation that would justify it, or where the level of participation is 
lower than that suggested by the theory, serve to highlight the norm’s existence. Although the practice 
is largely unaccompanied by the opinio juris necessary to establish a rule of customary law, these 
chapters argue that an extensive pattern of practice has formed a norm. These chapters also reveal that 
in many cases, the motivation for the practice is that the participation of peoples is perceived to assist 
IOs in carrying out their functions and fulfilling their mandates. Chapter Four concerns the 
                                                             
6 Finnemore (1996) 22-23. See also Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 891-892. Similarly, see Florini (1996) 364-
365. The definition of “norm” will be elaborated upon further in Chapter 4, section 1. 
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participation of peoples in standard-setting activities affecting them carried out by and through IOs 
and other intergovernmental fora. It assesses the participation of peoples in the process towards the 
adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) and in standard-
setting in and under the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”), the International Seabed Authority (“ISA”) and the International 
Maritime Organization (“IMO”).  
Chapter Five turns to participation in decision-making of international financial institutions, IOs 
carrying out field projects, and other organizations making decisions impacting on peoples. It finds 
that there is a widespread pattern whereby IOs solicit the free, prior and informed consent (“FPIC”) of 
indigenous peoples before making decisions regarding investment or development projects potentially 
affecting them, in a manner corresponding to the FPIC standard canvassed in Chapter 3. It considers 
FPIC policies of the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (“IFAD”), the 
Global Environment Facility (“GEF”), the Green Climate Fund (“GCF”), the UN Collaborative 
Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (“UN-REDD Programme”), the European Union (“EU”), the UN Development Programme 
(“UNDP”), the UN Environment Programme (“UNEP”), the UN Industrial Development 
Organization (“UNIDO”), the FAO, and the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (“WHC”). It goes 
on to find that in parallel to FPIC requirements, many organizations that make decisions relevant to 
indigenous peoples include indigenous peoples’ representatives on, or establish indigenous peoples’ 
advisory groups to, decision-making committees, examining in addition to some of the 
aforementioned organizations the Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples of Latin America 
and the Caribbean (“FILAC”) and the UN Indigenous Peoples Partnership (“UNIPP”).   
Chapter Six considers general forms of participation of peoples in IOs. Rather than focusing on 
specific instances of decision-making or standard-setting, it includes practices such as the 
establishment of observer or permanent participant statuses, as well as subsidiary bodies, by which 
peoples can participate in IOs. It examines the participation of non-self-governing territories and 
national liberation movements, including through associate member status in UN agencies and 
commissions. It then turns to the participation of indigenous peoples in the UN system, including 
through the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (“UNPFII”), the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“EMRIP”), and the prospects for a separate status for indigenous 
peoples. Chapter Six also discusses the practice of the Arctic Council.  
Finally, Chapter Seven turns to the practice of international courts and tribunals. Focusing on the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) tribunals and the 
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panels and Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), it finds that while the ICJ has 
increasingly enabled the participation of peoples in proceedings affecting them in innovative ways, 
the same cannot be said for the WTO and ISDS tribunals. The chapter examines amicus curiae 
participation in WTO and ISDS proceedings, including cases where indigenous peoples have 
participated via such means, but finds that the amicus mechanism does not fulfil the right of peoples 
to participate.  
Taken together, Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven carry out a “birds-eye assessment”, connecting 
the dots to reveal a wider picture. On the basis of the evidence canvassed in these chapters, it will be 
argued that the participation of peoples in global governance affecting them is a norm, in the 
constructivist sense. While it is unlikely that this norm has hardened into a rule of CIL, peoples 
affected by global governance activities have a legitimate expectation that they will be able to 






CHAPTER ONE: Self-Determination as Dynamic, Multifaceted, 
Relational and Remedial 
1. Introduction 
Self-determination is a foundational principle of the international legal order. It is situated at the 
centre of the UN system, forming part of the organisation’s purposes.1 The International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) has described it as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’2 
and a rule of customary international law3 and erga omnes character.4 Certain aspects of self-
determination may even hold peremptory status.5 
Yet despite its primacy, the principle of self-determination has been marked by ambiguity, 
inconsistency and uncertainty in its application.6 Of enduring relevance is the characterisation made 
by the Åland Islands Commission of Rapporteurs in 1921 that self-determination is ‘a 
principle…expressed by a vague and general formula which has given rise to the most varied 
interpretations and differences of opinion’.7 The better part of a century later, James Crawford 
described it as lex obscura—law undefined or unclear as to its contents.8 While the lack of clarity of 
the principle can be perceived negatively, its corollary is self-determination’s flexibility and openness 
to interpretation, which can be seen as a strength9 in that ‘it permits a broad range of plausible 
interpretations and is therefore able to accommodate unforeseen circumstances’ and changing political 
priorities.10 
A further corollary of the ambiguity and openness to interpretation of the law of self-determination is 
contestation. In particular, substantial controversy persists as the idea of self-determination as 
justifying secession—that is, ‘the creation of a new state upon territory previously forming part of, or 
being a colonial entity of, an existing state’.11 Since Woodrow Wilson first brandished self-
                                                             
1 Charter of the United Nations, Articles 1(2) and 55. 
2 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (“East Timor”) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, [29]; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall AO”) (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 [88].  
3 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (“Namibia AO”) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 
16, 31; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, 31-33; Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute 
(Burkina Faso v Mali) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, 566-567; East Timor, 102; Wall AO, 182-183. 
4 East Timor, 102; Wall AO, 171-172. On obligations erga omnes, see Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, 
Light, and Power Company, Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (“Barcelona Traction”) (Judgment) [1971] ICJ Rep 3, 32. 
5 Although this is widely debated. See infra Chapter 2, section 4.  
6 Dugard (1987) 160. See also Stavenhagen (1996) 2; Kingsbury (2001) 217; Koskenniemi (1994) 249. 
7 The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of 
Rapporteurs (April 1921) League of Nations Doc. B7 [C] 21/68/106, 27. 
8 Crawford (2001) 38. 
9 Summers (2014) 39. 
10 Saul (2011) 610, 621. 
11 Radan (2008) 18. 
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determination as a political principle in 1917, many have feared its use to justify the fragmentation of 
existing states, potentially plunging the international order into chaos.12 Such fears are not unfounded, 
as the volume of conflicts caused by self-determination claims can attest.13 The ongoing spectre of 
secession, coupled with a tendency in the literature to equate self-determination with secession, is 
intimately linked with other key debates: whether self-determination applies in the post-colonial 
context;14 whether an internal dimension of self-determination exists, or indeed whether self-
determination can be separated into internal and external dimensions;15 whether groups within states, 
such as indigenous peoples, are “peoples” entitled to self-determination or, stated differently, whose 
claims to self-determination are “legitimate”;16 and whether, or to what extent, self-determination is a 
peremptory norm.17 
This thesis leaves these long-standing debates to one side. Rather, it takes as a starting point claims 
that self-determination supports a right of peoples to participate in the international legal order in 
matters affecting them. The idea that peoples should have a voice in the international system is not 
novel; nor are peoples’ attempts to engage. As early as 1923, Levi General (“Deskaheh”), on behalf of 
the Iroquois Six Nations Confederacy, petitioned the League of Nations for membership as an 
independent state and relief in respect of Canada’s violations of the Six Nations’ sovereign rights:18 
although some states supported the Iroquois’ case, Britain insisted that the issue was a domestic 
matter.19 Similarly, a petition made by the Māori faith leader Tahupōtiki Wiremu Rātana was also 
turned away by the League,20 and in the late 1940s the Herero people of the land that is now Namibia 
faced their own uphill battle to be heard in the UN and at the ICJ.21 Decades on, the burgeoning 
international indigenous peoples’ movement of the 1970s and 1980s found the doors of the UN finally 
ajar in the process that eventually led to the adoption of the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”).22 These days, indigenous peoples regularly assert their entitlement 
to be present and participate in the affairs of the UN as well as other IOs which affect their interests.23 
                                                             
12 See e.g. US Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s criticism of President Woodrow Wilson’s conception of self-
determination, Lansing (1921) 97-98, 104; Shehadi (1993) 8; Weller (2009) 1; Chopra (1994) 37; Kimminich 
(1993) 95. 
13 Coleman (2013) 3-6. 
14 See e.g. Hannum (1996) 46; Weller (2008) 59; Crawford (2007) 389. 
15 Arguing to refocus attention towards internal self-determination, see e.g. Cassese (1995) 248-359. Arguing 
against internal self-determination, see e.g. Alfredsson (1993) 45. 
16 Coleman (2013) ch 1; Mégret (2016). 
17 In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), Article 53. See the arguments 
referred to in Chapter 3, section 4. 
18 General (1923); General (2015) 45; Niezen (2003) 31-36; Sanders (1998) 73-88.  
19 Hauptman (2008) 137-140; Minde (1996) 102-104; Anaya (2004) 57; Woo (2003). 
20 Thornberry (2002) 82; Lightfoot (2016) 36. 
21 See infra Chapter 7, 3.1. 
22 See infra Chapter 4, section 2. 
23 See e.g. the ongoing process in the UN, see below Chapter 6, section 3. 
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In the past two decades, several scholars have suggested that indigenous peoples, beyond merely a 
political claim, have a legal right to participate in international law-making and/or in global 
governance, derived from the right to self-determination.24 Koivurova and Heinämäki wrote in 2006 
that it seems ‘self-evident that the more rights of self-governance indigenous peoples possess, the 
more influence they should have in international treaty making’.25 In 2010, Charters proposed that the 
right of indigenous peoples to self-determination included a right to participate in international law 
and policy making.26 In 2018 Dorothee Cambou, similarly, argued that indigenous peoples have the 
right to participate in intergovernmental decision-making processes affecting them on the basis of 
their right to self-determination.27 Rather than “self-evident”, however, such statements raise further 
questions: how does the law of self-determination justify a right to participate internationally? Is there 
a basis for such a right in the doctrine? In exploring these questions, we can bypass many of the 
classic questions: it is not necessary to take a stance on issues such as secession and the internal-
external dichotomy, although if the international community were to recognise a right of peoples to 
participate in the international legal order this could well have flow-on implications for other 
debates.28  
In evaluating the extent to which the claim that peoples have the right to participate in global 
governance is justified in international law, the thesis will aim to construct a plausible account in 
theory of how this could be the case, and critically assess that account by reference to doctrine and 
empirical practice. While the claims have been made in respect of indigenous peoples, this thesis 
extends its scope to all peoples. Although “indigenous peoples” and other “peoples” entitled to self-
determination can be distinguished in important respects, including the manner in which they are 
entitled to exercise self-determination, this thesis broadly agrees with the accepted position that 
indigenous peoples are “peoples” with the right to self-determination.29 In constructing the theoretical 
account of the right, it is possible to make some generalisations about “peoples”, in the sense of both 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups—although when appropriate the differences between 
indigenous peoples and other peoples will be dwelled upon further. 
                                                             
24 Anaya (1993) 157; Young (2000) 275; Knop (2002) 13; Anaya (2004) 153; Anaya (2004b), Boyle and 
Chinkin (2007) 50; Charters (2010); Åhren (2016) 132; D Cambou (2018) 26; Koivurova and Heinämäki (2006) 
101-102; Heinämäki (2011) 223; Loukacheva (2009) 52-53. Cf Hofbauer (2017) 71. 
25 Koivurova and Heinämäki (2006) 102. In 2011, Heinämäki followed this up by proposing that the internal 
right to self-determination of indigenous peoples should include the representation of indigenous peoples in 
international norm-making: Heinämäki (2011) 223. 
26 Charters (2010). 
27 Cambou (2018). 
28 For instance, Coleman suggests that one reason why self-determination (secession) claims become violent is 
that ‘the international system provides minimal opportunities for a people to make their claim peacefully’, as 
their ability to participate in the formulation of rules and to participate ‘at a broader level in international 
relations, in the UN’ is minimised: Coleman (2013) 10. Also see Avebury (1996) 221 -222.  
29 Scheinin and Åhren (2016) 72; Anaya and Rodríguez-Piñero (2018) 61; Weller (2018) 146. 
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To construct the theoretical account, it is first necessary to revisit the principle of self-determination 
itself. This will not be a comprehensive treatment of self-determination, which has been done 
elsewhere;30 rather, salient aspects will be highlighted. This chapter briefly reviews its development 
and makes four preliminary observations on self-determination in international law. In particular, it is 
submitted that self-determination is dynamic, multifaceted, relational and remedial in its operation. It 
is a principle that, over time, has provided a foundation for the development of various legal rules 
concerning the relations between peoples and states; those rules have tended to emerge in a remedial 
manner. These assertions have each been made before. However, taken together they underpin what is 
to follow.  
By dynamic, it is submitted that the meaning of self-determination has changed over time, from before 
its Wilsonian conception through the decolonisation period until the present day. While the core 
meaning of self-determination has become solidified and entrenched—that all peoples should be able 
to control their own destinies under conditions of equality31—the ongoing nature of self-determination 
means that the principle has supported various specific legal rules. Relatedly, the multifaceted nature 
of self-determination means that it has multiple expressions: its application is context-dependent. 
Third, self-determination is relational: it has concerned the relations between self-determining 
peoples and others—specifically, relations of domination, subjugation and oppression. The final 
aspect brought out in this account is the remedial nature of the specific legal rules which have 
developed under the umbrella of self-determination. I do not use “remedial” in the sense of “remedial 
secession”—that is, the idea that a state’s failure to allow a people to exercise internal self-
determination may justify secession from the state. Rather, “remedial” is used to indicate that specific 
legal rules have emerged to remedy sui generis violations of the right to self-determination. As a 
consequence of these four features of the law on self-determination, in theory it can be said that if new 
or different relations of domination were to emerge so as to contravene a people’s ability to self-
determine, a new rule can and should be created under the auspices of the principle of self-
determination to remedy the violation.  
2. Self-determination as dynamic 
Self-determination has evolved considerably over the last century, including from a political principle 
to a legal principle, from a legal principle to a legal right, from being exclusively concerned with 
decolonization to also applying in other situations of alien subjugation and foreign domination, from 
                                                             
30 See e.g. Cassese (1995); Summers (2014). 
31 Adopted from Anaya (2004) 74. This was chosen from the multiplicity of formulations in the literature as it 
seems to accurately capture the intent and spirit of the law; the choice is to some extent arbitrary as there are 
many similar formulations. For other formulations, see e.g. Saul (2011) 613 (‘the core meaning of the legal right 
to self-determination centres on the idea of freedom from subjugation’); Macklem (2015) 95 (‘The right of self-
determination has become an instrument whose purpose is to promote a just distribution of sovereign power in 
the international legal order’). 
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an external right to independence to also encompassing an internal element, and from a right of the 
aggregate populations of territorial units to a right of indigenous peoples. This section will explore 
these developments in order to establish the changeable, fluid nature of the law of self-determination. 
This account is by no means exhaustive; it glosses over many debates. But the notion that self-
determination itself has evolved can hardly be disputed. The intention here is to indicate, in a broad-
brush manner, the nature of such developments. 
The most basic development is the principle’s shift in status from a political principle into one of law. 
From the eighteenth century onwards, self-determination was promulgated as a political principle with 
a variety of meanings.32 Although in the post-war settlements the application of self-determination 
was limited,33 and it was not considered a legal principle, it was nonetheless ‘crucial for the 
legitimacy of states and their boundaries’, and thus ‘shaped the content of the law’.34 The opinions of 
the two international commissions on the Åland Islands dispute of 1920-21 affirmed that the principle 
was not part of international law.35 Its transformation into a principle of law occurred only with the 
adoption of the UN Charter in 1945.36 
The legal principle of self-determination was not initially accompanied by rights or obligations: it was 
an aspirational goal rather than an operative principle.37 The Charter primarily envisaged self-
determination as contributing to one aim of the UN, and did not impose related obligations on 
member states.38 Indeed, many states stressed, in the debates preceding its adoption, that the inclusion 
of self-determination in the Charter was not to be construed as a right of a minority, ethnic or national 
group to secession, a right of a colonial people to independence, nor a right of the people of a 
sovereign state to democracy.39  
                                                             
32 Including by Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin: Cassese (1995) 14-23; Summers (2014) 175-179; Yusuf 
(2012) 376; Miller (2003) 612-617; Castellino (2000) 13; Hofbauer (2017) 64. On self-determination’s 
historical origins, see Rigo Sureda (1973) 17; Cassese (1995) 11-13, 32; Castellino (2000) 11; Summers (2014) 
132-173. 
33 Cassese (1995) 33; Summers (2014) 178-187; Coleman (2013) 44. 
34 Summers (2014) 179. 
35 Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the 
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations 
Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 3 (October 1920) 5; The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted 
to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs , League of Nations Doc. B7 [C] 
21/68/106, (April 1921) 27. On the case generally, see Crawford (2001) 13-14; Fromherz (2008) 1355-1356; 
Coleman (2013) 45-47. 
36 Article 1(2) of the Charter states that it is one of the purposes of the UN ‘to develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace’ Also see Article 55. 
37 Daes (1996); Rosas (1993) 225. 
38 Cassese (1995) 43; Rensmann (2012) 42. 
39 Cassese (1995) 42; Alston (2005) 260-261; Crawford (2007) 112-114; Summers (2014) 198-199. 
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Self-determination came to be associated with a legal right in the political and historical context of 
decolonisation.40 The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples41 (“the Colonial Declaration”) framed self-determination in universal language as a right of 
‘all peoples’, while specifically qualifying that the populations of trust and non-self-governing 
territories ‘or all other territories which have not yet attained independence’ were entitled to 
‘complete independence.42 The UN General Assembly (“GA”) soon afterward clarified, in Resolution 
1541, the basic colonial unit and the non-self-governing territory entitled to independence, as well as 
the means by which those territories could attain self-government.43 The 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States 
(“Friendly Relations Declaration”) further reinforced the nature of the right and the associated duties 
of states.44 By the end of the decolonisation period, then, the principle of self-determination, then, had 
become associated with a right of peoples subjected to colonial rule to freely determine their 
international status. 45 
A further evolution is evident in terms of self-determination’s status as a human right. Common 
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International 
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (“ICESCR”) not only reinforce self-determination as a legal 
right, but “build a bridge” between it and international human rights law.46 Some publicists, as well as 
the Human Rights Committee, even situate self-determination as a necessary precondition for, and 
means to, the realisation of all other human rights.47  
Common Article 1 represented several further developments in the meaning of self-determination. 
Article 1(2) provided for a new dimension of self-determination: the right to control natural wealth 
and resources.48 The term “freely” in Article 1(1) arguably implies freedom from foreign interference, 
meaning that external self-determination no longer meant only independence of colonies, but also 
non-interference between states in general.49 In addition, according to some, Article 1(1) entails that 
the people of a state have the right to freely choose their rulers.50 
                                                             
40 Cassese (1995) 71-74; Macklem (2016) 99-104. For differing early views on whether self-determination was 
a legal right, see e.g. Higgins (1963) 101-106; Emerson (1971) 464-465; Pomerance (1982) 70-71. 
41 GA res 1514 (XV). 
42 Ibid, [4], [5]. 
43 GA res 1541. 
44 GA res 2625. 
45 South West Africa AO; Western Sahara [55], [59]. 
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”); International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). See Higgins (1995) 114; McCorquodale (1994). See e.g. Human Rights 
Committee (“HRC”), ‘CCPR General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-determination), The Right to 
Self-Determination of Peoples’ (13 March 1984). See also African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Article 20. 
47 HRC (ibid) 142-143; McCorquodale (1994) 872. 
48 See Cassese (1995) 55-56. 
49 Cassese (1995) 55. 
50 Cassese (1995) 52-55. 
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Indeed, this latter development heralded the development of what many have called the internal 
dimension of self-determination, the migration of the right ‘from the international to the domestic 
realm’.51 Internal self-determination is the right of peoples to enjoy the freedom of authentic self-
government, which may entail autonomy vis-à-vis other entities in the state.52 The internal dimension 
encompasses a right to equitable representation in legislative, executive and judicial institutions,53 and 
is also said to enable peoples to freely choose their political and economic regimes and enjoy related 
rights, such as the right to vote, the right of peaceful assembly, and the freedom of expression.54 
While the expansion from external to internal did not necessarily exclude the continued application of 
external aspects of self-determination, it evidences the flexibility and dynamism of the principle and 
its ability to adapt to respond to new situations as they occur. 
Another broad shift in the law of self-determination has been the gradual expansion in the identity of 
the holders of the right, from the aggregate populations of states, to the peoples of colonised 
territories, to peoples under occupation and other forms of alien domination, to indigenous peoples. 
The reference to the self-determination of “peoples” in the UN Charter was apparently not intended to 
be understood as conferring rights to minorities or peoples in any ethno-cultural meaning of the term, 
nor to colonised peoples: “peoples” were to be regarded as the entire populations of states rather than 
sub-segments of a state, and as such the principle pertained only to relationships between states.55  
In the decolonisation period, as outlined above, it became clear that colonised peoples were entitled to 
self-determination, but territorial considerations proved paramount in limiting who could hold the 
right.56 Self-determination attached to the entire populations of colonial territories, rather than peoples 
within a colonised territory, even though the artificially created colonial territories tended to contain 
several cultural and ethnic groups.57  
Although states did not widely contemplate that peoples would continue to have a right to self-
determination after the completion of decolonisation, applying self-determination only to the colonial 
                                                             
51 Macklem (2016) 108. On internal self-determination generally, see e.g. Rosas (1993); Salmon (1993).  
52 Pomerance (1982) 37; Cassese (1995) 101; Seymour (2011) 386; Franck (1992). 
53 Re Reference by the Governor in Council Concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of Quebec 
from Canada, Supreme Court of Canada, 20 August 1998, 115 ILR 536 (Re Secession of Quebec) [136]. 
54 Crawford (2001) 25. 
55 Åhren (2016) 28-29; Cassese (1995) 39-43; Alston (2005) 260-261; Crawford (2007) 112-114; Young (2004) 
177. 
56 There is a scholarly consensus that colonial peoples have the right to self-determination: Summers (2014) 45-
436; Cassese (1995) 71; Crawford (2007) 127; Rigo Sureda (1973) 226; Knop (2002) 51; Kirgis (1994) 307; 
Quane (1998) 558; White (1981) 150; Musgrave (1997) 178; Anghie (1993) 466; de George (1991) 2; 
Michalska (1991) 78; Alfredsson (1994) 61. On territorial interpretations, see Resolution 1541, Principles IV 
and V. 
57 Michalska (1991) 82; Åhren (2016) 31, 35; Knop (2002) 56-57; Raič (2002) 242-243; Cassese (1995) 141-
146; Summers (2014) 305. See e.g. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, 555. Also see 




context created arbitrary distinctions between very similar situations of alien domination.58 With 
references in the 1960 Colonial Declaration and the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration to ‘peoples 
under alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’,59 it became arguable that self-determination 
extended beyond the overseas colonialism of Western states to, for instance, peoples under racist 
regimes, occupied peoples, and the people of Palestine.60  
With the adoption of the UNDRIP,61 it became clear that indigenous peoples were also “peoples” 
entitled to self-determination.62 The 2007 Declaration, as the first widespread recognition by states 
that self-determination was not confined to colonial peoples, represents ‘one of the most significant 
stages in the development of the right to self-determination since decolonisation’.63 Although 
indigenous peoples inherently have a strong connection to land and place, not all have a fixed or 
exclusive territory; they may be geographically dispersed in the manner of a minority group 
throughout a more diverse population.64 Indeed, they are more similar in many ways to “minorities”, 
traditionally considered outside the realm of self-determination, than what many had previously 
thought of as a “people”.65 Previously, peoples had been exclusively understood as aggregate 
populations of states or territories; the decolonisation regime had bypassed indigenous peoples, who 
merely ‘became the subjects of new forms of colonization’.66 That peoples can now ‘in addition be 
defined in terms of common ethnicity and culture is at least arguably a new feature in international 
law’.67 
In summary, self-determination is dynamic. In a century of its prominence in the international sphere, 
it has transformed from a political principle to a human right in international law; from providing a 
legal grounding to the right to independence of colonial peoples, to justifying a much wider variety of 
rights, accruing to a broader range of “peoples”; from accruing only to territorial units, to groups with 
a common ethnicity or culture. Its evolution has been intertwined with political developments, and has 
been made possible by the very uncertainty and vagueness that some consider intolerable. More 
broadly, there is nothing to suggest that the law of self-determination will not continue evolving well 
into the future. 
                                                             
58 Franck (1990) 152-174; Koskenniemi (1994) 241. 
59 Also see the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (25 June 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23. 
60 On peoples under racist regimes, see SC res 581 [7]. On occupation, see e.g. SC res 384; East Timor [90]; 
Summers (2014) 536-537; GA res 42/15. On Palestine, see e.g. Wall AO [118]; Wall AO, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Higgins [29]-[30]; GA res 3236 (XXIX); Quigley (2011) 224; Summers (2014) 540-541; Macklem 
(2016) 105. 
61 GA res 61/295 (“UNDRIP”). The legal status of the Declaration will be considered in Chapter 3. 
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3. Self-determination as multifaceted 
The above account of the evolution of self-determination reveals that it has not been a singular legal 
rule throughout its history: ‘in different situations self-determination has had different meanings’.68 
Indeed, at present the principle of self-determination supports or grounds a number of rights. In this 
sense, self-determination may be said to be ‘multifaceted’69 or have ‘multiple expressions’.70  
Here, reliance is placed upon Antonio Cassese’s account of self-determination as a general principle 
alongside a number of customary rules.71 The principle, Cassese elaborated, ‘enshrines the 
quintessence of self-determination’: that is, the ‘need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of 
peoples’ when the fate of peoples is at issue.72 The principle ‘sets out a general and fundamental 
standard of behaviour’ that ‘governments must not decide the life and future of peoples at their 
discretion’; rather, peoples ‘must be enabled freely to express their wishes in matters concerning their 
condition’.73 Like any principle, self-determination is ‘general, loose and multifaceted’, lending itself 
to ‘various and even contradictory applications’, and with ‘great normative potential and dynamic 
force’.74 From the broad principle, Cassese continued, one can deduce specific individual customary 
rules, which ‘cover specific areas where a broader measure of agreement has emerged among States 
as to…proper conduct’.75 The relationship between the principle and the rules, as Cassese saw it, is 
threefold: the principle indicates the method of exercising self-determination, that is, by the free and 
genuine expression of the will and wishes of the people concerned; can act as a standard of 
interpretation where a customary rule is unclear or ambiguous; and can be useful in cases not covered 
by specific rules.76 
As examples of such rules, Cassese listed the external self-determination of colonial peoples and 
peoples under foreign military occupation, in the sense of independence and other end-states arising 
from a people’s free choice of status.77 To this list could be added a variety of others: the right of 
peoples to exercise control over natural resources;78 the right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and 
informed consent;79 the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs;80 and, more controversially, the remedial secession of a 
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people which has been denied meaningful access to government to pursue its political, economic, 
social and cultural development.81 Granted, not all of these rights are necessarily customary in nature, 
with some deriving from treaty provisions or soft law instruments; nor are they necessarily 
uncontroversially accepted by all. Individual rules may also be contingent, and subject to limitations. 
The crucial point is that the principle of self-determination is not singular. 
In summary, self-determination is not only dynamic but also multifaceted. The parallel existence of 
different manifestations of self-determination applicable in different circumstances lends credence to 
the idea that in a new set of circumstances, a new rule could become recognised under the auspices of 
the broad principle. 
4. Self-determination as relational 
Self-determination concerns relationships. It fundamentally involves the relations between a people 
and others: states, empires, governments, and other peoples.82 It is these relations—specifically, 
relations of dominance, subjugation or exploitation of a people by another—that both give rise to 
exercises of self-determination, and constitute such exercises: all peoples that exercise their right to 
self-determination do so in relation to another unit—typically a state—while in the course of the 
exercise, that unit holds reciprocal obligations in relation to the people. 
This point can be illuminated by examining the language used in key international instruments. The 
Colonial Declaration condemns ‘[t]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation’,83 which raises the question: subjugation by who? Domination by who? To speak of 
‘dependent peoples’ fundamentally assumes a relationship between the people subjected to 
subjugation, domination and exploitation, and the entity that is doing the subjecting—in this case, 
colonising states. The Declaration further states that ‘armed action or repressive measures of all kinds 
directed against dependent peoples shall cease’,84 again presupposing the existence of a relationship of 
a certain kind between a dependent people and the entity applying armed force or repressive 
measures. The Declaration goes on to prescribe the future nature of the relationship: ‘[i]mmediate 
steps shall be taken’ by the colonial states ‘to transfer all powers’ to the dependent peoples ‘in 
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire’.85 A similar perspective reveals that all of the 
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key international instruments, likewise, are predicated upon a relationship of domination of a people 
by another entity—usually a state—and are prescriptive of that relationship to the extent that they 
impose obligations upon the dominating entity. In addition, judicial decisions on the erga omnes 
nature of self-determination assume a relation between a people and all other states. 
Moreover, the relational nature of self-determination can be understood by examining the division 
between internal and external dimensions of self-determination. This dichotomy is widely supported 
by commentators,86 and has been relied upon by judges of the ICJ87 and the Canadian Supreme 
Court,88 as well as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.89 In this conception, 
“external” and “internal” are defined by reference to a state within which a people entitled to self-
determination is situated. This mirrors the traditional distinction between internal and external 
sovereignty,90 in which the former is equated with a state’s internal self-government,91 while the latter 
refers to independence and the external relations of states.92 As outlined by Thornberry:93 
The external dimension or aspect defines the status of a people in relation to another people, State or 
Empire, whereas the democratic or internal dimension should concern the relationship between a 
people and ‘its own’ State or government. 
The internal-external dichotomy thus brings into sharp focus the relations between states and peoples 
in the exercise of self-determination. Under this formulation, it is the relationship between a state and 
a people—a relationship of colonial power and dependence, or of alien domination, foreign 
oppression or subjugation—that gives rise to and determines an exercise of self-determination, and 
creates correlative rights and obligations of the people and state respectively. Although the right is 
held by peoples, ‘determining their political status and economic, social and cultural development 
typically involves the structure and behaviour of states and their institutions.’94 In the decolonisation 
context, for instance, it is the relationship between the state and the colonial people that is central to 
the exercise of self-determination. The colonial relationship of control and oppression both led to the 
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establishment of the legal right of the peoples of colonised territories to determine their own political 
status, and defined the consequent obligations of the coloniser state. Those duties were primarily 
procedural in nature, ‘encompassing rather modest preparations of the territory for possible 
independence, the negotiated establishment of an environment and framework for a legitimate act of 
self-determination, the proper conduct of a referendum, and the orderly transfer of power’.95 
Likewise, any right to remedial secession would implicate the relations between the state and people 
concerned: for such an exercise to occur, the state would have had to deny the people its exercise of 
internal self-determination, and the right of the people to secede would imply corresponding 
obligations for the state. Arrangements for the autonomy of a territorial unit within a state also involve 
an ongoing relationship between the state and people concerned. Autonomy ‘is not simply freedom, it 
is a relationship’: complex governance frameworks are required for such arrangements to work.96 
While the dichotomy is ‘an effective way of presenting self-determination from a certain 
perspective’,97 it is limited in that it covers only the relations between peoples and state—rather than 
those with other actors like other peoples within the same state.98 Notwithstanding this, what the 
internal-external dichotomy reveals is the law’s preoccupation with the state-people relationship. In 
summary, the law of self-determination is predicated upon a relationship between a people and 
another—specifically, a relationship of domination. As Summers recognises, ‘the process of self-
determination involves a number of actors, typically peoples and states, but also others…. There may 
be more than one perspective on the dimensions of self-determination’.99 This point is examined 
further below. 
5. Self-determination as remedial 
We have seen that self-determination is a principle attached to which are a number of legal rights and 
correlative obligations, developed over time. Peoples self-determine in relation to others: the exercise 
of a right requires that other entities, typically states, meet a correlative obligation, and indeed 
presupposes a certain kind of relationship between a people and another—one of domination. 
Building on this discussion, this section will suggest that the specific rules have developed over time, 
under the broad umbrella of self-determination, in a remedial manner, so as to provide redress for 
ongoing situations of domination, subjugation or exploitation. Self-determination is a continuous 
process whereby the law form new remedies when so required. This will be illustrated by reference to 
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the development of the rules on decolonization, as well as the rules on the self-determination of 
indigenous peoples.  
This point can be illustrated by reference to two specific episodes in the development of the law, the 
first of which is the right of colonised peoples to freely choose their own political status. The 
colonisation process and the international law that accompanied and justified it denied countless non-
European peoples recognition and the ability to determine their own futures. The preamble and 
content of the 1960 Colonial Declaration, adopted in the midst of the burgeoning decolonisation 
movement,100 placed it squarely in this context, offering the rules that it contained as a remedy. The 
preamble, recognising ‘the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples’ and noting that 
‘the continued existence of colonialism…impedes the social, cultural and economic development of 
dependent peoples’, proclaimed ‘the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end 
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’.101 It was against this background that the GA adopted 
the Colonial Declaration, which ‘treats the right of self-determination as an instrument that addresses 
international law’s complicity with colonialism’.102 The right of colonial peoples to determine their 
own territorial status, then, did not emerge in isolation—rather, it was the response of the expanding 
international community to a specific relationship between colonial powers and colonised peoples that 
had come to be recognised as undermining self-determination. The principle of self-determination was 
the entry point and legal catalyst, but although the right of colonised peoples and nations to 
independence was regarded at the time as synonymous with the right of self-determination,103 
decolonisation procedures ‘did not of themselves embody the substance of the right…rather, they 
were measures to remedy a sui generis violation of the right that existed in the prior condition of 
colonialism’.104  
Similarly, the international law on the rights, including self-determination, of indigenous peoples can 
also be viewed as a remedy for a sui generis violation of self-determination. From the earliest 
beginnings of international law, shaped in the course of colonialism and imperial expansion in the 
writings of 16th and 17th-century jurists such as Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, indigenous 
peoples were not viewed as full sovereigns.105 Under the influential theory of sovereignty 
promulgated by Emmerich de Vattel, writing a century later, non-European peoples’ societies were 
viewed as uncivilised, and thus could not qualify as sovereign states.106 The imperatives of 
colonisation and empire acted so as to reinforce this political and jurisprudential tendency to deny 
                                                             
100 Summers (2014) 203, 209. Also see Kay (1967) 789; Emerson (1965) 493. 
101 Third, seventh and twelfth recitals.  
102 Macklem (2016) 100. 
103 Summers (2014) 205 note 64. 
104 Anaya (2009) 189. 
105 Åhren (2016) 8-10; Anghie (2004) 13-29. 
106 Åhren (2016) 13; Anaya (2004) 22-23. 
23 
 
indigenous peoples status, exemplified in the positivist school of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
The major premises of positivism ensured that international law ‘would become a legitimizing force 
for colonization and empire rather than a liberating one for indigenous peoples’.107 Prominent 
publicists considered indigenous peoples to be incapable of enjoying sovereign status or personality in 
international law;108 sovereignty was ‘essentially a European feature’.109 Under the doctrine of terra 
nullius indigenous lands prior to any colonial presence were considered unoccupied, providing the 
legal justification for the mass appropriation of land.110 Thus indigenous peoples were left outside the 
international legal system.  
International law’s exclusion of indigenous peoples continued well into the 20th century. While 
nominally recognising indigenous peoples, the earliest legal instrument addressing their situation 
ultimately perpetuated their exclusion in the international legal system.111 Indigenous peoples were 
also, crucially, excluded from the decolonisation processes of the mid-20th century. The “salt water” 
doctrine in Resolution 1541 formally linked the right of colonised peoples to independence to 
Western overseas colonial dominions, which implied ‘the exclusion of Indigenous peoples clustered 
within independent States’ boundaries from the scope of application of the principle of self-
determination’.112 In addition, the doctrine of uti possidetis preserved the former colonial boundaries, 
meaning that indigenous peoples within a former colony that had gained independence experienced 
only a change in ruler.113 Thereby indigenous peoples were continually excluded from determining 
their own destiny. 
This continued exclusion ‘lies at the heart of Indigenous peoples’ expression of their demands in 
terms of self-determination’.114 Indigenous peoples hold that they were prior sovereigns,115 and that 
the lack of recognition of this sovereignty during colonial expansion, along with the missed 
opportunity for statehood during decolonisation, is a wrong which must be remedied.116 This “lost 
statehood” or “missed sovereignty” argument underpins indigenous peoples’ demands for self-
determination.  
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In the late 20th century global indigenous peoples’ activism resulted in the international community’s 
recognition of the problems that the exclusion of indigenous peoples had led to. In 1971, the UN Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was authorised by the 
UN Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) to conduct a study on the problem of discrimination 
against indigenous populations.117 This process provided a focus for the global indigenous peoples’ 
movement, which from its beginnings at Standing Rock in 1974 quickly spread worldwide.118 The 
resulting Martínez Cobo report,119 which compiled a large among of data on indigenous peoples 
worldwide and presented a set of findings and recommendations on how the UN could begin to 
seriously address the situation, catalysed the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations which ultimately led to the development and adoption of the UNDRIP.120  
Viewed in this light, the UNDRIP is ‘essentially a remedial instrument’ based on the identification of 
a long-standing sui generis violation of self-determination.121 It was needed to remedy the systemic 
inequality and injustice arising from international law’s failure to recognise indigenous peoples’ 
historical sovereignty and self-determination over centuries.122 Brought about in the context of 
indigenous peoples’ growing demands for recognition, the identification in the Martinez Cobo report 
of a violation of the self-determination of indigenous peoples, and subsequent work on the part of 
states in partnership with indigenous peoples to address the violation, the Declaration represents a step 
towards rectifying ‘the adverse consequences of how international law validate[d] morally suspect 
colonization projects that participated in the production of the existing distribution of sovereign 
power’.123 
Under a remedial account, then, ‘the law of self-determination is the law of remedies for serious 
deficiencies of freedom and equality’.124 Self-determination is a continuous, ongoing process—a 
‘constant entitlement’125—in which new remedies come to be required by law.126 Just as 
decolonization procedures were not the substance of the right, but rather measures to remedy what the 
international community had come to recognise as a violation of the rights of colonised peoples, the 
rules on the self-determination of indigenous peoples reflected in the UNDRIP are also remedial 
measures for a sui generis violation of self-determination. As a third example, the international law of 
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minority rights may be viewed as a remedy for the exclusion of minority groups by the international 
legal rules determining ‘which collectivities are entitled to exercise sovereign authority and over 
which territory and people such authority operates’. In other words, because minorities are not entitled 
to exercise external self-determination in the sense of secession, it can be argued that minority rights 
are a kind of compensation provided by international law.127  Viewed in combination with the other 
characteristics of self-determination discussed above, this remedial account coupled with the 
relational account offers an explanation as to how new rules have been formed under the heading of 
self-determination, and provides clues for how they may be so formed in the future as the process of 
self-determination further unfolds.  
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been argued that the law of self-determination consists of an umbrella principle 
accompanied by multiple legal rules. The rules have emerged to remedy specific situations, or 
categories of situations, of the violation of the freedom and equality of peoples, involving a 
relationship of dominance of a people by another. This account has implications for this project. If 
self-determination is understood as multifaceted and dynamic—rather than as synonymous with 
secession or internal self-determination—this raises the possibility that another legal rule could come 
to be associated with the existing bundle. As Anaya puts it:128 
Other forms of violation of self-determination may be identified, and the remedies forthcoming need not 
necessarily entail the emergence of new states. Substantive self-determination may be achieved from a 
range of possibilities of institutional reordering other than the creation of new states. What is important is 
that the remedy be appropriate to the particular circumstances and that it genuinely reflect the will of the 
people, or peoples, concerned. 
If relations change, or if relations with other entities emerge, so as to undermine the exercise of the 
right to self-determination in a sui generis manner not addressed by the existing law, the situation 
should be remedied in the form of a new legal rule.
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CHAPTER TWO: Self-Determination as a Right to Participate in 
Global Governance 
1. Introduction 
Building on the account developed in Chapter One, this chapter outlines a wider perspective on 
peoples’ relations with others. Self-determination is not only affected by a people’s relationship with a 
colonial or occupying state; relations between peoples and IOs, as well as states acting collectively 
through IOs and other intergovernmental fora, are also at play. Section 2 of this chapter canvasses the 
rise of IOs and the expansion of their powers, the increased law-making and regulatory activity in 
intergovernmental fora, and the responses of international law to these shifts. It outlines the ways in 
which IOs, and states acting collectively through them, exercise public authority or power, including 
over peoples. This can be characterised as a structural relationship between IOs and states acting 
through them, on the one hand, and peoples on the other—a relationship in which the former exercise 
dominance, in a manner that undermines the latter’s realisation of self-determination.  
Section 3 then explores existing measures, finding that they do not provide an adequate remedy. 
Forms of internal self-determination do not assist. Although a state can sometimes effectively 
represent the interests of an affected people at the international level, that is not always the case. In 
addition, sometimes the state which contains a people affected by an action taken by an IO will not be 
a member of that organisation. For a people to be self-determining—to control its own destiny—it is 
not sufficient that it holds rights as against the state in which it is located. Nor does the participation 
of civil society assist. Not all non-state actors are alike, yet standardised rules for civil society 
observers in IOs tend not to account for this diversity. It may be difficult for peoples to qualify for 
observer status, and such status in turn may not provide for the level of participation required in order 
to protect a people’s ability to determine its own destiny. Similarly, proposals regarding individual 
rights to participation in IOs are not sufficient. An emphasis on individual rights tends to obscure the 
valid claims of groups—so if there is only an individual right to participate, the interests of peoples 
will be systematically sidelined.  
In Section 4, it is proposed that in order to remedy this violation of the right to self-determination, the 
international community should recognise an additional specific rule attaching to the principle of self-
determination: that a people has the right to participate in global governance on matters affecting 
them. This section will explore the nature and scope of the right’s correlative obligations, held by 
states and IOs. Aspects relating to the implementation of the right will be examined, including the 
degree of participation necessary to fulfil the right by reference to Arnstein’s ladder of participation. 
A right to participation does not generally entail a veto over any decision at the international level that 
would negatively impact upon a people, nor would it entitle a people to have a say in each and every 
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organisation upon each and every issue. The international legal order entails a necessary balancing of 
interests. However, the right would enable a people to have heard on matters affecting it, in such a 
way as to enable it to self-determine.  
2. The structural relation between peoples and international organizations 
This section aims to demonstrate that relations exist between peoples and IOs, and between peoples 
and states collectively acting through IOs and other intergovernmental fora, of the kind that justifies a 
remedy under the law of self-determination. The term “international organization” is here used to 
mean a formal intergovernmental organization (“IGO”), defined by the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) as ‘an organization established by treaty or other instrument governed by 
international law and possessing its own international legal personality’, having as its members states 
‘as well as other entities’.1 Here I also consider more informal organisations, which I refer to as 
“global governance bodies”. In addition, I refer to “intergovernmental fora” to mean, for instance, 
inter-state negotiation processes. This section first considers the rise of IOs, the growth in their 
powers and the privatisation and informalisation of global governance, along with the attitudes taken 
by international law in respect of IOs. It discusses the exercise of public authority by IOs, and the turn 
in IOs scholarship to accountability. Building on this, it examines the relationship between peoples 
and IOs, discussing the ways in which the activities of the latter affect the former, as well as the 
structural relationship between the two. On this basis, it argues that the relationship between peoples 
and IOs, and states acting through IOs and other intergovernmental fora, is one of domination or, 
alternatively framed, a threat to self-determination. 
2.1 The rise of global governance 
IOs have proliferated in the course of the last century,2 growing in a ‘highly contested, always 
provisional and never-ending process’.3 The earliest IOs emerged in the nineteenth century,4 and the 
creation of the League of Nations in 1919 represented the birth of the modern international 
institution.5 But the period starting after World War II and throughout recent decades has seen several 
waves of IO growth, including the UN and its specialised agencies, regional commissions and 
functional commissions, as well as international financial institutions and regional organizations.6 
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Today hundreds of IOs exist and operate in every functional area imaginable, including trade, 
development, health, environment, peace and security, and human rights.  
In addition to their numerical growth, IOs have, over time, come to exercise expansive powers, 
including powers ‘that were neither specifically contemplated at the time of their creation nor 
explicitly mandated in their founding treaties – through informal processes of discourse, practice and 
(re)interpretation’.7 This mission expansion has been attributed to several factors, including the role of 
member states in delegating to an IO new functions which are likely to serve states’ strategic 
objectives,8 the role of organizations’ secretariats who ‘continuously strive to expand the remit of 
their functions and budgets’ which is variously attributed to power-seeking behaviour or seeking to 
perform their existing functions,9 and the emergence of new global problems which require IOs to 
exercise new powers.10 Scholars have developed a nuanced understanding of how mission expansion 
has occurred in many institutions.11 Legally, this mission expansion has been facilitated by the 
doctrine of implied powers, under which IOs are held to have, in addition to the powers explicitly 
granted by member states through their constituent treaties,12 the powers necessary for their effective 
functioning.13 Through these political and legal processes, IOs have come to exercise extensive 
powers with far-reaching impacts on individuals, communities and domestic societies,14 through their 
ability to make laws,15 set standards,16 make decisions and recommendations,17 and disseminate 
information.18  
IOs are not the only entities exercising regulatory authority at the global level. The informalisation 
and privatisation of global governance, particularly since the 1990s, is another dynamic at play.19 
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Informal bodies such as the G20 and G8 ‘wield considerable political clout’.20 Hybrid public-private 
organizations, private entities, and intergovernmental networks of domestic regulators exercise public 
authority: they issue regulatory rules, standards and decisions; may adjudicate on particular matters; 
engage in consultations and deliberations; and often promote, monitor and supervise the 
implementation of regulatory norms.21 For instance, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, in which the principal participants are private corporations and states play only an advisory 
role, sets standards necessary for the operation of, and administers access to, the Internet.22 Its 
decisions can affect sub-state peoples, as in the case of its decisions whether to grant top level domain 
names to Palestine and Catalonia.23  
To a certain extent IOs may be said to exercise broad powers in their own right, but in addition to 
some extent the exercise of public authority by an organization may be attributed to the collective 
state members of an organization.24 In addition, states may collectively exercise broad powers in 
making international law through other intergovernmental fora, for instance in multilateral free trade 
agreements concluded outside the auspices of an IO.25   
2.2 The attitude of international law  
Despite these far-reaching powers, the international community historically displayed deference 
towards IOs and complacency regarding their rise.26 International law, heralding IOs as ‘harbingers of 
international happiness’,27 developed a functional approach which insulated IOs ‘from any external 
legal discipline or judicial accountability’.28  
Functionalism, itself born out of an encounter with colonial administration,29 broadly holds that the 
functions assigned to an organization by its member states both enable and limit the organization’s 
activity,30 and presents IOs as ‘neutral and a-political, solely functional entities…[which] can serve 
the interests of all precisely by focusing on a specific function’.31 Functionalism envisages IOs as 
agents acting on behalf of a principal32—a relationship also known as “vertical”—from which it 
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followed, for some, that IOs fundamentally depend on initial and ongoing state consent,33 and that IOs 
do not seriously challenge the position of states as the central actors on the global stage.34 The 
limitations of this approach, which is linked to orthodox positivist approaches to state consent, and 
mirroring schools in international relations such as realism (in brief, the view that states will pursue 
their own interests) and functionalism (states will cooperate to solve joint problems),35 are said to 
include that it does not adequately explain IOs in which decisions can be taken without unanimous 
state consent, nor relationships between IOs and other actors, and also fails to account for the separate 
existence, independent will (volont’e distincte) and international legal personality of IOs.36 However, 
in orthodox thought this “principal-agent” view has often prevailed, as states have been reluctant to 
regard IOs as independent entities rather than mere collective undertakings.37 
Yet in the years following the end of the Cold War, the attitude of the international community began 
to shift. It became apparent that IOs are not just the vehicles through which states act: they are 
autonomous global actors in their own right.38 Moreover, in addition to instances of mismanagement 
of IOs,39 it became clear that their activities were having substantial negative effects on states, 
individuals and communities.40 Furthermore, IOs were often steered by powerful states and special 
interests,41 and had ‘often ended up promoting forms of institutional intervention that look a lot like 
the extension of deep-rooted forms of colonial domination’.42 IOs are today recognised, at least by the 
critical schools, as ‘not, as some liberals would have us believe, neutral arenas for the solution of 
common problems but rather sites of power, even of dominance.43 
Hence, international legal scholarship on IOs has shifted focus from a narrow functional approach to 
critiquing IOs and studying ways in which they can be held to account.44 It is recognised in the 
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literature that IOs and other global governance bodies exercise public authority,45 impacting in 
meaningful ways the living conditions and opportunities of ordinary people:46 
The growing exercise of public authority by international organizations and the consequent intrusion in 
matters previously considered as exclusive spheres of states has transformed the dimensions of 
accountability in these organizations.  
Many have accordingly pointed out a lack of accountability, democracy and legitimacy in global 
governance.47 While in many domestic societies, national governments are to a greater or a lesser 
extent accountable for their policies and decisions to those whom they affect, the same is not true at 
the global level, where individuals are remote strangers lacking a direct connection to IOs or other 
global governance bodies.48     
Scholars of global administrative law scholarship know this as the problem of “disregard”.49 IOs and 
other global regulatory bodies systematically give greater regard to the interests and concerns of their 
core sponsors and constituencies, typically powerful states and well-organized economic actors, and 
tend to disregard other affected interests and concerns.50 Disregard has both procedural and 
substantive elements, with the former tending to accompany the latter. Procedural disregard includes, 
for instance, a regulator’s failure to gather information regarding the interests or concerns of affected 
groups and the resulting impacts, failure to provide access to relevant information, or failure to 
address such interests and concerns in giving reasons for decisions. The substantive element entails 
the adoption of decisions that unjustifiably harm or disadvantage those whose interests and concerns 
have been procedurally disregarded, where decisions have been adopted as a consequence of such 
disregard.51 As Stewart puts it:52 
Many global regulatory authorities have been justly criticized for giving inadequate regard to the interests 
and concerns of vulnerable and politically weak groups, diffuse and less well-organized and resourced 
societal interests, and vulnerable individuals, which has resulted in decision making that causes unjustified 
harm or disadvantage. 
Global administrative law’s response to this problem has been to call for non-state actors affected by 
decisions of global regulatory regimes to be heard and allowed to participate in the decision-making 
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47 See e.g. Nanz and Steffek (2004). 
48 Woods and Narlikar (2001) 569. 
49 Stewart (2014). 
50 Ibid 212. 
51 Ibid 224. 
52 Ibid 221. 
33 
 
processes.53 A central premise of global administrative law is that most issues of democratic 
legitimacy and the exercise of power on the global level are administrative in nature, and thus can be 
analysed with reference to values that include the rule of law, accountability, and participation.54 
Global administrative law extends concepts derived from the administrative law of the United States 
to global governance, taking an approach which identifies and maps global administration, asking 
where, how and with what effects power is exercised,55 and is preoccupied with ensuring that ‘the 
mechanisms, principle, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise 
affect the accountability of global administrative bodies…meet adequate standards of transparency, 
participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and 
decisions they make’.56 While this study, overall, does not apply a methodology of the type seen in the 
global administrative law literature, preferring to proceed along more traditional lines, it adopts as 
useful the notion of “disregard”, and shares the normative position that an individual affected by an 
exercise of public authority or administrative power should have their interests represented in the 
decision-making process leading to that exercise. 
In summary, IOs have proliferated and their powers have expanded to the point where they exercise 
public authority having direct and indirect impacts on individuals and communities, which raises 
troubling questions about organizations’ lack of accountability to those whom they affect. They have 
‘disempowered disparate domestic electorates, who could not benefit from the traditional 
constitutional checks and balances found in many democracies intended to limit executive 
discretion’.57 International lawyers are alive to these concerns and it is in the context of this literature 
that this work must be situated. 
2.3 The influence of international organizations over peoples 
As explored above, IOs, and states acting through them, exercise public authority in a way that affects 
not only member states but also others. In particular, for the purposes of this work, they can affect 
peoples, including their self-determination. The relationship between IOs and their member states on 
the one hand, and peoples on the other, is structural, arising from the regulatory authority situated in 
IOs. In the language of self-determination, an IO, or a group of states acting collectively, can 
“dominate” a people, interfering with its ability to determine its own destiny. Under Philip Pettit’s 
definition of domination, developed further by Iris Marion Young, an agent dominates another ‘when 
the agent has power over that other and is thus able to interfere with the other arbitrarily’; 
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interference is when ‘one agent blocks or redirects the action of another in a way that worsens that 
agent’s choice situation by changing the range of options’, and it is “arbitrary” ‘when it is chosen or 
rejected without consideration of the interests or opinions of those affected.58 An entity may therefore 
dominate another without ever actually interfering with it; domination ‘consists in standing in a set of 
relations which makes an agent able to interfere arbitrarily with the actions of others’.59 IOs are, as 
explored in the previous section, able to interfere with other agents; they wield public authority in a 
way that can directly or indirectly change the range of options available to individuals or other 
entities. It is this structural possibility of interference—which may be positive or negative—that 
constitutes domination.  
The remainder of this section will illustrate this point by reference to actual examples of domination 
and interference, in the sense meant by Pettit and Young, in several categories of activity. First, IOs 
and states acting collectively through them, as well as in other fora, carry out standard-setting and 
policy-making activities that affect peoples. Secondly, IOs and international courts and tribunals make 
decisions affecting peoples. Third, the UN occasionally exercises domination over a people by way of 
international territorial administration. Finally, IOs may act as corrective mechanisms that can 
effectively exercise a power of review over the actions and decisions of states, thereby potentially 
remedying violations of peoples’ rights. While not exhaustive, this section is intended to contain 
sufficient detail to demonstrate that IOs, and states acting collectively, have exercised power through 
the making of decisions, standards, and policies affecting peoples in myriad fields of activity. 
A conceptual distinction should be drawn between a matter affecting a specific people, and a matter 
affecting a class of peoples. By the former, I mean a decision, policy or law made by an IO that by 
dint of its topic, scope, content, objective, or application impacts upon a people. For instance, the 
decisions of the EU to ratify agreements with Morocco on trade and fisheries, and to implicitly accept 
their application to Western Sahara, specifically affect the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara.60 The 
advisory proceedings of the ICJ on Kosovo had a bearing on the self-determination of the people of 
Kosovo.61 A decision of a multilateral development bank to fund a project in a given location might 
affect a particular indigenous group occupying or with traditional ties to the area.62 By the latter, I 
mean an activity of an IO affecting, for instance, indigenous peoples in general. Examples include the 
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negotiation and adoption of the UNDRIP and other instruments setting out the rights of indigenous 
peoples in international law.63  
2.3.1 Standard-setting and policy-making activities of international organizations  
IOs and other bodies are frequently used as fora for the setting of standards that would affect 
indigenous peoples. This is most evident with regard to the process of the development of the 
UNDRIP and its adoption by the GA. This instrument goes to the heart of indigenous peoples’ affairs 
and concerns, and its development by states and UN bodies clearly demonstrates the power exercised 
by the latter over indigenous peoples.64 Other instruments on indigenous peoples’ rights developed in 
international fora include the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the ILO 
Convention No. 169, and the draft Nordic Sámi Convention.65 
WIPO, a ‘central institution of global economic governance’66 that among other things develops laws 
and policies relating to intellectual property,67 carries out standard-setting activities affecting 
indigenous peoples in respect of their traditional knowledge. The intellectual property framework 
developed under WIPO’s auspices is broadly incompatible with indigenous understandings of 
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expression: intellectual property rights are time-limited, 
designed to provide a temporary monopoly to incentivise and compensate innovation; to gain 
protection, an idea or work must be novel, have an identifiable inventor or creator, and have been 
invented or created by a specific act. 68 Traditional knowledge, by contrast, is ‘a living body of 
knowledge that is developed, sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a 
community, often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identity’.69 Ideas are not commodities but are 
collectively held, and some stewards of knowledge may never be authorised to share that 
knowledge.70 The WIPO framework is therefore unable to provide protection to many forms of 
traditional knowledge, which is left vulnerable to misappropriation and “biopiracy”.71 Recognition of 
this led to the establishment in 2000 of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
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Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (“IGC”),72 which is 
undertaking textual negotiations on draft instruments related to traditional knowledge, traditional 
cultural expressions, and genetic resources.73 It has produced Draft Articles on the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, and a consolidated 
document relating to intellectual property and genetic resources.74 There is a great deal at stake for 
indigenous peoples in these negotiations: ‘[f]or a people whose relationship of dependence with their 
ecosystem is first nature and a basis for their knowledge and socioeconomic and cultural 
life…intellectual property’s role in knowledge enclosure is a fundamental human rights issue 
bordering on life and survival’.75 The IGC process has the potential to address indigenous peoples’ 
‘claims for cultural recognition’ and ‘significantly accommodat[e] an alternative indigenous 
understanding of knowledge’.76 The conclusion of international agreements on genetic resources, 
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions ‘would be a landmark in international law 
and in IP law, and could potentially contribute to the prevention of their misappropriation’.77 
The traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples is also implicated in activities under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (“CBD”).78 The Convention itself recognises ‘the close and traditional 
dependence of many indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological 
resources’,79 and its Article 8(j) provides that states parties shall, subject to national legislation: 
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the 
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices. 
Another article of particular relevance to indigenous peoples is Article 8, providing for the 
establishment by states of protected areas: such mechanisms have historically served as an instrument, 
whether intentional or not, for the exclusion of indigenous peoples from their traditional lands and 
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territories.80 The Convention did not provide for the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous 
peoples to the establishment of protected areas. In addition, the Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit Sharing, developed under the Convention’s auspices, has implications for the protection of 
indigenous traditional knowledge, innovations and practices associated with genetic resources.81 
Further examples of IOs affecting indigenous peoples include the FAO which through its Committee 
on Food Security develops policy recommendations and guidance on food security and nutrition;82 
indigenous peoples are, among others, affected by food insecurity and thus recommendations and 
guidance emanating from the Committee will have effects on indigenous peoples. UNESCO has a 
broad mandate to set standards in the fields of education, culture, science, and communication and 
information,83 which as the organization recognises may ‘provide opportunities and have significant 
impacts for’ indigenous peoples84 as it ‘addresses key concerns of indigenous peoples such as 
endangered languages, mother tongue education, education for sustainable development, indigenous 
knowledge in scientific and environmental decision-making, and building knowledge societies’.85 The 
IMO is a specialized agency of the UN through which states set standards in maritime safety, the 
efficiency of navigation, and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,86 including of 
particular relevance to indigenous peoples, rules on heavy fuel oil, the avoidance of marine mammals, 
greenhouse gases and black carbon, underwater noise, sewage and greywater discharge, and invasive 
species through the IMO’s Marine Environmental Protection Committee and its Sub-Committee on 
Pollution Prevention and Response.87 
The ISA makes rules, regulations and procedures relating to prospecting, exploration and exploitation 
of mineral resources in the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.88 Indigenous peoples living traditional lifestyles on coasts and islands are likely to be 
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disproportionately affected by mining in the Area.89 Relying on the oceans and the seabed for food, 
health, cultural practices and livelihoods, indigenous peoples will face the adverse consequences of 
any negative effects on the marine environment.90 Indeed, deep sea exploration has already had 
adverse impacts on the livelihoods of indigenous peoples in the Pacific, including in Tonga and Papua 
New Guinea, due to disturbances of fish populations and negative effects on water quality.91 The 
development of policies and regulations related to deep sea mining, especially with regard to 
environmental protection, is therefore of great concern to coastal and island indigenous peoples. 
States acting collectively by way of negotiation and adoption of international agreements on 
environmental matters can also affect peoples. In addition to the CBD, noted above, indigenous 
peoples have been particularly affected (in a positive way) by the development of the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which sets out a range of control measures to eliminate 
the production and use of specified persistent organic pollutants, eliminate trade in specified persistent 
organic pollutants, minimise emissions of those that cannot be eliminated, and avoid the production 
and use of new persistent organic pollutants.92 Persistent organic pollutants such as heavy metals, 
pesticides, industrial chemicals and pharmaceuticals disproportionately affect indigenous peoples in 
the Arctic,93 as they are transported through atmospheric and oceanic currents and ingested by 
wildlife; they are found in the fatty tissues of animals, increasing in concentration at higher levels of 
the food chain.94 Northern indigenous peoples, due to their diets that include animals at the top level 
of Arctic food chains, are thereby exposed to high levels of persistent organic pollutants, resulting in 
adverse effects on health.  
In addition to standard-setting, IOs may make policies affecting specific peoples. One instance of this 
is the effect of EU legislation on Arctic indigenous peoples’ communities.95 European Directive 
83/129/EEC of 1982 prohibited the importation into the European Economic Community of skins and 
other products derived from seal pups.96 While the makers of the directive did not appear to expect 
any adverse effects on indigenous peoples, and indeed the directive in its preamble recalled that 
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traditionally practiced hunting does not harm seal pups and is ‘a natural and legitimate occupation, 
conducted with due respect for the balance of nature, and part of indigenous peoples’ traditional way 
of life and economy’, the ban in fact triggered the collapse of the EU market for seal furs.97 In turn, 
this affected the Inuit economy, which depended on the cash income from the fur market.98 Although 
a later version of the directive made an exception for Inuit hunting, Canadian Inuit were still 
disproportionately affected, and in any case the market had long since collapsed.99 This example 
shows that the regulatory acts of IOs may affect not only peoples within their member states, but also 
peoples who are “distant strangers” or “global others” due to being located in a state, or states, that are 
not members of the organization.100  
2.3.2 Decision-making activities of international organizations 
In addition to standards, IOs can make specific decisions which affect peoples. This can be seen, for 
example, in decisions to finance development projects. Development projects financed by IOs can 
have significant adverse impacts on indigenous peoples, who ‘tend to be the most negatively affected 
by development projects that have an impact on land tenure or use, due to their strong cultural 
attachment and economic dependence to the land they traditionally occupy’.101 Conversely, 
development financing has the potential to safeguard indigenous peoples’ rights and help them to 
realise self-determination, if done at indigenous peoples’ own initiatives and in accordance with their 
wishes.  
For instance, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (“IFAD”) is an international 
financial institution and specialized agency of the UN focusing on agriculture and rural development, 
established in 1977 with the objective of mobilising resources for agricultural development in 
developing countries.102 Given that it is an under-studied IO,103  a short explanation of its mandate and 
functions is in order. IFAD provides loans, grants and a debt sustainability mechanism to developing 
countries, particularly the ‘poorest food deficit countries’, for projects and programmes to increase 
food production and improve the nutritional level of the poorest populations.104 In fulfilling its 
objective, it is mandated to provide financing:105 
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primarily for projects and programmes specifically designed to introduce, expand or improve food 
production systems and to strengthen related policies and institutions within the framework of national 
priorities and strategies, taking into consideration: the need to increase food production in the poorest 
deficit countries; the potential for increasing food production in other developing countries; and the 
importance of improving the nutritional level of the poorest populations in developing countries and 
the conditions of their lives. 
It sources finance by soliciting contributions from member states, as well as from non-member states 
and other sources, in periodic replenishment cycles.106 Its three most recent replenishment cycles have 
each raised over US$1 billion from member states,107 and in 2019 IFAD expects to approve US$1.7 
billion in loans and grants.108 In total, as of January 2019 IFAD had disbursed US$20.9 billion in 
loans and grants, and mobilised a further $28.6 billion from other sources.109 IFAD’s activities affect 
indigenous peoples: its interventions have the potential to support indigenous peoples’ self-
determination and development, but conversely could have adverse effects. As indigenous peoples 
account for a disproportionate proportion of the global rural poor,110 IFAD has identified indigenous 
peoples living in rural areas of developing countries as ‘an important target group’ of the projects and 
programmes that it supports.111 It has supported many rural development programmes where 
indigenous peoples are the major beneficiaries.112 As a corollary, if one of its interventions goes 
wrong, such a programme could adversely affect indigenous communities. Indeed, IFAD found of its 
own work that ‘in many cases positive impact on indigenous peoples has been limited’ because 
indigenous peoples were not sufficiently considered in the planning process.113 
In addition to funding decisions, decisions of IOs regarding field programme and projects may also 
affect specific indigenous peoples. For instance, the UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO and FAO all carry out 
field programmes and projects which, if poorly designed or implemented, may impact on indigenous 
peoples’ lands, resources and livelihoods. 
More specific decisions affecting indigenous peoples are those of the ISA regarding licenses to 
explore and extract mineral resources, as referred to above, as well as decisions of the UNESCO 
World Heritage Committee (“WHC”) regarding the protection of natural and cultural heritage. 
Regarding the latter, a significant number of the properties designated as World Heritage Sites by 
UNESCO’s WHC under the 1972 World Heritage Convention114 are located in the territories of 
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indigenous peoples.115 According to the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage, 
over a third of sites designated for their significant “natural” heritage are home to indigenous 
peoples.116 Such a designation as “natural” obscures the fact that for indigenous peoples, nature and 
culture and fundamentally entwined. 117 Moreover, a study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (“EMRIP”) found that the establishment of World Heritage Sites ‘often have a 
negative impact on indigenous peoples because, often, their ancestral rights over their lands and 
territories are not respected or protected’.118 In some World Heritage areas, indigenous peoples have 
been subject to restrictions and prohibitions of traditional land-use practices,119 and in other cases 
have even been forcibly removed.120 In this way, the activities of the WHC in implementing the 
World Heritage Convention can perpetuate ‘the dynamics of colonialism’121  and the denial of self-
determination for indigenous peoples. In several cases human rights treaty bodies have expressed 
concerns about violations of indigenous rights in World Heritage areas.122 Conversely, the inclusion 
of an indigenous site on the World Heritage List can positively benefit an indigenous people, 
including by giving it increased leverage in negotiations with a national government over a proposed 
development.123 The number of indigenous sites designated as World Heritage sites is likely to 
increase in future since that the WHC actively encourages nominations from under-represented 
regions and of under-represented types of properties.124 
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2.3.3 Decisions of international courts and tribunals 
The ICJ, as the pre-eminent international court, can through its decisions have profound effects on 
peoples. Two strands of its jurisprudence are particularly relevant. The first is its case law on self-
determination. Considered in detail in Chapter 5, these cases generally deal with situations where a 
people has been denied its right to self-determination, often in the context of decolonization. In 
reaching findings on the rights of peoples, these ICJ decisions have the potential to fundamentally 
uplift a people’s prospects, or, alternatively, dash hopes of emancipation. The South West Africa 
advisory opinion, which concerned South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia, affected the 
people of Namibia in a positive sense in that by finding that the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw its administration 
immediately, the Court contributed to the eventual freedom of the people of Namibia from foreign 
domination.125 In the East Timor decision, the right of the people of East Timor to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources was at stake: Australia and Indonesia, which occupied East Timor, 
had set up a joint regime for exploiting the oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf off the coast 
of East Timor.126 The Wall proceedings concerned Israel’s construction of a wall which obstructed of 
the Palestinian people’s ability to exercise its right to self-determination;127 the Kosovo advisory 
opinion dealt with whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence was adopted in violation of 
international law.128 Most recently, the Chagos case concerned the separation of the Chagos 
Archipelago from Mauritius prior to the latter’s independence, and the continued administration of the 
Archipelago by the United Kingdom; its outcome affects the self-determination of the people of 
Mauritius, as well as that of the Chagossian people.129  
The second relevant strand of ICJ jurisprudence relates to border disputes. For instance, in the 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger) proceedings,130 the Court determined the course of the 
boundary between Burkina Faso and Niger. Recognising that doing so could affect the ‘nomadic and 
semi-nomadic populations’ along the border, the ICJ directed the parties to have due regard to their 
needs.131 Other decisions regarding border disputes may also impact on peoples living in the vicinity 
of borders at issue. In summary, the ICJ, by its decisions, are capable of having real effects on 
peoples. 
                                                             
125 South West Africa AO. 
126 East Timor, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 151. 
127 Wall AO. 
128 Kosovo. 
129 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory 
Opinion, 25 February 2019, General List No. 169 (“Chagos AO”). 
130 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger) (Judgment) [2013] ICJ Rep 44 (“Burkina Faso/Niger”). 
131 Ibid [112]. 
43 
 
The decisions of other international courts and tribunals (“ICTs”) may also affect peoples. For 
instance, the outcomes of proceedings in investor-state tribunals can affect indigenous peoples. 
According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, this is partly down to 
the nature of international investment itself.132 Investment agreements protect and regulate the 
property rights of investors related to the exploitation or use of land and resources, which can directly 
conflict with the ‘pre-existing – but not necessarily formally recognized and titled’ property rights of 
indigenous peoples under international human rights law.133 Inadequate provision for indigenous 
peoples’ rights in international investment agreements, as well as the actual or perceived threat of 
enforcement of investor protections under investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) and the 
associated regulatory chill, can have serious impacts on indigenous peoples’ rights.134 Down the line, 
approximately 30 percent of ISDS proceedings relate to the extractive or energy industries, where the 
majority of respondents are states with significant populations of indigenous peoples in whose 
territories the exploited resources are found.135  
2.3.4 International administration 
Another way in which IOs can dominate peoples is through international administration. The UN has 
on occasion assumed quasi-governmental powers over territories. The UN administration of East 
Timor between October 1999 and May 2002 exemplifies this. There, the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”)136 totally assumed the administrative functions of the 
state, becoming ‘in every respect the formal government of the country’.137 UNTAET had sovereign 
control over a territory: in effect, UNTAET was a trusteeship administration ‘preparing a territory for 
independence’.138 Legislative and executive powers were vested in the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator, a single individual who had the sole authority to 
issue regulations as national legislation. 
The population of East Timor, meanwhile, were excluded from the transitional administration, both in 
its planning and operational phases.139 The policies of UNTAET ‘consistently…underemphasized 
local participation and capacity-building with the effect of compromising the strategic objectives of 
democracy, effective administration, and rule of law’.140 The sole mechanism by which the people of 
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East Timor were able to participate in decision-making processes was through a non-elected body of 
14 East Timorese representatives appointed and chaired by the Transitional Administrator.141 The 
number of members was deliberately limited by UNTAET to facilitate swift decision-making.142 From 
the perspective of the people of East Timor, however, this did not allow for the full and active 
participation of East Timorese that was required in order for the transition to independence to be 
effective.143 The National Council for Timorese Resistance, a body broadly representative of the East 
Timorese people, proposed a dual political structure to implement decisions during the transitional 
period, but the UN ‘ignored their aspirations’.144  
The administration of East Timor, while extreme, is by no means the only example of international 
administration assuming de facto governmental authority: others include the UN Transitional 
Executive Authority in West Irian,145 the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia,146 the 
UN Interim Administration in Kosovo,147 and the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia.148 
2.3.5 International organizations as corrective mechanisms 
Some IOs are designed to, or in effect, review the actions of states so as to correct failures regarding 
the protection of the rights of peoples within their jurisdiction. States are not always capable of or 
willing to adequately protect marginalised or minority peoples. ICTs, as well as other IOs, can 
directly or indirectly exercise a form of review over states. An early example of this is the League of 
Nations’ mandates and minority protection regimes, whereby inhabitants of a mandate territory could 
petition the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission, and members of a minority group within 
certain states could petition the League’s Minority Section, to report violations by the mandatory 
power or state of the mandate or minority rights, respectively.149 Although in both systems the right of 
petition was held by individuals, rather than peoples as such, in practice petitions were sometimes 
made by representatives of peoples.150 Under both systems, the power of the League was restricted,151 
but the petitions systems offered a voice, however limited, to peoples and minorities, serving as an 
early blueprint on which later efforts could build.  
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The UN, too, has held emancipatory promise for many. From its early days, the peoples of non-self 
governing territories have attempted to access the Trusteeship Committee as well as other bodies to 
air grievances regarding violations of self-determination and gain relief from the international 
community.152 From the 1980s, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations provided a vessel for 
indigenous peoples’ representatives to draw attention to state violations of their rights;153 a similar 
function is today held by the UNPFII. The Human Rights Committee hears complaints from members 
of indigenous peoples.154 Other examples of IOs that can act so as to remedy state violations of 
peoples’ rights include the European Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”), the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights and the UNESCO WHC.155 
2.4 Conclusion 
These examples demonstrate that IOs and their member states are capable of interfering, by virtue of 
the exercise of public authority, with peoples—the activities of the former can directly and negatively 
affect the rights and interests of the latter. In addition, IOs can positively affect peoples’ rights, 
including by reviewing and remedying states’ violations of peoples’ rights. It is at once this possibility 
of interference coupled with the emancipatory potential that constitutes the structural position of 
domination that IOs and other intergovernmental fora occupy, by virtue of the location of public 
authority within them. Peoples have often been and continue to be dominated and exploited by other 
groups using state power to do so; it is argued that, in addition, the power of IOs can serve to threaten 
self-determination. As Sinclair states, ‘[t]he proliferation of IOs and the expansion of their legal 
powers’ may in fact be ‘indistinguishable from [international law’s] originary “civilising mission”’.156 
Yet alongside such concerns, the emancipatory promise of IOs for peoples has never entirely been 
lost. 
One objection could be that these examples in fact represent the activities of states impacting on 
peoples by acting through IOs, and so it is the states-peoples relationship that is at issue, rather than a 
direct relationship between peoples and IOs. The states-peoples relationship remains pertinent, of 
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course: states do remain central to formal IGOs, and actions taken by states could go some way to 
remedying the problem described above.157 However, IOs are in both a horizontal and a vertical 
relationship with states.158 Although in some ways they are the agents of states, they are also capable 
of exercising power autonomously in their own right.  
3. Existing law does not provide an adequate remedy 
It has been demonstrated that IOs and peoples exist in a structural relation of domination of the latter 
by the former. This has the ability to affect the self-determination of peoples, meaning that a remedy 
is called for in accordance with the law of self-determination. This section will examine the existing 
law on the internal self-determination of peoples, finding that it is not an adequate remedy. It then 
assesses emergent norms and practice regarding civil society participation, particularly through non-
governmental organisations (“NGOs”), and finds that such rules are not an adequate remedy either.  
3.1 Domestic political participation of peoples 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the law on self-determination has developed so as to provide for an 
internal aspect of self-determination, one element of which is the right of a people to participate in the 
political affairs of the state in which it is located. The existence of such participatory rights at the 
national level raises the question: are these not sufficient to protect peoples’ rights in the global 
sphere? If a people is well-represented in the relevant domestic government, so such an argument 
would go, additional rights at the international level are not necessary. Rather, it is for the state to 
balance competing domestic interests. Indeed, to enable peoples’ voice at both domestic and 
international levels—“two bites of the apple”159—could give them too much influence over 
international regulation.160  
It is true that in some cases a state may be able to represent a people at the international level so as to 
protect its right to self-determination. This will be so where the interests of the state and the people 
broadly overlap on a given issue. Moreover, a people might hold a dominant, rather than marginal 
place in domestic society, leading to its preferred position being adopted as a matter of foreign policy. 
In such situations, the people would almost certainly not require an additional voice on the global 
stage. In the case of indigenous peoples, which are almost without exception in a non-dominant 
position, Charters proposes that they would need to provide FPIC to their representation by the 
state,161 which indeed seems to follow from the thrust of the law relating on FPIC.162 
                                                             
157 See further, Section 4 of this chapter. 
158 See Daugirdas (2016). 
159 The phrase “two bites of the apple” was used in the context of NGO participation by Reinisch and Irgel 
(2001) 132. 
160 Bluemel (2005) 75. 
161 Charters (2010) 231, 238. 
162 Discussed in detail in Chapter 3, section 2. 
47 
 
However, in most cases participatory rights at the domestic level are not enough. This is so for several 
reasons. First, often the interests of a people do not align with those of the relevant state, meaning that 
the state’s position in an international forum will be at odds with the interests of the people, even 
taking into account the people’s right to participate within the state.163 This can be seen in practice. In 
the Softwood Lumber dispute the USA alleged that a lower-than-market-value timber harvesting fee 
paid by Canadian lumber producers to the Canadian government constituted a subsidy inconsistent 
with WTO law. The position taken by the Canadian government in the WTO proceedings conflicted 
with that of the Interior Alliance, a group of indigenous nations in the midst of a decades-long legal 
battle for recognition of aboriginal title, from whose unceded traditional territories the timber was 
being harvested. Canada, in arguing that no subsidy existed, stated that the stumpage fee was not a 
“financial contribution” because the Canadian lumber harvesting companies had a property right to 
exploit the timber by virtue of their land tenures or licenses—a position that the Interior Alliance 
opposed due to the implications such an argument would have for indigenous land title.164 
Of course, for any position a government takes on the international stage, there will invariably be 
some group of people who do not agree. It is in the nature of a diverse democracy that competing 
domestic interests must be balanced.165 But a people, by virtue of its right to self-determination, is 
different from other domestic actors: it is not equivalent to a trade union, or an interest group, or a 
political party. Of course, it is not suggested here that such interest-based constituencies should not 
have a voice, or should necessarily have a lesser voice than indigenous peoples; in many cases IOs do 
enable the participation of these others, to a greater or lesser degree.166 This work remains neutral on 
such questions. The point is that the right to self-determination distinguishes a people from other 
domestic constituencies.167 In addition to having a claim to participate by virtue of being affected by a 
matter, or having relevant expertise to contribute, as any individual or group may have,168 a people 
also has the right to self-determination.  
Second, in many states it is the executive branch of government, rather than the legislature, which 
determines foreign policy and represents a state in IOs. Although the legislature may have input on 
decisions of considerable domestic importance—such as regarding wars—for individual citizens, 
there is ‘no chain of election and recall running from citizens through their governments to the state 
delegates which will take the political decisions in the various forums of the organizations’.169 
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Although this executive-led approach has advantages, including that executives are not bound to make 
majoritarian decisions and therefore are in principle able to protect minority interests,170 in practice 
the isolation of the conduct of international relations from accountability to minority groups can carry 
corresponding risks. Forms of internal self-determination which provide enhanced participation in the 
electoral process or a level of autonomy will not assist a people to participate in the formation of 
foreign policy in matters affecting it. 
Third, in practice, in a democratic state, a people may not in fact be able to exercise its right to 
internal self-determination in the first place. In addition, not all states are democratic. In these cases, 
internal political participation cannot assist a people to exercise voice in IOs which affect them. 
Fourth, a people can exist across state boundaries. For instance, the territory of the Kurds, an ethnic 
group who have asserted a right to self-determination, covers parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria;171 
the Sámi live in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia;172 and the territory of the Inuit encompasses 
part of Russia, the USA, Canada, and Denmark-Greenland.173 In cases like these it is unlikely that any 
one state can effectively represent the interests of the transnational people at the international level. 
The people may not be able to exercise their right to internal self-determination within all of the 
relevant states, and it is even less likely that the interests of the people and all of the relevant states 
will coincide.174  
Fifth, a number of different peoples, or a class of peoples, located in different states may share a 
common interest. In this situation, a domestic balancing of interests within each state will tend to 
mean that the shared interest is systematically obscured from view at the international level. For 
instance, indigenous peoples in all parts of the world share common interests, and have found it useful 
to unite in a global movement to advocate at the international level.175 Until indigenous peoples did 
so, they were largely disregarded by IOs.176 
Sixth, IOs themselves delegate authority to organs, such as executive boards or secretariats, in which 
not all member states are included, so that even if a state is a member of an organization, it does not 
have a voice in all activity of that organization. While such a delegation of powers can be practical,177 
it means that these organs, which ‘act on behalf of the international entity, and are not to be equated 
with the (collectivity of) states’,178 are less accountable to states. Secretariats, generally speaking, are 
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capable of exercising considerable bureaucratic power independently of their member states, for 
instance by steering or manipulating the decision-making of states through the management and 
organisation of information.179 If a secretariat’s activities affect a people, a state may not necessarily 
be able to represent that people, even if its position aligns with that of the people. A secretariat should, 
in theory, be accountable to member states, but in practice this may not happen.180  
Similarly, boards can exercise executive functions, and even independent governing and legislative 
functions within an institution.181 The activities of executive boards can impact upon strangers to the 
organization.182 In addition, while the boards of some organizations are constituted of the 
representatives of several member states, other boards, such as the European Commission and the 
Executive Council of the African Union, hold responsibility for specific policy areas;183 still others, 
such as the Executive Board of UNESCO, sit as individual experts rather than state representatives.184 
For a people affected by the activities of a board to have a voice only within its own state is 
manifestly inadequate. 
For all these reasons, so-called “internal” self-determination in the sense of the participation of 
peoples in domestic public affairs is not an adequate remedy to the problem of the dominance of 
peoples by IOs.  
3.2 Civil society participation in international organizations 
Is civil society participation a potential remedy? Since the 1990s, civil society participation in IOs has 
proliferated.185 The UN Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) has provided for consultative 
status since its inception,186 but in the late 20th century the number of NGOs taking up that status 
vastly increased.187 NGOs have played influential roles in a number of international lawmaking 
processes.188 The importance of public participation in, inter alia, decision-making relating to the 
environment has been progressively recognised.189 Even organizations that have been much criticised 
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for lack of transparency and public accountability, such as the WTO, have gradually opened the door 
to a measure of civil society participation.190 
A considerable bulk of literature advances intrinsic and instrumental justifications for NGO 
participation in global governance.191 Intrinsically speaking, it is argued that civil society participation 
contributes to combatting the democratic deficit in global governance and improving the legitimacy of 
IOs.192 More instrumentally, it is argued that NGOs are positioned to provide unique technical and 
practical expertise and information which governments cannot deliver, thereby improving the quality 
of outcomes; that NGOs can facilitate positive outcomes at meetings by researching and proposing 
political options and acting as bridge builders between different national positions; and that NGOs can 
monitor and report on domestic implementation of the outcomes of intergovernmental processes, as 
well as build domestic public support for such policies.193  
Legally, it has been proposed that participation in international lawmaking is an individual human 
right, derived from article 25 of the ICCPR—the right ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives’—and also potentially from an emerging principle of 
CIL, and that this right should in practice be exercised through NGO participation.194  
Although the participation of civil society, and individual participatory rights, are certainly valuable, 
as well as legally justifiable for the reasons cited above, it is not sufficient to remedy the problem of 
the domination of peoples by IOs, nor to enable peoples the full exercise of self-determination. This 
can be understood by reference to the political theory underlying group rights, outlined in the 
following subsection. 
3.2.2 Liberalism, multiculturalism, and peoples’ rights 
Within domestic, democratic societies, there is a well-documented structural bias against non-
dominant societal groups: ‘whenever minorities exist, democracy is prone to undermine their 
interests’.195 In an electoral political system in which all individuals enjoy formal equality, groups 
which have distinct interests from, but are numerically outweighed by, the rest of the population are 
persistently outvoted and hence under-represented. They are ‘in a very real sense political captives of 
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the majority’, who may monopolise political power with barely more than half of the votes.196 
Cultural factors also come into play: members of the majority are generally disproportionately 
represented in cultural elites, 197 and the “cultural imperialism” exercised by members of a more 
materially privileged, dominant group often leads to the elevation of their particular experiences and 
perspectives within democratic processes, at the expense of others.198 In addition, the majority may 
view a minority group with resentment, further diminishing their power.199 Hence, where structural 
inequalities exist, ‘formally democratic procedures are likely to reinforce them’.  200 The purported 
neutrality of the state is in fact ‘an affirmation of one particular way of life’.201 
National judicial processes may, furthermore, fail to protect non-dominant minority groups, as such 
processes tend to be dominated by judges belonging to dominant societal groups; in addition, 
“national interests”, as defined by majority-controlled political and governmental institutions, often 
prevail, or are at least accorded significant weight, in the courtroom.202  The indeterminacy of law 
itself creates space for judicial and other forms of official discretion, which may be used by those in 
power to oppress others in the name of higher values.203 The rule of law does not assist here, as it 
reproduces prior power configurations which privilege some and oppress others, ‘while masking this 
precisely by presenting itself as value neutral’.204 
While scholars initially conceived of this problem as relating to classical ethnic, religious and national 
minorities205—those ‘discrete and insular minorities’ referred to by the US Supreme Court in 
Carolene Products206—it is equally applicable to peoples within states, including indigenous peoples. 
The caveat must be added that a group which is in the numerical minority is not always powerless or 
discriminated against; indeed, powerful minorities can sometimes successfully influence domestic law 
and policy-making.207 Political interest groups are sometimes minority groups208 and, further, in some 
cases ethnic or racial minorities have been the dominant societal group, such as European colonial 
peoples in many parts of the world, white Afrikaners and English in South Africa under apartheid, the 
Tutsi in post-1994 Rwanda, and the Fulani in Nigeria.209 To clarify, a given group may have a certain 
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status (high or low), power (dominant or subordinate), and number (majority or minority), but the 
problem concerns those groups which are of low status or subordinate power—these often correlate—
while being either a majority or minority in numerical terms. This thesis does not intend to bolster the 
position of already dominant minorities. While all peoples inherently hold the right to self-
determination, meaning that in principle peoples which are dominant or form a majority within a state 
have a right to self-determination, in practice the specific rights only arise when there is a relationship 
of domination or oppression as between the state and the people.210 This is evident in Kymlicka’s 
framing of the problem:211 
A multination state which accords universal rights to all its citizens, regardless of group membership, 
may appear to be neutral between various national groups. But in fact it can (and often does) 
systematically privilege the majority nation…. All of these decisions can dramatically reduce the  
political power and cultural viability of a national minority, while enhancing that of the majority 
culture. 
Classical liberalism, the traditionally dominant school of thought in political theory, structurally 
underpins the problem of the disregard of minorities within states. Liberalism, which in broad terms is 
premised upon the polity as formed by a social contract created between a number of individuals, does 
not adequately account for the existence of minorities, nor for the structural discrimination they face. 
In its uncritical acceptance of the culturally homogenous nation-state, classical liberalism as 
exemplified in the works of philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, JS Mill and Jacques 
Rousseau does not consider the ‘heterogeneity of [hu]mankind and of the population of virtually 
every existing state’.212  While liberalism was cognisant of the problem of the “tyranny of the 
majority”,213 in that democratic majority rule was ‘not the government of each by himself, but of each 
by all the rest…the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people’,214 liberalism’s 
responses to this issue were characteristic of its atomic individualism in that they focused on 
individual rights and liberties as a counterpoint to the tyranny of the majority. There was no 
recognition of groups or collectives of individuals existing at a level between that of the individual 
and that of the state; if individual rights were protected, liberals assumed, minorities did not require 
further protection.215 
That polities are not universal and unified and that non-dominant groups face institutionalised 
domination and oppression led to the development of a different theory of justice, multiculturalism. 
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Recognising that group membership and cultural background is important to individuals,  216 and that 
the state cannot be neutral in practice but rather ‘tends to allow the values and practices of the 
majority culture to dominate’,217  multiculturalism asserts the necessity of group rights. As such, it 
better accounts for cultural diversity and the interests of minority groups, without sacrificing 
individual freedom.218 
A multiculturalist approach is evident in the account of procedural justice developed by Iris Marion 
Young, building on the work of Jurgen Habermas and Agnes Heller.219 This account is particularly 
relevant for refuting the notion that individual rights to participation at the international level are 
sufficient for the protection of the right of peoples to self-determination. For Young, justice requires 
that everyone who follows a norm ‘must in principle have an effective voice in its consideration and 
be able to agree to it without coercion’;220 a democratic decision is legitimate ‘only if all those 
affected by it are included in the process of discussion and decision-making’.221  Stressing that the 
bias against non-dominant groups can be counteracted ‘only by acknowledging and giving voice to 
the group differences’ within a democratic society, Young asserts that procedural justice requires that 
‘a democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of 
the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or 
disadvantaged’.222 
Multiculturalism thus conceptually underpins substantive and procedural group rights, including the 
rights of minorities as well as the rights of peoples to internal self-determination.223 In response to the 
problem thus identified, minority rights emerged in international law—albeit framed as individual 
rights applicable by virtue of membership of a collective—in legal instruments such as article 27 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),224 the European Framework 
Convention on National Minorities,225 the UN Minorities Declaration,226 the Lund Recommendations 
on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life,227 and the OSCE Copenhagen 
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Document.228 These documents contain, alongside more substantive rights, the rights of members of 
minority groups to participate in public affairs at the domestic level.229 Internal self-determination, 
too, is underpinned by multiculturalism’s recognition of the value of the autonomy and political 
participation of groups. 
Returning to the global level, liberalism, in addition to being the dominant tradition of political 
philosophy supporting the emergence of the state, was also fundamental to the advent of the 
international legal system in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia and strongly influential in its 
subsequent development.230 Publicists such as Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, and most notably 
Emmerich de Vattel developed theories of international law as a discrete body of law between 
consenting sovereign states,231 which assumes the individual-state dichotomy, the coinciding of the 
nation and the state, and thus the erasure of other groups. In turn, the positivists of the long nineteenth 
century232 built on this tradition of liberal thought to elaborate foundational doctrines of international 
law which have had continuing effects on the contemporary legal system.233 These basic positivist 
doctrines, in particular that of sovereignty, were forged out of, and complicit in, the colonial 
encounter: sovereignty adhered only to civilised states, excluding ‘uncivilised’ non-European 
societies, which operated so as to ‘legally account for the expansion of Europe’.234 In this way, liberal 
thought carried through international legal positivism worked so as to exclude and erase from legal 
subjectivity or personality not only less powerful nations and ethnic groups within European states, 
but non-European peoples in general.235 Liberalism later underpinned the rise of individual human 
rights, as well as self-determination in the decolonization period, in that while the notion of who could 
be sovereign had expanded, a self-determining “people” was viewed as the aggregate population of a 
state or territory, and human rights were only enforceable by individuals as against states.236 
Liberalism has failed to protect group rights both domestically and internationally. Individual rights to 
participate in global governance, exercised through civil society representation, are similarly 
inadequate. Individual rights must be supplemented by group rights, both in terms of procedural and 
substantive rights. Yet while the rights of peoples are recognised in relation to states, this is not the 
case with respect to IOs. Theories of the participation of civil society framed in terms of individual 
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rights to participate and shaped by liberal democratic values, if they do not account for group rights, 
reproduce the structural inequalities inherent in classical liberalism at the international level.  
Indeed, the idea that in theory a focus on individual and civil society participation tends to obscure 
prior power dynamics and reproduce existing oppressions, therefore damaging the interests of non-
dominant groups, is supported by reference to observed practice. Just as surface neutrality, or formal 
equality means that participants from dominant groups in practice have more influence in local and 
national political participation as described above, the same dynamic occurs in global governance. In 
IOs that allow observer participation, many more NGOs from the Global North participate than NGOs 
from the Global South.237 The former have much greater capacity and resources, and it is likely that 
their representatives would be taken more seriously by the delegates of powerful states due to identity 
factors similar to those which play a part at the local level.  
In summary, the idea of an individual right to participate in the international legal order, exercised 
through NGO and civil society participation, is underpinned by liberalist political philosophy which 
has been shown to be inherently flawed with respect to the interests of non-dominant minority groups. 
To account for group interests, multiculturalism informs us, substantive and procedural group rights 
are required—in both domestic and global governance. The importance of individual participation in 
the international legal order, for other reasons, is certainly not disputed here. However, it should be 
supplemented by procedural rights for non-dominant minority groups. 
3.2.3 Peoples are not equivalent to NGOs 
 In addition to the concerns drawn from political philosophy, there remains a fundamental distinction 
between self-determining peoples and the memberships of NGOs and other civil society groups. As 
Koivurova and Heinamaki write:238  
It would seem fair to distinguish between indigenous peoples and other groups when it comes to 
representation in international law: if nothing else, indigenous peoples’ organisations represent peoples, 
not interest-based constituencies such as the members of environmental organisations. 
International law has agreed that a “people” is a kind of group deserving of extra protection. While 
some may wonder at the underlying reason—why, after all, should international law care about 
groups,239 let alone groups of this specific kind—the fact remains that a people entitled to self-
determination is not equivalent to an NGO.240 The rationale for NGO participation is often argued to 
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include their ability to provide expertise and knowledge not otherwise available to global governance 
bodies—such as environmental organisations holding specialised technical information. Such a 
rationale does not apply, at least in the same way, to peoples. Many indigenous peoples have a history 
of self-governance and of entering into relations with states as sovereign nations in their own right.241 
Furthermore, the representatives of indigenous peoples are generally accountable to the members of 
the indigenous people, who have elected or appointed them, unlike NGOs in general.242 This is not to 
say that peoples should necessarily be entitled to a level of participation over and above that of NGOs, 
or that of other groups and individuals. It is merely to suggest that the underlying reasons justifying 
participation are different, and may therefore warrant different forms of participation in different 
circumstances. Unlike cases should not be treated as like. 
In addition, observer mechanisms for NGOs are often not accessible to indigenous peoples, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. In brief, indigenous peoples are often not constituted as non-governmental 
organisations; indeed, many indigenous peoples’ organisations can be said to be governmental in 
nature, so that indigenous peoples may be unwilling to seek observer accreditation even if they are 
technically eligible. They may not meet the requirements for accreditation, due to the poor fit between 
traditional organisational and governmental structures and the requirements designed for Western 
NGOs. 
4. Relations between international organizations and peoples justify additional remedies 
This chapter has so far demonstrated that public authority has shifted from the national level to the 
global level. IOs and other global governance bodies have accrued considerable public power, and 
their activities can directly affect peoples. There is a structural relation of the dominance of peoples 
by IOs and states acting collectively through them. In this light, internal self-determination in the 
sense of political participation in, or autonomy from, national governments is not sufficient to protect 
the right of peoples to self-determination. Nor is civil society participation in global governance an 
adequate means by which a people can self-determine.  
A further evolution in the law of self-determination is therefore warranted. By reference to Chapter 1, 
the law of self-determination has proved its dynamism; it has expanded to encompass additional 
facets as required to remedy specific situations posing a threat to the ongoing process of self-
determination. It is apparent that the state-people relationship is not the only relationship that is 
relevant to a people’s exercise of its right to self-determination. Also pertinent is the relationship 
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between peoples and IOs, as well as states acting through such organizations. This is a sui generis 
relation requiring a remedy, which the law of self-determination can and should evolve to provide. 
4.1 A right of peoples to participate in global governance 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1 above, the procedural rights of non-dominant peoples are necessary to 
protect their substantive rights. An individual right of members of peoples to participation is not 
sufficient. It is therefore submitted that the law of self-determination supports a right of peoples to 
participate in global governance. Alongside and in addition to rights to political participation in 
national governance, peoples should have, by virtue of the principle of self-determination, the right to 
participate internationally. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the scope of the right and its 
corresponding obligations, the question of who may exercise the right, as well as its implementation 
and limitations.  
At the risk of introducing unnecessary confusion with existing terminology, this right can be viewed 
as the “external” aspect of self-determination’s participatory element, by reference to the state. Just as 
peoples have the right to participate in national public affairs (“internal” to the state), this right would 
protect their participation externally, in global governance.243 Similarly, some might choose to frame 
it as an element of “external self-determination” more broadly.244 However one looks at it, the right is 
aimed at remedying the problem, identified and outlined above, of IOs’ domination over, and 
disregard of, peoples. 
Of course, such a right would not constitute the entire content of self-determination. As Xanthaki 
notes, states are ‘eager to ‘fill’ the meaning of the right to self-determination with democracy and 
participation, as an attempt to set the external aspect of the right – and secession – aside’.245 But as 
seen in Chapter 1, the law of self-determination is multifaceted; while a position is not taken in this 
work on whether a right to secession exists, the existence of a participatory element does not preclude 
the possibility, nor the existence of other political or economic rights that may fall under the broad 
umbrella of self-determination. 
In many cases the right will require participation in a reactive sense: for instance, an IO in the process 
of making a decision will be obliged to give an affected people the opportunity to be heard. States 
carrying out intergovernmental negotiations on an issue of fundamental concern to indigenous peoples 
will be required to enable the participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives. An international 
court making a decision affecting a people that is not a state will have a duty to ascertain that people’s 
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views and wishes—which does not necessarily imply that the affected people require standing as 
parties. 
But the right to participate may also require opportunities for proactive participation: the initiation by 
a people of their own participation. For instance, taking into account the potential for IOs to help 
peoples realise self-determination, peoples require a forum at the international level by which they 
may, upon their own initiative, raise concerns about violations of their rights by states. For 
international courts and tribunals, this means standing as a party able to initiate proceedings, rather 
than the ability to participate as an amicus curiae or intervener. 
4.2 The identity of the right-holders 
So far this work has deliberately left the term “peoples” unexplained. I do not intend to offer a 
definition; to fully explore the concept would require its own full-length study.246 Although some 
would emphasise the necessity of defining the unit which is entitled to exercise a right in order to 
make that right operational,247 in light of self-determination’s evolving, remedial, process-oriented 
nature and the ways in which the “peoples” who can invoke it are an expanding category, the term’s 
very uncertainty is necessary to its emancipatory potential. Rather, a constructivist approach is more 
appropriate. Such an approach recognises that a people is not an ‘organic whole preceding its self-
reflective and…political coming into being’.248 The problem with such a ‘primordialist or essentialist’ 
approach is that simply because a group of people may share some characteristic, such as a shared 
territory, culture or language, they might not necessarily seek to self-determine.249 In addition, in the 
words of Yael Tamir:250 
all attempts to single out a particular set of objective features – be it a common history, collective 
destiny, language, religion, territory, climate, race, ethnicity – as necessary and sufficient for the 
definition of a nation have ended in failure. Although all these features have been mentioned as 
characteristic of some nations, no nation will have all of them. 
Rather, a constructivist approach, recognising that a nation is a construct existing ‘when its members 
believe that it does’,251 holds that a people is constructed by its own members ‘dialogically and 
politically’, and ‘is always the result of a political reinterpretation of [characteristics such as ethnicity] 
as founding a particular distinct collective that aspires to self-determine’.252 As Frédéric Mégret puts 
it:253 
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the existence of a people does not precede their political coming into being. The business of 
guaranteeing the right to self-determination cannot be first and foremost that of finding peoples so that 
they can be allowed to engage in a politics of their own. Rather, the concept of what constitutes a 
people is deeply enmeshed in the actual manifestation of self-determination by particular peoples, and 
the search for its political recognition. 
The notion of a “people”, therefore, is not ‘sharply defined by universal applicable criteria’, but 
embodies ‘a continuous process in which claims and practice in numerous specific cases are 
abstracted in the wider institutions of international society, then made specific again at the moment of 
application’.254  
It is worth noting in the case of indigenous peoples that although no universally accepted definition 
exists255 and indigenous peoples themselves have resisted attempts to define them,256 of assistance are 
the working definition in the Martínez-Cobo report257 as well as the indicia laid out in the 
International Law Association’s 2011 report258 and the statement of coverage in ILO Convention No. 
169.259 It is a matter of consensus that indigenous peoples are “peoples” with the right to self-
determination.260 
A “firewall” between “peoples” and “minorities” has long existed in international law—the former 
entitled to self-determination and the latter merely entitled to minority rights261—largely motivated by 
fears regarding secession.262 However, the distinction between peoples and minorities may be more 
illusory than real,263 especially in light of the extension of self-determination to indigenous peoples,264 
and as demonstrated in recent research showing that minority rights and “internal self-determination” 
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cover substantially the same ground.265 Further support for this idea is found in the argument that 
minority rights are themselves justified as a compensation for the exclusion of some groups from 
being able to hold sovereign power by way of external self-determination.266 Indeed, in the context of 
participatory rights, it is conceivable that the distinction could break down: a connection to territory is 
not needed, and so the right could potentially be exercised by classical minorities and other non-
territorial groups.267 However, for the purposes of this work it is not necessary to decide the point. 
The distinction between indigenous peoples and other peoples entitled to self-determination is 
relevant for the exercise of the right. Under the accepted position in international law, the right of 
peoples—in the classical sense—to self-determination includes the right to external self-
determination, which can be exercised by way of secession from a state.268 By contrast, for indigenous 
peoples, the accepted position is that self-determination operates internally, and by way of rights 
related to lands, natural resources and culture.269 These differences have implications for the matters 
in which participation is to be exercised. Below it will be argued that whether or not a people is 
affected by a given global governance process, and the degree to which they are affected, is one 
determinant of whether and how the right is to be implemented.270 On this basis it can be said that, 
non-self-governing territories, for instance, have a strong claim to participate in UN processes 
regarding decolonization under the UN Charter, such as the proceedings of the Trusteeship 
Committee. Indigenous peoples will have a strong claim to participate in, among other things, 
standard-setting processes affecting the environment and natural resources. This thesis does not intend 
to “group together” indigenous and other peoples in respect of the implementation of the right.  
4.3 Who represents the right-holder? 
A related issue is, who is the proper representative to participate on behalf of a people in a global 
governance process, and who should determine such a question? The problem of who is representative 
of a given people may well be a fraught one characterised by internal politics: think of the competing 
peoples’ organizations in South West Africa, for instance.271 States have expressed a concern, in the 
context of peoples’ participation in IOs, to ensure that peoples’ representatives are legitimate 
representatives of the people.272  
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It is for a people itself to determine who is representative of it.273 In the domestic context, the dangers 
of allowing a state to decide who to “consult” are well recognised.274 At the global level, therefore, it 
should be up to a people to decide who participates on its behalf in a matter affecting it. In general 
peoples have their own organizations and institutions with internal structures and mechanisms for 
ensuring accountability to their members, as well for electing leaders and deciding which individuals 
may represent the people externally. Some peoples’ organizations, such as national liberation 
movements and indigenous peoples’ organizations, are already well recognised by the international 
community, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) as representative of the Palestinian 
people, the Front Polisario for the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara, the Sámi Parliaments for the 
Sámi, the Inuit Circumpolar Council for the Inuit people, or the Confederation of the Six Nations for 
the Iroquois. Peoples’ representative organizations, like any layer of government, may well face 
challenges in fairly representing all individuals and minorities within the group; the existence of an 
“official” representative voice may close off ‘further, alternative or subaltern voices’ that are silenced 
due to the idea of a singular, reified “people”.275 But this issue is common to all entities purporting to 
represent a large number of people, and is not a reason to differentiate peoples’ participation from that 
of states. There may be hard cases where an IO is faced with two or more entities both purporting to 
represent the same people; in such a situation, if there is doubt as to who is the proper representative 
the answer could be “both”. States and IOs should not use representativity concerns as a pretext for 
exclusion; this is an unavoidable risk. 
The matter of representativity gains an additional dimension when an activity of an IO represents a 
class of peoples: when WIPO, for instance, is setting standards regarding the traditional knowledge of 
indigenous peoples, who is properly to represent the indigenous peoples of the world? This concerns a 
relation between states and an IO, on the one hand, and a class of peoples, on the other. Here, too, 
indigenous peoples should decide amongst themselves who is qualified to represent them: in cases 
like this, indigenous peoples have formed their own coalitions and caucuses with internal 
organizational structures to determine who is to participate on behalf of the global class.276  
4.4 Obligations 
Who holds correlative obligations? The existence of a collective right requires some person to be 
subject to a duty.277 As noted by Judge Weeramantry in the East Timor opinion, the notion of duties 
corresponding to the right of self-determination ‘has not received the same degree of analysis’ as the 
right, even though ‘[t]he existence of a right is juristically incompatible with the absence of a 
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corresponding duty’ and to argue otherwise is ‘to empty the right of its essential content and, thereby, 
to contradict the existence of the right itself’.278 The theory of IOs covered earlier in this chapter, by 
which they are both, to some extent, the agents of states, as well as autonomous actors in their own 
right, suggests that correlative obligations should be held by both states and IOs. This dual nature 
means that both states and IOs should hold obligations in order for the right to be effective. Each of 
these obligations will be explored in turn. 
4.4.1 Obligations of states 
As self-determination is a human right, it is appropriate to draw on international human rights law in 
discussing the scope of the obligations. It is commonly said that states are obliged to ‘respect, protect 
and fulfil’ human rights: the first entailing a negative obligation, the second an obligation to protect 
rights-holders from violations of the right by others, and the third an obligation to take positive steps 
to enable enjoyment of rights.279 Of this triumvirate, the third element is most relevant for our 
purposes. As expressed by the Human Rights Committee, the obligation of states to respect the rights 
contained in the ICCPR and ensure them to all individuals in their territory and subject to their control 
contains, in addition to a negative element, a positive requirement to adopt ‘legislative, judicial, 
administrative, educative and other appropriate measures to fulfil their legal obligations’.280 
Depending on the circumstances, this may require a state to fulfil its obligations on either or both of 
two levels: enabling a people to participate as part of the state’s own delegation; and promoting the 
participation of peoples in IOs more generally. 
For a state which has within its jurisdiction a people affected by the activities of a given IO, or by a 
matter under negotiation in an intergovernmental forum, fulfilling the right may require the state to 
include a representative of the affected people on its national delegation. In proceedings of an 
international court or tribunal affecting a people who are not entitled to standing as parties, fulfilling 
the right could require that a state, party to the case or with the ability to intervene, incorporates 
submissions made by a representative of the affected people into its own submissions. For example, as 
will be seen in Chapter 7, WTO dispute settlement panels, empirically speaking, only consider amicus 
curiae submissions when a state party appends them to its own submissions: in such circumstances, 
states parties have a duty to append amicus briefs of affected peoples or otherwise include them as an 
integral part of their own submissions.281 A state may also discharge its obligation in international 
courts and tribunals by including peoples’ representatives as speakers during oral proceedings.282 
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The erga omnes nature of self-determination suggests that the right is not just opposable against the 
state or states in which a people finds itself. Rather, all states have an obligation to promote the 
creation of opportunities within IOs, other intergovernmental fora and global governance bodies for 
peoples to participate in matters affecting them. States collectively have substantial control over the 
functioning of IOs, and have it within their power to amend procedural rules, create new bodies and 
mechanisms, or take other actions as necessary to enable the participation of peoples in existing IOs. 
Of course, no one state can do this alone, so all states are obliged to constructively work towards the 
fulfilment of the right, for instance by making proposals, making submissions in support, voting, and 
taking other actions as appropriate. When creating a new IO, states would be obliged to provide for 
the participation of peoples on the activities of the organization affecting them within the relevant 
constitutional documents and rules of procedure.  
4.4.2 Obligations of international organizations 
The “respect, protect, fulfil” framework can be applied by analogy to IOs—albeit, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 3, it is difficult on a strictly doctrinal basis to assign obligations to IOs. In theoretical 
terms, the obligations of IOs will come into play in (at least) three scenarios. Firstly, when an IO by 
some activity is affecting a people which is not located within any of its member states. Secondly, 
when a subsidiary organ of an IO, the membership of which is not representative of all member states 
of the organization, affects a people. Thirdly, in a situation where a state has not heard or has not 
adequately represented an affected people. Additional situations may also exist. When one of these 
conditions is met, the IO has an obligation to enable the people to participate. Some considerations for 
how this obligation should be implemented are laid out in Section 4.5 below; in short, it depends on 
how seriously the people is affected. 
4.4.3 Obligations of others 
In theory, global governance bodies which do not qualify as formal IOs—private or informal 
entities—should also hold obligations. As a matter of doctrinal public international law, the existence 
of such obligations are even harder to ground than those of IOs, so the matter will not be dwelled 
upon here. The bulk of this study will focus on the right of peoples to self-determination as against 
IGOs, as well as corresponding obligations of those organizations. The following chapters will assess 
the extent of doctrinal support for the right of peoples to participate in global governance and the 
corresponding obligations of states and IOs, and survey the practice of states and IOs in this regard. In 
this latter exercise, the practice of informal organizations, such as the Arctic Council, will become 
relevant to the extent that it adds to evidence of an existing norm and provides a model for the 




4.5 Implementation and limitations 
When considering the implementation of the right, two questions go hand in hand. First, what degree 
of participation is necessary to fulfil the right? Second, what limitations ought to apply to the exercise 
of the right? These questions will be examined in turn. 
4.5.1 Level of participation required 
It has rightly been pointed out that “participation” is an ambiguous term that ‘can seem to mean 
everything and nothing’.283 In the context of the right above outlined, what does participation entail? 
What degree of participation is required for the exercise of the right? One could draw an analogy with 
international instruments on the participatory rights of indigenous peoples to say that participation 
must be “full and effective”,284 but to do so simply raises the question of what constitutes “full” and 
“effective”. A better approach is to return to the theory of self-determination. By its logic, and at the 
risk of sounding circular, the answer is: that which enables the people concerned to self-determine. 
This will vary according to the situation, and can be expressed as what Claire Charters calls a 
“contextual-participation approach” which she defines as a ‘scale of participation ranging from the 
high-end, full participation, like that of states, with indigenous peoples’ consent sought, to lower-end 
participation, such as formal avenues for input’.285 The extent to which a people are affected by the 
matter at hand in a given governance process will affect the degree of participation required to 
implement the right: if the matter affects the core of a people’s ability to determine their own destiny, 
a greater degree of participation will be required for states and IOs to discharge their duty; on the 
other hand, if peoples’ issues are ‘only one of many concerns, and, for example, do not impinge 
directly on their right to self-determination’, lower levels of participation are appropriate.286 For 
indigenous peoples, at least for profound violations of their rights, their free, prior and informed 
consent may be the level of participation that is appropriate.287 
Further light can be shed on the standard of participation required to fulfil the right by reference to 
Sherry Arnstein’s typology of participation,288 which although first articulated in 1969 ‘retains 
considerable contemporary relevance’ in the social sciences.289 Arnstein’s theory, while developed in 
the context of the participation of citizens in local government, is readily adaptable to the global 
                                                             
283 Croft and Beresford (1992-1993) 20. 
284 E.g. Article 19 UNDRIP. Such instruments are discussed further in Chapter 3.  
285 Charters (2010) 222-223. 
286 Charters (2010) 222. 
287 See Chapter 3, Section 2 below on free, prior and informed consent. 
288 Arnstein (1969). 
289 Cornwall (2008). Arnstein’s typology is widely used in current social science literature, see e.g. Hurlbert and 




governance context.290 The typology is laid out as a ladder, each rung representing a level of 
participation. In order from lowest to highest, the rungs are “manipulation”, “therapy”, informing”, 
“consultation”, “placation”, “partnership”, “delegated power”, and “control”.291 Arnstein defines 
participation as ‘the redistribution of power’ that allows those marginalised to be included in 
determining policies and decisions.292 The lowest rungs of the ladder—“manipulation” and 
“therapy”—do not meet this definition. By the former, Arnstein means participation enabled by the 
decision-makers or power-holders for the sole purpose of engineering support—participation as a 
vehicle for public relations.293 By “therapy”, Arnstein means “clinical group therapy” to “cure” 
citizens of their ills; a useful analogy at the global level is a policy of “engagement with” indigenous 
peoples that is in fact a policy of integration and assimilation.294 Adapting this typology to the context 
of the right to participate in global governance, then, indicates that the right to participate requires a 
level of participation that is higher than manipulation or assimilation. If, for instance, an IO sets up an 
advisory committee with the sole purpose of manipulating support for a decision or policy that has 
already been made, and with no other power than to “rubber-stamp” the outcome,295 it is highly 
unlikely that the organization could be regarded as having discharged its obligation. 
The middle rungs of the ladder, according to Arnstein, represent ‘degrees of tokenism’.296 
“Informing” entails a one-way flow of information between the IO and an affected people.297 While 
information disclosure is often necessary for effective participation, alone it will hardly ever meet the 
minimum standard of participation required to fulfil the right. Just higher on the ladder are 
“consultation” and “placation”, and here is where I differ from Arnstein. She suggests that 
consultation, i.e. the invitation of views, is a mere ‘window-dressing ritual’ offering ‘no assurance 
that views will be taken into account’ and in which participants ‘are primarily perceived as statistical 
abstractions’.298 Placation, similarly, for Arnstein consists in a few “hand-picked” participants being 
placed on a public body: if such participants are unaccountable to a constituency and if the usual 
players hold the majority of seats, the participation will not be effective.299  
By reference to the discussion of “affectedness” above and below, I suggest that consultation in some 
circumstances may suffice to fulfil the right—for instance, where a people is only one of several 
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affected groups, or where a people is only indirectly or mildly affected by the outcome of the process. 
Where a people is individually and fundamentally impacted by the matter at hand, conversely, 
consultation would likely be insufficient. Similarly, while having one or two representatives on a 
decision-making committee may not guarantee a people affected by its decisions control over the 
outcome, it is equally not appropriate for the people to have a majority of seats where, for instance, 
the people is only affected by one out of a number of matters considered by the committee, or where 
the people is one of a number of affected groups. 
The top three categories of Arnstein’s typology are “partnership”, “delegated power” and “control”. 
Partnership refers to participatory mechanisms by which an IO or states agree to share decision-
making responsibilities so that a people can ‘negotiate and engage in tradeoffs with’ states and other 
power holders.300 Delegated power consists in a people holding ‘dominant decision-making authority’ 
over a matter, for instance through holding a majority of seats on a decision-making board, or a 
separate and parallel body with veto power over another.301 Control, Arnstein says, is even more 
extensive: ‘full control guaranteeing that participants can govern an institution’ and be in full charge 
of its policy and management.302 Evidently, full control by a people over an IO making decisions 
relevant to them will be warranted only in extremely rare situations. Delegated power, too, will be 
appropriate in a limited range of circumstances where a people (or a class of peoples) is the only 
entity substantially affected by the decisions of a body. One such circumstance is in regard to a 
subsidiary body of an international financial institution that is tasked with making decisions on 
allocating funding specifically to indigenous peoples as the recipients. In that situation, the right to 
participate would be fulfilled if representatives of indigenous peoples held a majority of seats on the 
decision-making committee. A level of participation corresponding to Arnstein’s notion of partnership 
will more often be required to fulfil the right, although by no means in all circumstances.  
The question of what form and level of participation will be sufficient to fulfil the right will ultimately 
fall to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The categories adapted from Arnstein are neither 
precise nor mutually exclusive; however, they are useful in drawing attention to the ‘critical 
difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed 
to affect the outcome of the process’.303  
4.5.2 Limitations 
Self-determination and its derivative right to participate are human rights, and therefore subject to 
limitations. Although the right to self-determination is often framed in absolute language or limited 
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only by the territorial integrity of states,304 it is not an absolute right since it does not have the purpose 
of protecting the personal or physical integrity of the group.305 Therefore, in recognition that peoples 
do not exist in a vacuum but consist of, and are part of a broader society of, individuals and other 
groups, limitations on the right to participate are justified in order to protect the rights of others or the 
general interests of society.306 For instance, the exercise of the right may be limited to allow other 
individuals or entities to also exercise participatory rights: for instance, if many different individuals 
and groups are potentially affected by a standard-setting exercise of an IO, such as the general 
standard-setting activities of the FAO, it would be appropriate for affected peoples to exercise a level 
of participation similar to others who are affected.  
The level of affectedness as discussed in the preceding section may, conceptualised in another way, 
also be framed as a limitation on the scope of the right, in accordance with the need to protect the 
general interests of society. That is, if a people is not at all affected by the activities of a given 
organisation, or in a given matter, their right to participate will be limited accordingly. I frame the 
issue of affectedness as a limitation to the right as opposed to a core qualification—stated in another 
way, I formulate the right as one to “participation in global governance” rather than a qualified right 
to “participate in matters affecting them”—because of the notion of dominance held by Young and 
Pettit under which positive interference is not required for a relationship of domination to exist. In 
other words, it is not required that an IO be carrying out an activity that affects peoples. Peoples have 
an inherent right to participate by virtue of the structural relation of domination, regardless of the 
degree of actual interference. However, the exercise of the right is constrained by reference to the 
protection of the rights of others and the general societal interest. 
A second limitation evidently applies in respect of peoples who are well-represented by states. If, as 
discussed above in Section 3.1, a people is fully represented by a state in a global governance process 
which affects the people—and, in the case of an indigenous people, the people have given free, prior 
and informed consent to their representation by the state—this will be a limitation upon the right. Put 
another way, only if a people has gone unheard at the domestic level on a given matter will the right 
to participate in global governance become operative. 
4.6 Rights to transparency and access to justice 
In addition to participatory rights, other rights also logically flow from the right of peoples to self-
determine in relation to IOs. The right to transparency—or access to information—is one. 
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Participation is so entwined with transparency and access to information that it is difficult to unpick 
one from the other: for the former to be effective, the latter is nearly always required. The right of 
access to justice is another.307 Together, participation, transparency and access to justice form a 
“procedural triad”, any element of which is difficult to disentangle from the others.308 This study 
focuses the right to participation, and in the following chapters it will proceed to assess the extent of 
doctrinal support for this right, as well as the extent to which it is reflected in the practice of IOs. 
Accordingly, there is not the scope nor the space to do the same for transparency and access to justice. 
This could be an appropriate subject for future work. 
4.7 Addressing concerns 
Concerns and potential dangers should be addressed at this stage. 
The first is practical. The cost and delay incurred by states and IOs in the course of enabling 
participation is not to be dismissed out of hand. Certainly, participation carries a cost, for instance in 
terms of funding attendance of peoples’ representatives at meetings. Hearing additional voices may 
well mean that policy and decision processes take longer than they otherwise would. The effective 
exercise of the right may even oblige states and IOs to engage in building the capacity of would-be 
participants to enable them to navigate the complexity of global governance processes, adding further 
cost. However, on balance this concern is outweighed by the intrinsic importance of self-
determination, as well as the likelihood that the quality of the decisions reached will be higher.309 In 
addition, in practice costs may be kept to a minimum by the use of procedural rules surrounding 
matters like speaking times, submission lengths, and the like. States may also find that the information 
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and expertise provided by an affected people enables a decision to be made faster than otherwise 
would be possible.  
The second point regards the potential danger of resentment, backlash and reprisal by states against 
peoples that participate in global governance. In the League of Nations context, the minorities regime 
that enabled certain minorities to petition the League regarding state misconduct engendered the 
resentment of the regime by states, and in fact led to the intimidation of minorities and even harsher 
violations of their rights.310 However, nowadays it has become more accepted by states that sub-state 
groups can appeal to IOs and ICTs, for instance the European Court of Human Rights and human 
rights treaty bodies. While it is impossible to remove any risk of reprisals, that risk is certainly lower 
than in the time of the League. In addition, the context is different: the League of Nations minority 
regime only applied to certain new states, while the right of peoples to participate would formally 
apply to all peoples and involve obligations for all states on the same footing.  
The final concern regards unintended consequences and structural inequality. One could argue that the 
participation of peoples might, in effect, further disenfranchise states that are already marginalised in 
the international community: least developed countries, for example, face enough challenges to 
effectively protect their interests in intergovernmental law-making and standard-setting processes 
without competing with, for instance, indigenous peoples. In addition, the pattern of participation by 
indigenous peoples to an extent mirrors wider geopolitical divides: for instance gaps persist in terms 
of the attendance of indigenous peoples’ organizations at international conferences as well as the 
capacity and experience of peoples’ representative organizations.311 In response to this concern, it 
should be noted that the increased participation of indigenous peoples on matters affecting them 
should not, and does not necessarily, mean that the participation of disadvantaged states will suffer. 
As for the disparities between indigenous groups, this is a valid concern that needs to be addressed at 
a practical level by indigenous peoples, states and IOs, but does not undermine the argument for the 
right to participate.  
5. Conclusion  
In summary, this chapter has argued that the rise of IOs and other global governance entities and the 
expansion of their powers, resulting in the exercise by IOs of public power affecting peoples, has led 
to a structural relationship of the domination of peoples by IOs. This affects the right of peoples to 
self-determination. IOs hold both a potential to negatively impact on peoples, but also emancipatory 
possibility. By reference to the theoretical account of self-determination developed in Chapter 1, this 
chapter has proposed that the law of self-determination should evolve to remedy this deficiency. The 
addition of a specific rule under the broad umbrella of self-determination is justified. This can be 
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conceptualised as a right of peoples to participate in the activities of IOs, other global governance 
bodies and intergovernmental fora which affect them. Corresponding obligations are held by states 
and IOs. The right is not absolute, and is accordingly subject to limitations including where peoples 
are well-represented by states, are only one among a number of affected third parties, or are not 




CHAPTER THREE: Doctrinal Support for a Participatory Right 
1. Introduction 
Up until this point, the thesis has taken as its starting point a claim that there exists a right of 
(indigenous) peoples to participate in global governance affecting them, grounded in the principle of 
self-determination. For the purpose of determining whether this claim is justified, it has constructed a 
theoretical argument, building on an account of the law of self-determination to hold that the 
relationship of domination exercised over peoples by IOs and other global governance bodies, and by 
states acting collectively through such entities, justifies in theory the alleged right along with 
correlative obligations held by states and IOs.  
Does the theoretical construction find support in positive international law? This is the question 
examined in this chapter. A doctrinal method is used to assess the extent to which the right of peoples 
to participate in global governance is consistent with, and supported by, the positive law in the form 
of international instruments, the decisions of international courts and tribunals, and the statements of 
treaty bodies. The law of jus cogens is examined to see whether it could provide positive grounding 
for the right. In addition, the elements of CIL applicable to states and IOs are explored, to provide a 
foundation for the inquiry carried out in the following chapters.1  
The chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2 examines international agreements and other legal 
instruments, along with the decisions of treaty bodies and international courts and tribunals. It begins 
by arguing that there is a degree of support for a participatory element of self-determination, found in 
general instruments and judicial decisions, although it finds no express support for a right to 
participate in global governance. The chapter then turns to look at the law on indigenous peoples’ 
participation rights, as found in the UNDRIP, the ILO Convention 169, and the decisions of 
international courts and treaty bodies. It finds that in this context participation is evidently a core 
element of the right to self-determination. Moreover, the law on indigenous peoples’ consultation and 
FPIC provides analogous support for the notion that there is a spectrum of participation whereby the 
level of participation required to fulfil the right is higher when the matter is one that has a more 
significant adverse impact on a people. Further, the chapter finds that there is some, albeit limited 
support in indigenous peoples’ instruments for a right of indigenous peoples to participate in matters 
affecting them at the international level. However, all of the law on indigenous peoples’ rights is 
limited, from a positive law standpoint, in terms of which states may be said to bear obligations as a 
result. 
                                                             
1 This chapter relies on the classical sources of international law as contained in the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”), Article 38. 
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Moreover, it becomes clear that it is difficult to find, in the instruments and decisions, a basis for 
imposing a correlative obligation on IOs. With the exception of one, ambiguously worded sentence in 
the UNDRIP, the black letter law is silent on this matter, and IOs are not party to relevant treaties. 
The chapter therefore goes on to consider two alternative bases for assigning an obligation to IOs to 
respect, protect and fulfil the right of peoples to participate in matters affecting them. The first, 
discussed in Section 3, is the law of jus cogens. While this initially may appear a promising avenue 
for imposing an obligation upon IOs, as IOs are bound by peremptory norms of law, upon closer 
examination it becomes less attractive, as it is unlikely that the right can be considered peremptory in 
nature. 
The other avenue that may provide a basis for assigning duties to IOs is CIL. Custom also seems the 
most promising basis in positive law for the proposed right and obligations in general, given that other 
positive sources of law contain only limited support. Section 4 will assess the theoretical basis for the 
argument that IOs may be, in certain cases, both creators and subjects of CIL. In addition, it will lay 
out the methodological factors, with respect to both states and IOs, that the following chapters will 
take into account in considering, among other questions, whether the proposed right has attained the 
status of a rule of custom. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Treaties, international legal instruments, and decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies 
In assessing support for the proposed right, it is first necessary to turn to legal instruments and 
decisions on self-determination in general, before examining the more specific legal regime on the 
rights of indigenous peoples.  
2.1 A participatory aspect of self-determination 
The doctrinal canon of treaties, international legal instruments and decisions on self-determination 
provide a modicum of support for a participatory element. Classic statements on self-determination, 
such as those contained in the UN Charter,2 common Article 1(1) of the Human Rights Covenants,3 
the Friendly Relations Declaration, and the Helsinki Final Act,4 contain open formulations that, while 
not precluding participation, merely offer an umbrella under which a ‘broad range of international 
legal understandings about self-determination take shelter’.5 However, to the extent that they can be 
interpreted to provide for internal self-determination, that is, representative government, they can be 
said to support, under the broad umbrella, a right to participation at the state level. Representative 
                                                             
2 Articles 1(2) and 55. 
3 Also see Article 20(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
4 Helsinki Final Act, Principle VIII. 
5 Foster (2001) 144. 
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government ‘by definition requires effective avenues for political participation by all individuals and 
groups subject to a particular government’.6  
In relation to common Article 1, as Caroline Foster highlights, an examination of negotiators’ 
discussions in the development of the Covenants reveals an interpretation of the article concerned 
with internal governance.7 Several countries including the US, the US, Greece, Denmark, New 
Zealand, and a number of developing countries proposed that self-determination should include a 
right to be free from an authoritarian regime, and Western states also argued for rights of political 
participation and representative government.8 
The Human Rights Committee has subsequently interpreted self-determination in Article 1 as 
requiring participation of peoples on matters affecting them at the national level. For instance, in its 
conclusions on Australia, the Committee has called on the country to allow indigenous peoples a 
stronger role in decision-making over their traditional lands and natural resources.9 Similarly, with 
respect to Sweden, the Committee expressed concern that the country does not allow the Sámi people 
a significant role in decision-making processes that affect their traditional lands and economic 
activities.10 It recommended that Morocco should enhance meaningful consultation with the people of 
Western Sahara with a view to securing their free, prior and informed consent for development 
projects and resource extraction operations affecting them.11 With regard to Mexico, it urged the state 
to take appropriate measures to ensure indigenous communities’ participation in the country’s 
institutions.12 The Committee welcomed developments in Norway to ensure ‘full consultation’ with 
the Sámi in matters affecting their traditional livelihoods,13 in 2006 welcomed an agreement between 
Norway and the Norwegian Sámi Parliament setting out procedures for consultation between the 
central government and the Sámi Parliament, which it noted was in furtherance of Article 1 of the 
Covenant,14 and in 2018 called for the state to ensure meaningful consultation with the Sámi in 
practice.15 The Committee, in relation to Honduras, expressed concern that a draft law on indigenous 
peoples’ rights had not been developed with the participation of indigenous peoples.16 
                                                             
6 Foster (2001) 151. See also Fox (1992) 606. 
7 Foster (2001) 146. 
8 Ibid 146. This should be viewed in the context of Cold War politics. 
9 HRC, ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee, Volume I’ (2000) UN Doc A/55/40, 498-528. 
10 HRC, ‘Concluding observations: Sweden’ (24 April 2002) UN Doc CCPR/CO/74/SWE 15. 
11 HRC, ‘Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Morocco’ (1 December 2016) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/MAR/CO/6 [10]. 
12 HRC, ‘Concluding observations: Mexico’ (27 July 1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.109 [19]. 
13 HRC, ‘Concluding Observations: Norway’ (1 November 1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.112 [10]. 
14 HRC, ‘Concluding Observations: Norway’ (25 April 2006) UN Doc CCPR/C/NOR/CO/5 [5]. 
15 HRC, ‘Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Norway’ (25 April 2018) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/NOR/CO/7 [37(b)]. 




The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also interpreted common Article 1 as 
requiring the participation of peoples on matters affecting them. For example, it expressed concern 
about the failure by Costa Rica to consistently consult indigenous peoples with a view to obtaining 
their free, prior and informed consent in respect of decision-making processes affecting their ability to 
exercise their rights.17 In relation to Honduras it has recommended that the state involve indigenous 
peoples in the preparation of its draft law on indigenous peoples’ rights.18 The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its general recommendation on the right to self-determination 
considered that the right has an internal aspect linked with the right of every citizen to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs,19 thereby clearly supporting an interpretation of Article 1 that has a 
participatory element.  
The “safeguard” clause of the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, by which it attaches importance to 
‘representative government as an indicator of compliance with the principle of self-determination’,20 
also lends some support to the idea of self-determination requiring representative government.21 
Judicial opinions also contribute some grounding. Statements made by judges of the ICJ lend support 
to the idea that self-determination can be construed as a participatory right of peoples. In the Western 
Sahara advisory opinion, although the Court did not have to decide matters of substance relating to 
self-determination, it defined self-determination as ‘the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will 
of peoples’.22 This constitutes evidence pointing to the participatory content of the right.23 In the 
Court’s formulation, some entity—left undefined by the Court, presumably states—needs ‘to pay 
regard to’ the will of peoples, freely expressed. In other words, the will of a people on matters relating 
to its self-determination must be heard. The other side of the coin of “paying regard to” the freely 
expressed will of peoples is the participation of peoples.  
Judge Yusuf, in his separate opinion in the Kosovo proceedings, considered that self-determination 
chiefly operates internally, to entitle the population of a state ‘to determine its own political, economic 
and social destiny and to choose a representative government’ and also to entitle ‘a defined part of the 
population…to participate in the political life of the State, to be represented in its government and not 
to be discriminated against’.24 
                                                             
17 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), ‘Concluding observations on the fifth 
periodic report of Costa Rica’ (21 October 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/CRI/CO/5 [8]. 
18 CESCR, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Honduras’ (11 July 2016) UN Doc  
E/C.12/HND/CO/2 [12]. 
19 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21: The right to self -
determination (1996) UN Doc A/52/18, Annex VIII at 125 [4]. 
20 Foster (2001) 147. 
21 Friendly Relations Declaration; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 
22 Western Sahara [59], [162]. 
23 Klabbers (2006) 194-195. 
24 Kosovo, Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf [9].  
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Separate opinions in the Chagos advisory proceedings are also relevant.25 Judge Gaja pointed out that 
the Chagossians ‘were never consulted or even represented’ in the process that led to the separation of 
the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, nor were the people of Mauritius ‘given an opportunity to 
express their views’. In part because ‘[t]he will of the peoples belonging to the non-self-governing 
territory did not play any significant role in the process’, the decolonization process had not been 
lawfully completed.26 Further, the compensation that the Chagossians received for their displacement 
did not ‘make their will insignificant’ under the perspective of self-determination’.27 Similarly, Judge 
Abraham declared that if the British authorities had consulted the Chagossian people, and if the 
Chagossians ‘had expressed their free and informed will’ not to be integrated into Mauritius, the 
‘parameters of the question submitted to the Court would…have been substantially different’, and 
self-determination may require the freely expressed will of the different components of a population 
of a territory to be taken into account ‘even if that leads to partition as a solution’.28 Judge Abraham 
here implicitly recognised that the Chagossians ought to have been consulted. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”) in its decision on the Katanga 
case also supports a view of self-determination as participation, finding that:29 
[i]n the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights…and in the absence of evidence 
that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participation in government…the Commission holds 
the view that Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire. 
This statement implies that the right to participation is a necessary element of self-determination, 
failing which Katanga may be able to exercise remedial self-determination. Further, in the case of 
Kevin Mgwanga Gunme v Cameroon, the Commission held that the people of southern Cameroon 
were not entitled to secede from the state in part because they were represented in the national 
assembly.30 
2.1.1 The East Timor opinions: ‘There is another “third party” in this case’ 
Special attention should be paid to the separate opinions in the East Timor case, which evidence 
judges’ awareness of the need to hear affected peoples in both ICJ proceedings and intergovernmental 
negotiations.31 While these statements do not go so far as to expressly hold that peoples have a right to 
participate in international matters concerning them, they demonstrate an increasing acceptance that 
                                                             
25 Further on the background to the case, see Chapter 7, Section 3.2. 
26 Chagos AO, Separate Opinion of Judge Gaja [1]-[2]. 
27 Ibid [6]. 
28 Chagos AO, Declaration of Judge Abraham, 2. 
29 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire (Merits), ACHPR (1995) Communication No 75/92, 1. 
30 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme v Cameroon (Merits), ACHPR (2009) Communication No 266/2003 [190]. 
31 East Timor. 
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affected peoples should be heard in relevant proceedings at the Court as well as in intergovernmental 
negotiations. 
The background was that East Timor had been a colony of Portugal from the sixteenth century until 
1975, when the Portuguese administration withdrew. Three months later, a local group declared 
independence, upon which Indonesia staged a military intervention. Since 1975, East Timor had 
remained under Indonesia’s occupation and effective control.32 Several GA and SC resolutions had 
denounced the military intervention and called upon states to respect East Timor’s territorial integrity 
and the right of its people to self-determination,33 and East Timor was on the list of non-self-
governing territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the UN Charter, although Portugal 
remained its administering Power.34 Against this background, Australia and Indonesia entered into an 
agreement (the Timor Gap Treaty) on the delimitation of the continental shelf between East Timor 
and northern Australia and a joint regime for exploiting the area’s oil reserves,35 estimated at between 
500 million and 5,000 million barrels.36  
Among Portugal’s claims was that Australia had infringed the right of the people of East Timor to 
self-determination, to territorial integrity and unity, and to permanent sovereignty over its national 
wealth and resources, had infringed the rights of Portugal as the administering Power, and had 
contravened Security Council resolutions 384 and 389.37 It alleged that by entering into negotiations 
with Indonesia and concluding and implementing the resulting agreement, Australia had signalled its 
recognition of the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor.38 Indonesia had not accepted the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction and therefore could not be subject to proceedings.39 The majority held that the 
ICJ lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim, as to do so would require ruling upon the lawfulness of 
Indonesia’s entry into and continued presence in East Timor; following the Monetary Gold rule, 
Indonesia’s rights and obligations would ‘thus constitute the very subject-matter of such a judgment 
made in the absence of that State’s consent’.40 
By all accounts, the interests of the East Timorese people were vitally affected by the matter at hand. 
As Judge Weeramantry noted, the oil and gas potential of the area formed ‘in all probability the 
                                                             
32 Ibid [11]-[13]; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 144.  
33 See e.g. GA res 3485; SC res 384; SC res 389. 
34 East Timor [16]. 
35 Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an area between the 
Indonesian Province of East Timor and northern Australia (signed 11 December 1989, entered into force 9 
February 1991) 1001 Australian Treaty Series 9, preamble. 
36 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 147. 
37 East Timor [10] and [19]. 
38 Ibid [17]. 
39 Ibid [21]. 
40 Ibid [33]-[34]. Cf Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry. For 
the Monetary Gold principle, see Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, UK 
and USA) (Preliminary Question) [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 32-33. 
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principal economic asset of the East Timorese people, awaiting them at such time as they achieve self-
determination’.41 As the East Timorese people were non-self-governing, they had the right to 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Further, Judge Weeramantry stated, if a substantial 
time was to elapse before East Timor achieved independence, and if the Timor Gap Treaty was to be 
in full operation in the meantime, ‘a substantial segment’ of these resources might well be lost to East 
Timor ‘for all time’.42 The Treaty, by dividing these resources between Australia and Indonesia 
without the consent of the East Timorese people, and with no indication that the benefits of resource 
exploitation would be directed back to East Timor, thus had a substantial impact on their right to self-
determination. 
Judge Vereshchetin, in his separate opinion, held that Indonesia’s lack of consent was only one reason 
for lack of jurisdiction. The other reason, ‘no less important’ in his view, was ‘the lack of any 
evidence as to the views of the people of East Timor’, on whose behalf the application was filed.43 In 
a clear recognition of the fact that the people of East Timor were voiceless in the ICJ, he wrote:44 
Besides Indonesia, in the absence of whose consent the Court is prevented from exercising its jurisdiction 
over the Application, there is another “third party” in this case, whose consent was sought neither by 
Portugal before filing the Application with the Court, nor by Australia before concluding the Timor Gap 
Treaty. Nevertheless, the Applicant State has acted in this Court in the name of this “third party” and the 
Treaty has allegedly jeopardized its natural resources. The “third party” at issue is the people of East Timor.  
Since the Judgement is silent on this matter, one might wrongly conclude that the people, whose r ight to 
self-determination lies at the core of the whole case, have no role to play in the proceedings. This is not to 
suggest that the Court could have placed the States Parties to the case and the people of East Timor on the 
same level procedurally. Clearly, only States may be parties in cases before the Court…. This is merely to 
say that the right of a people to self-determination, by definition, requires that the wishes of the people 
concerned at least be ascertained and taken into account by the Court. 
Judge Vereschetin does not go so far as to say that self-determination requires the participation of a 
people in relevant proceedings. He stops short of suggesting any procedural reform to allow a people 
to participate directly. Indeed, he suggests that to do so would be to place “peoples” on the same 
procedural level as states and would directly contradict of Article 34 of the ICJ statute, under which 
only states may be parties in ICJ proceedings. Nor does he identify other procedural means by which 
the Court may ascertain and take into account the wishes of the people concerned. However, his 
opinion indicates clear awareness that there was another affected party—a people—who went unheard 
in proceedings, concern that the Court had not heard evidence of the people’s views, and implicitly 
                                                             
41 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 151. 
42 Ibid 198. 
43 Separate Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin 138. 
44 Ibid 135. 
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‘created the possibility of a colonial people’s indirect participation before the court in a case 
concerning their right to self-determination’.45 
Judge Vereschetin considered that the Court should have had reliable evidence on the extent to which 
Portugal’s application was supported by the people of East Timor – especially because Portugal had 
not had effective control of East Timor for 20 years. As such, the Court could not, without clear 
evidence to the contrary, easily dismiss the contention that Portugal was ‘not in a position to act in the 
Court with full knowledge of the wishes and views of the majority of the East Timorese people’.46 
Portugal did not provide any evidence of the people’s wishes and views, however.47 Nor did Australia 
provide such evidence, although Australia also sought to argue that its side benefited the East 
Timorese people.48 He held that Portugal had a duty ‘to consult the leaders or representatives of the 
people before submitting the case to the Court on their behalf’, noting that the Secretary-General had 
been holding consultations on the future of East Timor with a broad cross-section of East Timorese 
people representing various trends of opinion, as well as the governments of Indonesia and Portugal.49 
In this way, in the consultations ‘the East Timorese people [was] considered as a distinct party 
“directly concerned”, which [could] speak for itself through its representatives’.50 Portugal’s status as 
the administering Power did not automatically confer on Portugal ‘general power to take action on 
behalf of the people concerned, irrespective of any concrete circumstances’.51 
The dissenting opinions of Judge Skubiszewski and Judge Weeramantry, while not going as far as the 
separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin, also reveal an awareness that an affected party was going 
unheard and indicate a participatory element of self-determination. Judge Skubiszewski noted that 
although ‘both Parties invoked the interests of the East Timorese people’, they ‘presented [the court] 
with little or no evidence of what the actual wishes of that people were’.52 Nonetheless, and noting 
that ‘East Timor [had] not been well served by the traditional interests and sovereignties of the 
strong’,53 he went on to make ‘certain elementary assumptions’: that the people’s interests would lie 
in peaceful mechanisms, rather than military intervention; ‘free choice’, rather than incorporation into 
another State via the use of force; and, most interestingly, ‘when the active participation of the people 
is guaranteed, in contradistinction to arrangements arrived at by some States alone with the exclusion 
of the people and/or the United Nations Member who accepted “the sacred trust” under Chapter XI of 
the Charter’.54 By this latter statement, Judge Skubiszewski seemed to refer to the lack of participation 
                                                             
45 Knop (2002) 207. 
46 Separate Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin 135. 
47 Ibid 136. 
48 Ibid 136. 
49 GA res 37/30. 
50 Separate Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin 137. 
51 Ibid 138. 
52 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski 136. 
53 Ibid [45]. 
54 Ibid [52]. 
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of the East Timor people in the treaty negotiations between Australia and Indonesia.  Judge 
Weeramantry, too, recognised that the people of East Timor were not themselves participants in 
proceedings, characterizing East Timor as ‘a territory not in a position to speak for itself’.55 In 
considering the locus standi of Portugal, however, he came to a different view than that of Judge 
Vereshchetin: Portugal could represent the people of East Timor, as any other view ‘would result in 
the anomalous situation of the current international system leaving a territory and a people, who 
admittedly have important rights opposable to all the world, defenceless and voiceless precisely when 
those rights are sought to be threatened or violated.56Indeed, he considered, the fact that Portugal had 
a ‘direct nexus’ with East Timor, and was the administering Power recognised by the UN, 
strengthened Portugal’s claim to speak on behalf of East Timor.  
The East Timor decision, then, marked a turning point in terms of a recognition by members of the 
Court that a people was going unheard in proceedings regarding its self-determination, as well as in 
intergovernmental treaty negotiations affecting it, and that the Court ought to find some means to 
allow the people to express its views and wishes. While this stops short of expressly recognising a 
right to participate, it is submitted that these statements hold persuasive weight. 
2.2 Indigenous peoples’ participation, consultation and free, prior and informed consent 
The international law on indigenous peoples’ rights contains, as a central element of self-
determination, rules relating to the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples as well as 
their consultation and FPIC on matters affecting them. The UNDRIP and the ILO Convention No 169 
are the main sources of law here, along with decisions of regional courts and human rights treaty 
bodies. In some cases, the relevant provisions are phrased in an open manner, leaving it open to 
interpretation as to whether the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making affecting 
them applies only at the state level or also internationally.  
The second part of the section turns to the law on FPIC. Although FPIC—which conceptually fits 
within participation and derives from self-determination—in positive terms relates to obligations held 
by states with respect to indigenous peoples, and therefore cannot be read to expressly support the 
theoretical formulation of the right to participate in global governance, it sheds light on what level of 
participation is required in a way that is consistent with the theoretical framework in Chapter 2. The 
law on FPIC has developed a continuum or spectrum: where fundamental rights of indigenous peoples 
would be substantially impacted, the consent of the affected peoples is required, whereas less 
impactful actions require mere consultation. What is required for the right to participation to be 
fulfilled is a function of the level of affectedness. 
                                                             




The final part of this section turns to specific provisions of international legal instruments that 
support, to a limited extent, a right of indigenous peoples to participate in the international legal order. 
Before turning to the content of the law, we will address a preliminary question regarding the status of 
the UNDRIP. 
2.2.1 The legal status of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The legal status of the Declaration—an instrument hailed upon its adoption as ‘the beginning of the 
realisation of the vision, aspirations and basic rights of indigenous peoples living in all parts of the 
globe’57—affects the significance one can assign to its provisions in assessing the extent to which 
international law supports the existence of a right of peoples to participate in global governance. The 
Declaration is not a legally binding international agreement, but rather a GA declaration, meaning that 
it is prima facie to be regarded as “soft law”.58 Notwithstanding this, it holds substantial persuasive 
authority by reason of its format, support, drafting history, subsequent treatment, and the degree to 
which it aligns with previously existing law. 
The first factor pointing to the significance of the Declaration is its format:59 it is not merely a 
resolution of the GA, but a declaration, a format restricted to ‘formal and solemn’ instruments on ‘rare 
occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated’.60 Like the 1970 
Friendly Relations Declaration or the 1960 Colonial Declaration, neither of which are strictly binding 
international agreements but which have been generally accepted and regularly relied on in legal 
argumentation, there is ‘a strong expectation that members of the international community will abide 
by’ the UNDRIP.61 
Second, the Declaration was adopted with overwhelming support from every corner of the globe, 
evidencing general acceptance of its principles and bestowing it with particular authority.62 143 states 
voted in favour, with four opposed, 11 abstaining and 34 absent; the opposers have all subsequently 
reversed their position to support the Declaration.63 GA declarations adopted with such a level of 
support are often indicative of CIL.64 At the very least, this level of consensus evidences ‘the special 
legitimacy and authoritativeness’ of the instrument.65 
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Third, the Declaration has an extensive drafting history, to which states put in a considerable amount 
of effort.66 It was discussed and negotiated for nearly 30 years, and some suggest that the fact that the 
states who opposed its adoption ‘appeared to do so through fear that by accepting, they would be 
accepting some form of legal commitment’ lends additional support to the view that the Declaration 
holds legal significance.67 
Fourth, an examination of the way in which the Declaration has been received reveals that many 
domestic and international actors have treated it as a source of law, and used it for guidance in 
interpreting other relevant laws.68 For instance, the IACtHR used the Declaration in interpreting the 
law on free, prior and informed consent in its Saramaka decision,69 and the ACHPR has also used the 
Declaration in deciding cases as well as issuing an advisory opinion on it.70 The domestic courts of 
several countries have relied upon it.71 
Lastly, the content of the Declaration is strongly related to previously existing law—its provisions 
refer to rights and principles which were either already recognised, or were emerging, in international 
human rights law.72 It aligns with the practice of human rights treaty bodies, and some of its 
provisions directly mirror existing international instruments.73 In this way, it can be said to constitute 
an agreed interpretation of pre-existing international legal sources.74 
In this light, some are of the view that the Declaration, or at least many of its provisions, represent 
existing CIL,75 while others are more cautious, expressing the view that it may become CIL over 
time.76 At the very least, the Declaration has significant persuasive weight, and many of the factors 
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that make this so also weigh in support of a reading of the Declaration as CIL. In addition, it has a 
high degree of legitimacy, as assessed by reference to its procedural legitimacy, the fairness and 
justice reflected in its content, and the extent to which international actors engage with it.77 
With this understanding of the Declaration as a highly influential international legal instrument 
carrying a high level of weight, let us turn to its content as well as that of other sources. 
2.2.2 Participation in matters affecting them  
The right of indigenous peoples to participate in matters affecting them is found in the earliest 
international legal instrument on indigenous peoples’ rights. Participation is a pillar of ILO 
Convention No 169,78 which albeit only ratified by 23 countries has had an outsize influence on 
subsequent international legal instruments and standards.79 Article 6.1 of the Convention imposes an 
obligation on states to establish means by which indigenous peoples can freely participate ‘at all 
levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for 
policies and programmes which concern them’.80 
The equivalent provision in the UNDRIP is framed in terms of a right rather than an obligation. 
Article 18 states that:81 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their 
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to 
maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions. 
This provision does not clearly define the scope of the right: does ‘matters which would affect their 
rights’ refer solely to decision-making at the national level, or also at the international and global 
level? On its face, the text can be read broadly to include participation in all levels of governance.82 
Indeed, the version of this article in the 1994 Draft Declaration originally stipulated that ‘indigenous 
peoples have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, at all levels of decision-making in matters 
which may affect their rights’,83 which could arguably indicate that the drafters originally intended to 
specify that the right to participation included participation in the international legal order.84 
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The right of indigenous peoples to decide their own priorities for development and participate in the 
formulation and implementation of development plans and programmes is also provided for in both 
the ILO Convention and the UNDRIP.85 Article 7.1 of ILO 169 provides that indigenous peoples have 
the right to ‘decide their own priorities’ for development ‘as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions 
and spiritual well-being and…lands’, and to ‘exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own 
economic, social and cultural development’. Further, they ‘shall participate in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which 
may affect them directly.’   
The UNDRIP contains a similar formulation. Article 23, stating that indigenous peoples ‘have the 
right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development’, 
stipulates that they ‘have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, 
housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them’. While potentially different in 
scope—health, housing and other economic and social programmes could be interpreted both more 
narrowly or alternatively more broadly than “development plans and programmes”—these two 
provisions could both be read broadly so as to include participation at the global level in developing 
plans and programmes affecting them.     
The UNDRIP articles on participation clearly derive from the right to self-determination contained in 
the same instrument. Self-determination is regarded as a ‘foundational right’86 which grounds many of 
the other rights in the Declaration. Article 3, mirroring common article 1 of the Covenants, provides 
that indigenous peoples ‘have the right to self-determination’, by virtue of which ‘they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.87 
The condition on which states were able to agree to this provision, which entailed considerable 
difficulty,88 was the inclusion of Article 46(1) stipulating that nothing in the Declaration can be 
interpreted as implying ‘any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States’.89 
It is thus clear that under the Article 3 right to self-determination, indigenous peoples do not have the 
right to become independent from existing states. Article 3, rather, is interpreted by many as entailing 
internal self-determination in the sense of self-government, autonomy, and political participation in 
state affairs.90 The drafting history of Article 3 shows that for several states, self-determination meant 
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the right of indigenous peoples to participate fully in decisions affecting them.91 For instance, 
Australia ‘recognize[d] that the intention of Article 3 is to enunciate…the legitimate aspirations of 
indigenous peoples to enjoy more direct and meaningful participation in decision-making and political 
processes and greater autonomy over their own affairs’.92 Canada stated that ‘self-determination is 
now seen by many as a right which can continue to be enjoyed in a functioning democracy in which 
citizens participate in the political system and have the opportunity to have input in the political 
processes that affect them’.93 Norway, similarly, opined that ‘the right to self-determination includes 
the right of indigenous peoples to participate at all levels of decision-making in legislative and 
administrative matters and the maintenance and development of their political and economic 
systems’.94 
Article 4 reinforces the notion that self-determination for indigenous peoples is to be exercised by 
“internal” means, providing that indigenous peoples, ‘in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions’.95 Autonomy is also related to 
participation: it ‘may be seen as a way of increasing participation in public life in much the same way 
as devolution or other autonomy arrangements have tried to do so in non-indigenous contexts’.96 
Moreover, Article 5 provides that indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
own distinct institutions while retaining their right to participate fully in the life of the State. It can 
thus be seen that self-determination for indigenous peoples, under the Declaration, manifests in ‘on 
the one hand, autonomous governance and, on the other, participatory engagement’.97 
Against this background, the provisions of the UNDRIP on participation and FPIC have been viewed 
by some states,98 as well as scholars,99 as an expression of, or part of the substance of, the right to self-
determination.  
In summary, participation is a core element of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. The 
relevant provisions in the UNDRIP are framed in an open way that would allow for a reading that 
indigenous peoples have the right to participate in matters concerning them at the global level. This 
point will be returned to in Section 2.3.  
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2.2.3 Consultation and free, prior and informed consent 
Further clarity on what participation requires is found in the law of consultation and FPIC. The 
obligation of states to consult indigenous peoples in relation to decisions affecting them is arguably a 
general principle of law, as it is found in international instruments, the decisions of international 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and the decisions of national courts.100 Consultations must be 
genuine and meaningful. In addition, there is a high level of agreement that the principle of FPIC 
governs the manner in which the process of consultation should take place.101 The UNDRIP, the ILO 
Convention and international courts and treaty bodies are clear that while FPIC does not confer a right 
of veto with regard to decisions affecting them, in some cases, the right to participate requires more 
than consultation: decisions substantially affecting their fundamental rights may require consent. That 
is, ‘the degree of participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes depends on the 
nature and implications of the proposed measures’.102 Free, prior and informed consent is ‘premised 
on and essential for the operationalisation of the right to self-determination’, as it allows a people to 
exercise control over their destiny.103 This section elaborates on the law by reference to international 
instruments and judicial decisions. 
Under ILO Convention 169, states are obliged to seek indigenous peoples’ consent through 
consultations on legislative or administrative measures affecting them. According to its Article 6.1, 
states must ‘consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through 
their representative institutions’, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or 
administrative measures which may affect them directly’. Such consultations are to be carried out in 
good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, ‘with the objective of achieving agreement 
or consent’ to the proposed measures.104 Several other provisions of the Convention stress the need for 
participation of affected peoples in the development of government policy.105  
The “soft” requirement of consultation with the objective of obtaining consent hardens into the need 
for consent in cases of the relocation of indigenous peoples.106 Article 16.2 provides that relocation 
shall take place only with the ‘free and informed’ consent of the relevant indigenous peoples.107 
The UNDRIP further developed the law on FPIC, requiring it not only in the case of relocation, but 
also before decisions are made regarding the disposal or storage of hazardous materials in indigenous 
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peoples’ lands and territories.108 However, before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures ‘that may affect’ indigenous peoples, states are merely required to ‘consult 
and cooperate in good faith’ with them ‘in order to obtain’ their FPIC.109 The same is the case with 
regard to the approval of any project affecting indigenous peoples’ lands, territories and other 
resources.110 While some argue that these latter articles impose an absolute obligation to obtain 
consent, the statements of a number of states following the adoption of the Declaration, as well as a 
comparison with previous drafts of the articles, suggest that the more restrictive interpretation is 
justified.111 
The IACtHR has also confirmed the duty of states to consult indigenous peoples on matters affecting 
them.112 In Saramaka People v Suriname the Court held that states must ensure the effective 
participation of the members of an indigenous community on any development or investment taking 
place within their territory for any measure that would amount to a restriction of indigenous peoples’ 
rights to their land and natural resources.113 Effective participation requires that the state must consult 
with the indigenous peoples concerned in good faith, provide them sufficient information, and respect 
their customs and traditions; the objective of the consultation should be the reaching of an agreement 
among the parties.114 The Court further clarified, in Kichwa v Ecuador, that the information provided 
must be in clear and accessible language and be complete enough to guarantee that if consent is given, 
it has been given free from manipulation, and that consultation entails the right to play a real role in 
the decision-making process.115  
The Court took a sliding scale approach to the question of when consent is required: for small-scale 
development projects mere consultation suffices, but FPIC is required for large-scale development 
projects or investments that would have a major impact within indigenous peoples’ territories, or 
where the cumulative effects of a number of small-scale projects would resemble that of a large-scale 
project.116 The Inter-American Court thus ‘drew a continuum’ between consultation and consent in 
which the latter is required where the impacts are greater.117 
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The ACHPR has also taken the stance that on development or investment projects that would have a 
major impact within the territories of indigenous peoples, the state is required not only to consult, but 
to obtain their FPIC.118 
The decisions of human rights treaty bodies further reinforce the idea that where the impacts are 
greater, the FPIC of the affected peoples is required rather than their mere consultation. In Länsman v 
Finland, the Human Rights Committee held that the decision of the Finnish authorities to allow stone 
quarrying in a reindeer-herding area did not violate the right of the Sámi in the area to enjoy their 
culture, because the relevant communities had been consulted and the quarrying activities had only a 
limited impact on their way of life and did not amount to a denial of their rights.119 This second part of 
the Committee’s reasoning suggests that if the impacts had been more significant, mere consultation 
would not have been enough.120 The Committee later held that measures which did substantially 
compromise or interfere with the culture of indigenous peoples required the FPIC of those peoples, 
rather than consultation.121 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has held that 
when the preservation of indigenous peoples’ cultural resources, ‘especially those associated with 
their way of life and cultural expression’, are at risk, then states should obtain the affected peoples’ 
FPIC.122 In the same comment, the Committee stated that the development of laws and policies that 
affect indigenous peoples merely required participation—suggesting that the Committee is making a 
distinction between the former and the latter in terms of severity. 
The argument that the right to participate requires in situations of serious impacts the consent of the 
affected indigenous people is supported by statements of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“EMRIP”). The 
Special Rapporteur stated that while FPIC requirements in the UNDRIP should not be read as 
conferring a general right to veto, merely that consultations must be held in good faith and with the 
objective of reaching agreement.123 However, the Special Rapporteur found, ‘the strength or 
importance of the objective of achieving consent [should vary] according to the circumstances and the 
indigenous interests involved’; in cases of a ‘direct impact on indigenous peoples’ lives or territories’ 
there is a ‘strong presumption’ that consent is required, and ‘in certain contexts, that presumption may 
harden into a prohibition of the measure or project in the absence of indigenous consent’.124 Likewise, 
the EMRIP has found that under the UNDRIP, FPIC must be obtained in matters of fundamental 
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importance for the rights, survival, dignity and well-being of indigenous peoples; in assessing whether 
a matter is of such fundamental importance, the views of the affected peoples should be prioritised, 
while other decisive criteria include the nature of the proposed plan or activity and its impact on the 
peoples.125 
In summary, the sources on the FPIC of indigenous peoples situate it as a key element of self-
determination. The general understanding of FPIC entails that consultations are conducted in the 
absence of coercion or pressure, before taking the relevant decision or undertaking the relevant 
activity, and with sufficient information provided to the affected indigenous peoples.126 The principle 
of FPIC entails that while states may implement development projects or other measures without 
indigenous peoples’ consent provided that doing so will not substantially interfere with the enjoyment 
of their fundamental rights, consent is required when a project is likely to produce a major negative 
impact on indigenous peoples’ lands, livelihoods and cultures.127 This understanding corresponds with 
the theoretical notion that the degree of participation of peoples in matters affecting them should be 
higher when the potential impacts are greater. 
2.3 Peoples’ participation in the international legal community 
Two instruments on indigenous peoples’ rights provide express grounding for the right of peoples to 
participate in the international legal community. The first is the UNDRIP. The second is the 
regionally specific draft Nordic Saami Convention. 
Firstly, shedding some light on the correct interpretation of Articles 18 and 23 of the UNDRIP is its 
Article 41, which provides: 
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other intergovernmental 
organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the provisions of this Declaration through the 
mobilization, inter alia, of financial cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means of ensuring 
participation of indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall be established. (emphasis added) 
The second sentence of Article 41 is ambiguous as to who is to establish the ways and means of 
ensuring indigenous peoples’ participation. It is also not clear on its face as to the level at which it 
requires participation (at the state level, or in IOs. Both of these matters can be resolved by reading 
the second sentence in the light of the first, so that UN agencies and organs and other IGOs are 
required to establish ways and means of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples in their 
processes on issues affecting them.  
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Read in the light of Article 41, other provisions such as Articles 18 and 23, which were on their face 
ambiguous, would seem to apply to the participation of peoples in IOs.128 In its own right, Article 41 
creates a strong expectation that indigenous peoples will be enabled to participate on issues affecting 
them in UN processes. The Human Rights Council took this view, stating that Articles 18 and 41 
constitute a basis for the promotion of the participation of indigenous peoples at the UN level.129 The 
EMRIP has also taken a supportive position, highlighting that the enhanced participatory status of 
indigenous peoples’ organisations in UN processes would be in line with Article 18.130 Denmark also 
supports this interpretation.131 
A more regionally specialised legal instrument which, although still in draft form, is nonetheless 
relevant to this study is the Nordic Saami Convention. Originally proposed by the Sámi Council in the 
mid-1980s132 and released as a draft in 2005133 by an expert commission composed of representatives 
of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and each of the three Sámi parliaments in the three states,134 the 
convention has the objective of affirming and strengthening the rights of the Sámi people necessary to 
secure and develop its language, culture, livelihoods and society, with the smallest possible 
interference from national borders.135 It contains various obligations for the Nordic states regarding 
culture, land, natural resources, and so on.136 Article 19 of the draft Convention provides that:137 
the Saami parliament shall represent the Saami in intergovernmental matters. The States shall promote 
Saami representation in international institutions and Saami participation in international meetings. 
This provision, upon ratification of the Convention, would impose an obligation on Norway, Sweden 
and Finland to promote the representation of Sámi in international institutions and their participation 
in international meetings. It directly goes to the existence of a right of peoples to participation in 
global governance and the corresponding obligations of states as outlined in Chapter 2, albeit in a 
specific regional context. The members of the Expert Committee who drafted the article described it 
as expressing the external aspect of self-determination in a milder form than that of secession.138 The 
Commentary to the Draft Convention also makes it clear that Sámi have the right to be represented in 
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intergovernmental matters when they concern the interests of the Sámi.139 Although it has not yet been 
formally adopted by the states and the Sámi parliaments—and in light of the protracted process until 
this point,140 it may be some time before it is—when it is so adopted, it could be relevant to the 
determination of CIL. 
2.4 Obligations of international organizations under international legal instruments 
One difficulty with matching the theory with doctrinal reality as discussed in the above instruments 
and decisions is that obligations of IOs cannot readily be inferred. Common Article 1(3) creates a 
broad duty of states to ‘promote the realization of’ and respect the right of self-determination, under 
which the specific duties outlined in Chapter 2 could fit: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration 
of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
ILO Convention 169 also creates obligations for states regarding the participation of affected peoples 
in decision-making—although these are even more limited as they do not obviously pertain to 
participation in international decision-making, and only a small number of states are party to the 
Convention.  
However, neither the Covenants nor any of the other international instruments or decisions discussed 
above establish corresponding obligations for IOs. The ICCPR and ICESCR limit membership to 
states, restricting IOs from becoming parties,141 and even where membership is not prima facie 
constrained it can be difficult in practice for IOs to become members of treaties.142 With a few 
exceptions,143 IOs are not parties to key human rights conventions.144  Indeed, the question of under 
what circumstances IOs hold obligations is notoriously uncertain.145 Falling logically prior to the issue 
of responsibility, as the existence of an obligation is a precondition for responsibility for breach,146 the 
matter of obligations of IOs is much less developed than that of their responsibility. According to the 
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advisory opinion of the ICJ in WHO-Egypt, in theory IOs can hold obligations under treaties to which 
they are parties:147 
International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations 
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under 
international agreements to which they are parties. 
As a corollary, IOs are not bound by treaties to which they are not parties.148 While some argue that, 
to the contrary, IOs can be bound by treaties to which they are not parties, as to hold otherwise would 
allow member states to frustrate or avoid their obligations by acting through an IO,149 this argument 
encounters significant obstacles: there may not be much overlap in the obligations held by all member 
states of an organization; to hold an IO to an obligation held by not all member states would violate 
the pacta tertiis rule; and if the common treaty obligations were to automatically bind an IO upon its 
establishment, this would diminish the wide discretion of member states to modify their treaty 
obligations under the VCLT.150 
A possible exception is the UNDRIP, but such an argument encounters difficulties. The final sentence 
of Article 41 neglects to mention who “shall establish” the ways and means of ensuring participation 
of indigenous peoples on issues affecting them. The first sentence creates an obligation—at least in 
soft law—applying to UN organs and specialised agencies as well as other IGOs, so read in this light 
the second sentence could be considered to, similarly, apply to these UN entities. However, this 
cannot be said to be a legally binding obligation. In addition, the other articles regarding participation 
cannot be said to create obligations for IOs. Regardless, the UNDRIP, while constituting evidence of 
self-determination as a participatory right and of an emerging right of indigenous peoples to 
participate on issues affecting them in IOs, does not completely fill the gap between the lex lata and 
the lex ferenda. 
3. Jus Cogens 
So far, it has been seen that while international legal instruments and judicial decisions provide some 
support for the proposed right and the obligations of states, it is more difficult to find a doctrinal 
grounding for the obligation of IOs.  
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The law of jus cogens, at first glance, could provide a basis for an obligation of IOs to hear an 
affected people, as scholars are widely of the view that peremptory norms bind IOs;151 under the 
VCLT, states cannot by treaty establish organizations able to violate jus cogens norms,152 which exist 
to protect the fundamental values of the international community, and are therefore non-derogable in 
effect.153 Some have argued that self-determination is a norm of peremptory status, for instance on the 
basis of statements made by Ammoun J in his separate opinion on the Barcelona Traction case,154 the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,155 some 
members of the ILC,156 and some states during deliberations on the VCLT and the Friendly Relations 
Declaration and in submissions to the ICJ.157 If it was accepted that the principle of self-determination 
is peremptory in nature, this could provide a doctrinal basis for the duty of IOs to enable an affected 
people to participate. 
However, such a proposition is widely contested.158 Even if it is accepted that a certain set of rules 
attaching to the principle of self-determination, such as the law on decolonization, are jus cogens, it 
cannot easily be argued that self-determination is jus cogens in all its manifestations. While some hold 
that self-determination as a whole is peremptory as specific rules such as permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources are ‘integral element[s]’ of the general principle159 and that it would be ‘artificial 
and improper to attribute a different legal force’ to each,160 this view relies on a values-based 
approach to jus cogens, rather than the more generally accepted consent-based approach.161 From the 
perspective of state consent, it is troubling if new rules emerging under the umbrella norm of self-
determination can be fast-tracked to peremptory status without first being accepted by states as 
such.162  
It is therefore difficult to argue that the peremptory nature of self-determination (which is, in any case, 
contested) means that the right of peoples to participate in global governance is also jus cogens by 
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virtue of its grounding in the principle of self-determination, and that in turn a corresponding 
obligation is held by IOs as a matter of positive law.  
4. Customary international law 
The final source of international law considered here is custom. In addition to the support for the 
proposed right found in international legal instruments and decisions, the existence of a general 
practice accepted as law may also provide a foundation for the existence of a rule in positive 
international law. Moreover, as will be seen, CIL can bind IOs as well as states, and therefore holds 
the potential to overcome the difficulty of assigning an obligation to IOs. This section lays out the 
general considerations to be applied when determining whether the proposed rule has emerged in CIL. 
Considerations relating to states will be addressed, and then those relating to IOs.  
4.1 State practice and opinio juris in the formation of custom  
This work adopts an uncontroversial approach to CIL in respect of states. Here is not the place for a 
lengthy exposition regarding ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law’,163 which has been the subject of many studies164 as well as the recent six-year study of the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”).165 In assessing whether the right of peoples to participate in 
global governance and the corresponding obligations of states has been accepted into the corpus of 
international custom, it will be necessary to consider whether the two constituent elements of custom 
are both present: a general practice, and acceptance of that practice as law (opinio juris).166 While a 
separate inquiry must be carried out in respect of each, the same material may go to evidence both.167 
The type of material that is relevant will be informed by the circumstances and context.168 The 
practice may take a wide range of forms, including physical and verbal acts, diplomatic acts and 
correspondence, conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an IO or at an intergovernmental 
conference, conduct in connection with treaties, executive conduct, legislative and administrative acts, 
and decisions of national courts.169 For a rule of CIL to be established, the practice must be general, 
                                                             
163 ICJ Statute, Article 38. 
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that is, ‘sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent’.170 As the commentary to the 
ILC conclusions explains, the practice ‘should be of such a character as to make it possible to discern 
a virtually uniform usage’, although the exact extent depends on the rule in question and universal or 
uniform practice is not required.171 The requirement of opinio juris entails that the practice must be 
undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation, as opposed to mere usage or habit.172 Broad and 
representative acceptance is required.173 Forms of evidence of opinio juris include public statements 
made on behalf of states, official publications, government legal opinions, diplomatic correspondence, 
decisions of national courts, treaty provisions, and conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by 
an IO or at an intergovernmental conference.174 
In the present instance, the proposed obligations of states as framed in Chapter 2 are two-tiered: first, 
a duty to enable the voice of affected peoples in IOs and other international fora by including peoples’ 
representatives on their national delegations; and second, a duty to promote the creation of 
mechanisms for the participation of affected peoples in IOs and other global governance bodies. In 
respect of the first obligation, the relevant evidence would include material such as: domestic 
legislation regarding the inclusion of peoples’ representatives on state delegations (practice and opinio 
juris); the practice of states in respect of the same, as ascertained according to lists of participants in 
international fora (practice); statements made by states in international fora (opinio juris); and any 
other relevant statements or practice. In terms of the second obligation, the evidence will include 
proposals and statements advanced by states in IOs and other international fora (practice and opinio 
juris); and decisions of bodies of IOs that are representative of member states with regard to the 
participation of peoples, as such documents evidence the collective practice and will of states 
(practice and opinio juris). In addition, some of the material covered in other sections of this chapter 
will also be relevant to the question of custom: GA resolutions, for instance, can provide evidence as 
to the practice and opinio juris of states.175  
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4.2 Customary international law and international organizations  
Two preliminary points need to be established: that IOs can be bound by CIL, and that they can 
contribute to its formation.  
On the first, the phrase in the WHO-Egypt opinion—‘obligations incumbent upon [IOs] under general 
rules of international law’—has been much debated in the literature. The term ‘general rules of 
international law’ is rightly criticised as a ‘monument to indeterminacy’;176 it has been used 
inconsistently by the ICJ at different times to variously mean rules of custom, rules of custom and 
general principles, or something else entirely.177 But while some construe the ICJ’s statement as 
excluding the application of rules of CIL to IOs,178 the more generally accepted view seems to be that 
IOs can be subject to CIL.179  
Of course, IOs will not be affected by all existing rules of CIL. Many rules simply do not apply to 
their activities: rules on state responsibility, self-defence in armed conflict, or territory.180 Other rules 
may apply to IOs as well as to states: custom relating to human rights, for instance. On the other hand, 
some rules are primarily applicable to IOs: rules on their responsibility, for instance. Thus it is 
conceptually possible for IOs to be bound by a mixture of the same and different obligations than 
those applicable to states. The ICJ’s statement in the Reparations advisory opinion supports this 
notion:181 
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their 
rights, and their nature depends on the needs of the community. 
As the ILC phrased it in its Commentary to the ARIO, IOs are ‘quite different from States and in 
addition present great diversity among themselves’. Unlike states, they ‘do not possess and general 
competence and have been established in order to exercise specific functions’.182 In its commentary to 
the Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law, the ILC further 
emphasized that IOs are ‘not states’ and ‘may have their own rights and obligations under 
international law’.183 
                                                             
176 Klabbers (2017) 989. 
177 Danilenko (1993) 9-10; Weil (1983) 436-437. 
178 Benvenisti (2018) 22-23; Alvarez (2016) 8-9; Klabbers (2017) 997-998. 
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On the second point, it has long been recognised that IOs play a role in the formation of custom as 
fora in which States develop a general practice accepted as law:184 they can be vehicles through which 
states act as well as catalysts of state practice.185  
More recently, it has been acknowledged that the practice of IOs themselves can contribute to the 
establishment of CIL. Some are of the view that IOs do not have a role in the creation of custom but 
can nonetheless be bound by it.186 However, other commentators as well as the ILC are of a different 
opinion.187 Conclusion 4 of the 2018 ILC Conclusions provides that, in addition to the practice of 
states, which is primary:188 
2. In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation, or 
expression, of rules of customary international law.  
The Commentary to the Conclusions makes clear that it is referring to the practice of IOs themselves, 
as opposed to the practice of states acting within or through such organizations.189 By reference to the 
theory of IOs explored in Chapter 2, this seems correct.190 The Commentary states that the practice of 
IOs may be particularly relevant ‘with rules of customary international law that are addressed 
specifically to them, such as those on their international responsibility or relating to treaties to which 
they are parties’.191  
The Commentary further provides for two cases where such practice is relevant: where member states 
have transferred exclusive competences to the IO, such as in the case of the EU; and where member 
states have conferred on the organization powers functionally equivalent to those exercised by states, 
such as when organizations are ‘concluding treaties, serving as treaty depositaries, in deploying 
military forces (for example, for peacekeeping), in administering territories, or in taking positions on 
the scope of the privileges and immunities of the organization and its officials’.192 These ostensibly 
exclusive cases are rightly criticised as ‘elusive’ and ‘ill-defined’,193 leaving many unanswered 
questions, as well as ‘overly formalistic’ with regard to the role of IOs in international relations.194 
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A helpful analytical distinction is made by Magdalena Pacholska, between rules applicable only to 
states, rules applicable to both states and IOs, and rules applicable only to IOs.195 It seems ‘self-
evident’ that IOs should be able to participate in the formation of the latter two kinds of rules.196 This 
notion is supported by the views of states197 and IOs,198 and is generally supported by the theory of 
particular custom.199 However, to counter the risk that ‘IOs might over time be capable of imposing 
customary rules on States against their will’,200 it is appropriate that the practice of an IO may only 
contribute to the creation of CIL binding states if it ‘has been generally accepted over time by the 
organization’s member States’.201 
Regarding the weight to be attributed to the practice of IOs, the Commentary notes that the practice of 
IOs carries greater weight the more directly it is carried out on behalf of its member states or endorsed 
by them, and the larger the number of the member states.202 Thus, for instance, a practice of the UN 
mandated by a GA resolution would hold great weight. Other factors relevant in weighing the practice 
include the organization’s nature, the nature of the relevant organ, whether the conduct is ultra vires, 
and whether the conduct is ‘consonant with that of the member States of the organization’.203 
Otherwise, it is intuitive that similar considerations in assessing the practice and opinio juris of states 
apply to that of IOs.  
The right of peoples to participate in global governance, if it exists, would entail obligations for both 
states and IOs. Hence, in accordance with Pacholska’s suggestion, the practice and opinio juris of IOs 
themselves, as well as that of states, is relevant for ascertaining whether the right is a rule of CIL. The 
distinction between the practice of IOs themselves, as opposed to the practice of states acting within 
IOs, is not necessarily easy to make.204 More likely to show evidence of the former are the acts of 
bodies or officers of IOs that are not representative of the organization’s membership, and the public 
statements of officers of IOs. More likely to go towards the latter are decisions of representative 
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bodies of IOs. The distinction between the two is not overly important in this study, as the proposed 
rule applies to both IOs and states.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has uncovered the limitations of international legal instruments such as the Human 
Rights Covenants and the UNDRIP, as well as judicial decisions, in respect of doctrinal support for 
the proposed right of peoples to participate in matters affecting them in global governance. There is a 
modicum of support for a participatory element of self-determination as between a people and the 
state, as well as some suggestion in soft (albeit persuasive) law that indigenous peoples are entitled to 
participate in the affairs of IOs that concern them, and the potential for hard law to similar effect in 
respect of the Nordic states. Moreover, the international legal regime on indigenous peoples’ 
consultation and FPIC aligns with the notion that to fulfil the proposed right requires a higher level of 
participation the more affected the relevant people is.  
Although the proposed right is not inconsistent with the positive law on the reading developed here, 
the extent of doctrinal support is restricted. While it can be argued that there is a doctrinal foundation 
for an obligation of states, found in common Article 1(3) of the Covenants, the only potential textual 
basis for an obligation of international instruments exists only in soft law and applies only to 
indigenous peoples rather than to peoples more generally; the law of jus cogens does not assist. In 
addition, explicit backing for a right to participate in international and global affairs concerning them, 
as opposed to local and national matters, is extremely limited. 
In this light, further work is warranted to determine whether the proposed right has formed, or is in 
the process of forming, a rule of CIL. This chapter has set out the grounds for holding that the practice 
and opinio juris of IOs, as well as that of states, can be relevant in such an assessment. Further, it has 
set out the relevant factors to be taken into account in considering whether the proposed right has 
become a rule of custom. The empirical analysis in the following chapters in part draws upon this 
framework to determine whether the proposed right has become a rule of CIL. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Participation in Standard-Setting 
1. Introduction 
The next four chapters will canvas a large amount of practice of IOs and states with regard to peoples’ 
participation in matters affecting them at the international level. An examination of this practice will 
reveal four main insights. 
First, it is unlikely that a rule of CIL has formed, by reference to the considerations set out in the 
preceding chapter. While practice is widespread, it is not necessarily consistent, and is rarely 
accompanied by the requisite opinio juris. Some theories of custom would not require opinio juris, or 
would hold that a rule of custom can be formed with only a few instances of practice accompanied by 
opinio juris.1 But by the more standard, accepted view, it is difficult to argue that custom has 
emerged. In the assessment, accordingly, instances of opinio juris will be highlighted where they can 
be found, but the matter will not be dwelled upon in every case. While there is considerable evidence 
that IOs and states consider the practice to be aligned with or required by the UNDRIP, because many 
states do not consider the UNDRIP to be international law—only soft law—it is difficult to 
confidently state that this constitutes opinio.  
Regardless of the existence of a rule of custom, a widespread practice exists whereby states and IOs 
have created mechanisms and policies to enable peoples to participate in global governance on 
matters concerning them. These chapters aim to draw many instances of practice together, connecting 
the dots to reveal the wider picture. They will assess the practice by reference to the level of 
participation required under the framework adopted from Arnstein. In addition, with regard to the 
question of who is entitled to represent a people, the thesis will identify a general practice whereby 
IOs allow peoples themselves to determine who will represent them.  
The third finding that these chapters will reveal is an insight as to the motivations of states and IOs for 
adopting the practice of enabling peoples to be heard in global governance matters affecting them. If 
not because of a belief that it is required by law, why do IOs do this? First, it will be seen that many 
organizations believe that the participation of peoples in matters affecting them is intrinsically 
important. Second, it will be seen that in many cases the explicit or implicit motivation, evident in the 
statements of IOs and states, is that enabling affected peoples to participate allows an organization to 
better carry out its functions and fulfil its mandate, or to more effectively achieve the objectives of a 
treaty. IOs can better fulfil their objectives by enabling peoples to participate in matters affecting 
them, because doing so can yield information that would not otherwise be available to policy- and 
decision-making processes, add to the perceived legitimacy of the outcomes, and improve the 
                                                             
1 See e.g. D’Amato (1998) 1; Kopelmanas (1937) 129-130; Mendelson (1998) 188. 
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implementation of and compliance to policies and decisions due to increased buy-in of affected 
peoples. In this way the imperatives of functionalism can result in inclusion.  
On this basis, the thesis will argue that there is a norm, in the social constructivist sense found in 
international relations literature whereby “norms” are ‘shared expectations about appropriate 
behaviour held by a community of actors’ that ‘create patterns of behaviour in accordance with their 
prescriptions’.2 A “norm” has a ‘prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of “oughtness”’ and ‘shared moral 
assessment’.3 The existence of a “norm” correlates with the reactions of others: behaviour which 
conforms with the norm generates praise or a neutral reaction, whereas conduct which violates the 
norm results in disapproval or stigma.4 A norm has emerged and has been accepted by a critical mass 
of IOs.5 Peoples affected by global governance activities have a legitimate expectation that they will 
be able to participate in the relevant processes.  
The final thread leads to a question. It will be seen that some instances of practice, while appearing to 
meet the standard required to fulfil the right on paper, in reality work such that participation is 
nominal, rendering the appearance of voice illusory. Due to a lack of secondary literature on how 
participation takes place “on the ground” in many of the IOs studied, however, it is difficult to assess 
the extent to which such problems occur. This is an area where other research methods, such as 
interview-based or ethnographic, could be applied to answer the question of whether participation is 
in fact meaningful.  
This “birds-eye assessment” will reveal a complex picture whereby the existence of a norm (in the 
social constructivist sense) throws into sharp relief cases where that norm is violated. By no means do 
all IOs consult or include peoples consulted or included on decisions that affect them. Even where 
there is nominal participation, it may not be full and effective. There is much more to be done to fulfil 
the right in all cases. However, the large number of cases where there is full and effective 
participation demonstrates the acceptance of the norm. Statements attributable to IOs, as well as those 
of states, evidence the perceived benefits of this norm: it is said to, instrumentally speaking, enable 
IOs to better achieve their mandated objectives and fulfil their functions, due to the improved quality 
of information to be used in policy- and decision-making, as well as greater buy-in to and ownership 
over outcomes by affected peoples. While it is unlikely that this norm has crystallised into a rule of 
CIL, it forms a legitimate expectation for affected peoples and a blueprint by which a rule of custom 
may in future emerge. 
                                                             
2 Finnemore (1996) 22-23. See also Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 891-892. Similarly, see Florini (1996) 364-
365. 
3 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 891-892. 
4 Ibid 891-892. 
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to convince a critical mass of IOs and states to embrace the new norm, are peoples who have been affected by 
global governance processes.  
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These chapters are laid out as follows. This chapter concerns the participation of indigenous peoples 
in standard-setting activities of IOs and states acting collectively in intergovernmental fora. Chapter 5 
concerns the participation of peoples in decision-making affecting them, focusing on that of 
international financial institutions and UN field programmes. Chapter 6 concerns general mechanisms 
for the participation of peoples in IOs, including associate member status, advisory or subsidiary 
bodies, permanent participant status, and the special case of Palestine. Chapter 7 discusses the 
participation of peoples at international courts and tribunals, focusing on the ICJ, ISDS tribunals, and 
WTO dispute settlement. To some extent this division is arbitrary; other ways of categorising the 
practice into manageable servings could have been chosen, including by area of mandate or type of 
participation. The categories overlap to a certain degree. In addition, the thesis does not include some 
kinds of practice, such as the participation of peoples in peace negotiations, international 
administration, and some IOs that act as corrective mechanisms for state violations of peoples rights, 
such as the human rights treaty bodies and regional human rights courts. While these fields contain 
relevant material, the scope of this study is necessarily limited by available space: in the case of the 
latter, the workings of human rights treaty bodies and regional human rights courts are relatively well 
understood, whereas this thesis prefers to give space to practice that has not yet been explored in the 
literature. These chapters also largely leave aside practice relating to the obligation of states to include 
peoples’ representatives on national delegations; this would require its own substantial study. 
This chapter first considers standard-setting on the rights of indigenous peoples. It outlines the 
participation of indigenous peoples in the development of the UNDRIP and the ILO Convention 169. 
Then, the chapter turns to other standard-setting activities affecting peoples’ rights, considering 
practice under the WIPO, UNFCCC, CBD, FAO, and UNESCO. It examines the ISA and IMO as 
negative examples where the relevant practice does not exist. 
2. Standard-setting on the rights of indigenous peoples: the process leading to the adoption of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
In the past few decades significant advances have been made regarding the adoption of international 
instruments on the rights of indigenous peoples. By definition, these instruments fundamentally 
concern indigenous peoples, and so it is an area in which a high level of participation is required to 
fulfil the right. The process leading to the adoption of the UNDRIP was one such. The development of 
regional instruments on indigenous peoples’ rights has also seen a high level of participation of 
indigenous peoples.6 While these processes can be contrasted with the creation of the ILO Convention 
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No. 169 on indigenous peoples, which was developed in a much quicker procedure with much less 
space for the participation of indigenous people,7 it is evident that in the vast majority of cases of 
standard-setting on indigenous peoples’ rights there is a sense of the intrinsic importance of 
indigenous peoples’ participation. In addition, there is a recognition that indigenous peoples’ 
involvement is necessary to reach the objective of formulating an instrument on their rights.  
The process of the development of the UNDRIP was characterised by an ‘extraordinarily liberal, 
transparent and democratic procedure’8 and high levels of participation of indigenous peoples 
themselves, in a way that has subsequently been characterised as a “best practice”. It took place in a 
subsidiary body and then a working group, both established under UN auspices, before the eventual 
debate and adoption of the instrument in the GA.  
2.1 Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations (“WGIP”) was established by ECOSOC in 1982 as a 
subsidiary organ of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.9 Meeting 
in annual sessions, it was composed of five members of the Sub-Commission, who were independent 
human rights experts.10 The WGIP’s mandate was to review developments concerning the promotion 
and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, and to elaborate standards concerning their rights.11 
From 1985, the latter part of this mandate chiefly related to the development of a declaration on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, an initiative of the WGIP itself which was subsequently authorised by 
the Sub-Commission.12 
The WGIP supported the broad participation of indigenous peoples in its activities. In addition to 
states, and NGOs with consultative status at the ECOSOC, the WGIP decided that indigenous 
peoples’ organizations without consultative status with the ECOSOC should be able to participate as 
observers.13 Indigenous peoples were thus placed on the same footing as states in the WGIP’s 
proceedings. These representatives of indigenous peoples were permitted to speak, prepare working 
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presence of indigenous representatives as members of the public at the first and second meetings of the WGIP, 
was never formalised in writing: Stamatopolou (1994) 68 note 30. On the rules of participation, see Cambou 
(2018) 40; Sanders (1989) 408. 
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papers, and make proposals.14 Particularly notable is the role of one staff member of the Sub-
Commission, Augusto Willemsen Diaz, in promoting this mode of participation.15 In his own words, 
Willemsen Diaz ‘sought ways of opening [the WGIP] up to the involvement of indigenous peoples’ as 
he was ‘concerned about the restrictive effect’ of the requirement for ECOSOC consultative status 
and ‘felt it absurd, and contradictory in the extreme, to create a working group to listen to indigenous 
organisations’ representatives and then to demand that they have consultative status before they could 
participate in its sessions’, likening it to ‘destroying with one hand what you had just finished building 
with the other’.16 
In practice, indigenous peoples’ representatives took advantage of this status to both make formal 
presentations and informally lobby WGIP members and state delegates.17 The participation of 
indigenous peoples was assisted by the 1985 establishment of the Voluntary Fund for Indigenous 
Populations, administered by the Secretary-General on the advice of a five-person board of which one 
member must be a representative of an indigenous peoples’ organization.18 This participatory practice 
may be attributed both to the WGIP itself as an organ of the UN, and to states: although it first began 
on the initiative of the WGIP, the establishment of the Voluntary Fund by member states acting 
through the GA can be seen to have implicitly acknowledged and authorised the practice.  
Despite modest levels of attendance at first,19 in practice the WGIP played host to the participation of 
large numbers of indigenous representatives: in 1988, for instance, ten indigenous NGOs and 76 other 
indigenous organizations participated,20 while in 1992 there were around a thousand participants, 
representing hundreds of groups.21 In addition, the WGIP saw state practice with respect to the 
inclusion of indigenous representatives on their delegations, including by Australia, Norway and 
Sweden.22 
While some have described indigenous peoples’ participation at the WGIP as ‘performance’ and 
‘social drama’,23 others highlight that their views were ‘increasingly taken into account’:24 the first 
complete draft of the declaration, produced in 1988, ‘substantially reflected proposals submitted by 
                                                             
14 Eide (2009) 34, 36. Willemsen Diaz explains the process of how this decision was arrived at, on a proposal of 
Asbjörn Eide, the then Chair of the WGIP: Willemsen Diaz (2009) 27. 
15 Willemsen Diaz (2009). 
16 Willemsen Diaz (2009) 26. 
17 Alfredsson (1989) 24. 
18 GA res 40/131. According to a 2010 report of the UNHCHR, ‘in practice, indigenous persons have been 
regularly appointed as members of the Board’: A/HRC/15/38. In practice at times the board has been 100% 
indigenous: Willemsen Diaz (2009) 29. 
19 Muelebach (2001) 420. 
20 Sanders (1989) 410. 
21 Willemsen Diaz (2009) 27. 
22 Alfredsson (1986) 25. 
23 Thornberry (2002) 22. 
24 Eide (2009) 36. 
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indigenous peoples’ representatives’.25 The WGIP was an ‘important platform for the dissemination 
of information and exchange of views’ among indigenous peoples, states and NGOs, and the process 
of drafting the declaration was ‘an important means for indigenous peoples to promote their own 
conceptions about their rights’.26 
Following a process of revision, in which indigenous peoples along with states and others were 
consulted,27 the WGIP completed its final draft text in 1993,28 which was adopted by the Sub-
Commission in 1994 and forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights.29 
The WGIP’s procedures can be seen as ‘both dramatic and modest’, as even though it was the first 
time indigenous peoples had an institutional voice at the UN, the WGIP was ‘at the lowest level in the 
system’:30 its recommendations would have to go through the Sub-Commission, the Commission on 
Human Rights, the ECOSOC, the Third Committee, and the GA before being approved. It did not 
have policy-making or adjudicatory powers. As such, indigenous peoples perceived that they were 
still being ‘treated as second-class citizens’ at the UN.31  
In addition, the practice of the WGIP cannot be said to have been accompanied by opinio juris. There 
is no evidence to suggest that the participation of indigenous peoples was regarded by the Working 
Group or UN member states as required by law; rather, it seems to have been done in response to 
increased demands by indigenous peoples, as well as to enable the WGIP to fulfil its mandate.32 
Hence, while the WGIP served as a way for indigenous peoples to ‘make place’ for themselves within 
the UN,33 strengthen their own identity and sense of solidarity,34 and participate ‘fully and very 
actively as proponents and direct drafters’ in the making of their rights under international law,35 it 
cannot be seen as supporting the formation of CIL.  
                                                             
25 Anaya (2004) 63; see Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
‘Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights: A Set of Preambular Paragraphs and Principles’ (1988) UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/25. See also Alfredsson (1989) 24 (‘There is no question that [indigenous peoples’] views 
have had a significant impact on the content of resolutions adopted and on the current preliminary draft 
principles’). 
26 Anaya (2004) 63-64. 
27 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘First Revised Text of the 
Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (1989) UN Doc  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33; 
Anaya (2004) 84 note 90; Working Group on Indigenous Populations, ‘Annotations to the Provisional Agenda’ 
(8 June 1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1994/1/Add.1 [5]-[7]. 
28 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Report of the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Eleventh Session’ (1993) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, Annex I. 
29 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, res 1994/45 of 26 August 
1994, ‘Draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples’; Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Report on its 46 th session’ (1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/5. 
Commission on Human Rights res 1995/32 of 3 March 1995. 
30 Sanders (1989) 407. 
31 Burger (1994) 92. 
32 Willemsen Diaz (2009) 26; Eide (2009) 34. 
33 Muelenbach (2001) 440. 
34 Stamatopoulou (1994) 69. 
35 Willemsen Diaz (2009) 28. 
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2.2 Open-ended Intersessional Working Group on the Draft Declaration, 1995-2006 
As the WGIP’s work on the draft Declaration came to an end, the Commission on Human Rights 
established an intersessional working group with the sole purpose of developing a draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“WGDD”), taking into account the WGIP’s draft.36  
Following the successful participation of indigenous peoples in the WGIP, the ECOSOC authorised 
observer participation of indigenous peoples’ organizations not in consultative status with ECOSOC 
for the sessions of the WGDD in recognition that they had ‘special knowledge and understanding of 
the current situation of the world’s indigenous people and their human rights needs’.37 The meetings 
of the WGDD were declared to be informal—thus avoiding stringent rules of procedure—and states 
and indigenous peoples had equal rights to make oral interventions and submit written proposals; in 
addition, it was agreed that any consensus on the draft text would need to include both states and 
indigenous peoples.38 Although this arrangement was ‘formally less open’39 than the WGIP as it 
required the accreditation of organisations without consultative status and in principle the state 
concerned could object to accreditation, it nonetheless represented the positive recognition and 
endorsement by the international community of the importance of indigenous peoples’ participation in 
the making of their own rights. In practice, states rarely objected.40 In addition, states such as 
Denmark and Norway included indigenous representatives on their delegations.41 
It has been noted that indigenous peoples’ representatives had a ‘significant’ level of participation and 
succeeded in ‘gaining significant substantive influence’ over the outcome in the draft declaration as 
finalised by the WGDD.42 This arrangement is widely considered to be “best practice” with respect to 
the participation of indigenous peoples,43 as well as more generally ‘a good example of an inclusive 
and participatory UN process that contributed to the legitimacy of its outcome’.44 However, for the 
purposes of this study it too lacks any evidence that the practice was accepted as law.  
 
 
                                                             
36 Commission on Human Rights res 1995/32. For detailed accounts of the discussions at the WGDD, see 
Henriksen (2009); Chávez (2009) 96. 
37 ECOSOC res 1995/32 [4], [7]; Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32. The accreditation 
procedure for such organizations was set out in the Annex to resolution 1995/32. 
38 Henriksen (2009) 79.  
39 Willemsen Diaz (2009) 28. 
40 Human Rights Council, Participation Report [27]. 
41 Henriksen (2009) 81. 
42 Ibid 79. 
43 See e.g. Grand Council of the Crees, Letter to Claire Charters (2012), accessible at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/ConsultationonIPparticipationintheUN.aspx. 
44 WIPO IGC, ‘Draft Study on the Participation of Observers in the Work of the Intergovernmental Committee 
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’, WIPO Doc 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/7, Annex [11]. 
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2.3 Adoption of the Declaration at the General Assembly 
The WGDD process concluded with the referral by the Sub-Commission and the subsequent adoption 
by the Human Rights Council of a draft declaration.45 Upon the transferral of the draft declaration to 
the GA, indigenous peoples’ representatives who had participated vigorously in the proceedings of the 
WGIP and WGDD for more than 20 years found themselves with a ‘greatly diminished voice’.46 
Owing to the strict rules of procedure applicable to the GA and its Third Committee, indigenous 
peoples could not participate in the discussion. They remained on the sidelines as disagreements over 
self-determination, the definition of indigenous peoples, and state sovereignty resulted in the process 
temporarily stalling.47 While indigenous peoples were informed about a final set of changes made by 
states a week before the UNDRIP’s adoption in 2007,48 it does not appear that they were able to 
exercise any influence over the alterations. This case demonstrates that participation may ultimately 
be limited by entrenched procedural rules that maintain the centrality of states in IOs. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the GA, ‘no other UN human rights instrument ha[d] ever been 
elaborated with so much direct involvement and active participation on the part of its intended 
beneficiaries’.49 The great majority of the process had taken place by way of direct negotiations 
between indigenous peoples and states. The process leading to the adoption of the UNDRIP can be 
characterised as a partnership, in Arnstein’s terminology, whereby power was shared between states 
and the peoples concerned. This level of participation was undoubtedly necessary for the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the resulting instrument. 
3. Standard-setting affecting indigenous peoples’ rights 
This section considers the practice of the WIPO, the UNFCCC, the CBD, the FAO, UNESCO, the 
ISA and the IMO. In each case, the relevant practice will be explored, followed by a consideration of 
the motivations for the practice and the question of opinio juris. In the WIPO, UNFCCC and CBD the 
practice takes the form of participation of indigenous peoples in subsidiary organs dealing with 
matters specifically affecting them. In the FAO the practice consists of enhanced participation, along 
with other affected groups. These organizations also provide for a lower level of participation in their 
wider affairs. UNESCO and FAO also have policies regarding the participation of indigenous peoples 
in matters affecting them. 
 
 
                                                             
45 The Council had recently replaced the Commission. Human Rights Council res 2006/2. 
46 Carmen (2009) 98. 
47 See Castellino and Doyle (2018) 28; Eide (2009) 38-40. 
48 Carmen (2009) 98. 
49 Daes (2009) 74. 
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3.1 The World Intellectual Property Organization Intergovernmental Committee on 
Traditional Knowledge 
As outlined in Chapter 2, WIPO’s standard-setting activities affect indigenous peoples, particularly 
the process underway in its IGC. In this body, WIPO has instituted sui generis rules of procedure to 
enable indigenous peoples’ participation. 
The WIPO Rules of Procedure do not provide for the participation of indigenous peoples, or indeed of 
anyone but member states and observer states and IGOs.50 However, even before the establishment of 
the IGC, from the earliest stages of WIPO’s consideration of traditional knowledge there was a 
recognition within the organisation that it should reach out ‘to identify and explore the intellectual 
property needs and expectations of new beneficiaries, including the holders of indigenous knowledge 
and innovations’.51  
At the IGC’s first meeting, a fast-track accreditation procedure for ad hoc observers was established 
to allow indigenous communities (and other entities) without permanent observer status at WIPO to 
participate in the IGC’s meetings.52 Indigenous peoples, along with all other participants, are allowed 
to speak at the beginning of the IGC sessions, and are also permitted some speaking time during the 
sessions.53 In practice, the Chair of the IGC has allowed observers to intervene on any agenda item, 
and to make drafting proposals on negotiating texts and other working documents for consideration by 
member states; such proposals are incorporated in the text if supported by at least one member state 
and are reflected in the reports of the sessions.54 On occasion, indigenous peoples’ representatives 
have served as rapporteurs for contact drafting groups.55 In addition, in 2013 an IGC meeting included 
an Indigenous Expert Workshop as part of its proceedings,56 and another will be held during 2020-
2021.57 This is a markedly higher level of participation than permitted in other organs of WIPO, and 
gives indigenous peoples the ability to make meaningful inputs into the standard-setting process. 
Under Arnstein’s typology it falls at a level between consultation and partnership. If and when 
                                                             
50 WIPO, General Rules of Procedure, No 399 (FE) Rev. 3, 1998. (Adopted 28 September 1970; amended 27 
November 1973, 5 October 1976, and 2 October 1979), Rules 7 and 8. 
51 WIPO Budget Committee, ‘Draft Program and Budget 1998-1999’ (1998) WIPO Doc WO/BC/18/2—A/32/2 
107. See IGC, ‘Participation of Local and Indigenous Communities in the Work of the Committee’ (2002) 
WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/12 [3]-[8]. 
52 IGC, ‘Rules of Procedure’ (2001) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/2 [6], [8]; IGC, ‘Report on the First 
Session’ (2001) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/13 [17]-[18]. 
53 IGC, ‘Report on the Seventh Session’ (2005) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/15  [63]. 
54 IGC, ‘Draft Study on the Participation of Observers in the Work of the Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’, WIPO Doc 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/7, Annex [24]. 
55 IGC, ‘Intersessional Working Group (IWG) 2, March 2011’ (2011) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IWG/2/3. 
56 IGC, ‘Report of the Indigenous Expert Workshop’, WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/25/INF/9. 




negotiations result in legal instruments on traditional knowledge and cultural expression, the contents 
of such instruments will have been greatly influenced by indigenous peoples. 
In addition to their participation in the substantive negotiations, since 2005, pursuant to a proposal 
made by New Zealand,58 the sessions of the IGC have been opened by panels of representatives of 
indigenous and traditional communities presenting on their concerns and experiences.59 According to 
the WIPO Secretariat, these panels are ‘a rich source of information on the experiences, concerns and 
aspirations of indigenous and local communities concerning the protection, promotion and 
preservation of traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions and genetic resources’.60 
Summaries of their proceedings are recorded in WIPO’s reports of the IGC meetings,61 and 
presentations made by panel participants are made available on the IGC website.62 While the panels 
could be argued to heighten the visibility of indigenous peoples and increase awareness of their 
concerns and experiences, in practice they may not add much to, and may even detract from, 
indigenous peoples’ substantive influence. State representatives often leave the room during the 
presentations,63 and there is no formal mechanism by which they feed into the process. This is an 
ineffective variety of consultation, under Arnstein’s typology. The panels have thus been rightly 
criticised as increasing ‘apparent participation while not improving their influence’ and sidelining 
indigenous peoples’ views.64  
WIPO provides some practical support for the participation of indigenous peoples. The Secretariat 
facilitates preparatory consultative arrangements for indigenous representatives through an Indigenous 
Consultative Forum before each IGC meeting, and provides a dedicated room for indigenous peoples 
and local communities’ representatives to hold consultations throughout the meetings,65 as well as a 
‘fully equipped office with multilingual secretarial support’.66 In addition, WIPO nominally funds, 
with member states’ contributions, the participation of accredited indigenous and local communities 
through the WIPO Voluntary Fund.67 However, the fund is frequently depleted, and in reality finances 
                                                             
58 IGC, ‘New Zealand Proposal—Practical Participation of Indigenous and Local Communities’ (2005) WIPO 
Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/14. 
59 IGC, ‘Report on the Seventh Session’, [63(iv)]. 
60 WIPO, ‘Presentations on Indigenous and Local Community Experiences’, 
https://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/panels.html, accessed 5 August 2019. 
61 IGC, ‘Draft Study on the Participation of Observers in the  Work of the Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’, Annex [37]. 
62 WIPO, ‘Intergovernmental Committee IGC’ https://wipo.int/tk/en/igc/. 
63 Gordon (2014) 655. 
64 Ibid 655. 
65 IGC, ‘Practical Guide for Observers’, 4, 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/igc/pdf/observers_practical_guide.pdf. 
66 Ibid. 
67 WIPO, ‘Establishment of the WIPO Voluntary Fund for Accredited Indigenous and Local Communities’ 
(2005) WIPO Doc WO/GA/32/6, Annex.  
109 
 
the attendance of only a few representatives;68 in addition, states have opposed the funding of 
indigenous peoples’ participation from WIPO’s core budget.69 This experience demonstrates that 
mechanisms for enabling indigenous peoples’ participation may be rendered illusory if not materially 
supported.70  
It has been pointed out by indigenous peoples and international legal scholars that while the level of 
participation is more than nothing, it does not place indigenous peoples on the same footing as 
states.71 While indigenous peoples may make textual proposals and amendments, these require the 
support of at least one state in order to be reflected in the text.72 Proposals made by states, of course, 
encounter no such gatekeeping. Indigenous peoples cannot vote in the IGC, unlike states, nor will 
they be able to vote on the adoption of any eventual instrument in the WIPO General Assembly.73 
Moreover, accreditation of indigenous peoples’ organisations under the “fast track” procedure in 
practice still takes up to a year, and member states can block organisations from participating.74 In 
addition, indigenous peoples’ representatives have the same level of participation as other non-state 
actors such as NGOs and industry observers. Hence some have argued that the IGC is still premised 
on a ‘statist franchise’ in which the participation of indigenous peoples is ‘marginal and mediated 
through the prism of the state’.75 Indigenous peoples’ participation does not meet the level of 
partnership in which power is distributed. 
Such criticisms led indigenous peoples’ representatives at the IGC’s 20th meeting in 2012 to withdraw 
from active participation, calling on states to acknowledge that the process ‘should include Indigenous 
Peoples on equal terms with the States since the work will directly impact’ their lives, lands, 
territories and resources, and saying they would not participate again until the rules of procedure were 
changed ‘to permit [their] full and equitable participation at all levels of the IGC’.76 They requested 
‘full and effective participation’ in ‘all relevant negotiations and decision-making processes, including 
all regular and special sessions of the IGC, the General Assembly, diplomatic conferences and any 
other related meetings regarding the proposed instruments’; the ability to make proposals without 
                                                             
68 See e.g. IGC, ‘Report of the Thirty-Sixth Session’ (2018) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/36/11 [31]; ‘Report 
on the Thirty-Fifth Session’ (2018) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/35/10 [36]. See also Gordon (2014) 655.  
69 IGC, ‘Report on the Twenty-Eight Session’ (2014) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28 [34]. 
70 Solomon (2017) 227. 
71 See e.g. Gordon (2014); Lawson, Bikundo and Tranter (2019); Solomon (2017); Boehme (2018). 
72 Gordon (2014) 632. 
73 Lawson, Bikundo and Tranter (2019) 307, 309. 
74 Gordon (2014) 654. 
75 Lawson, Bikundo and Tranter (2019) 307, 310. 





requiring immediate state support; and consultation on ‘all proposals, deletions and amendments of all 
text in a collaborative manner’.77 
These protests did not ultimately result in change. In response to the immediate situation, the IGC 
“took note” of the statements and stated that the requests might be considered at future meetings. 
Subsequently, pursuant to a request by the WIPO General Assembly,78 the WIPO Secretariat proposed 
several options to enhance observer participation in the IGC.79 It suggested, inter alia: drawing a 
distinction between observer organizations that represent and are accountable to indigenous peoples 
and local communities, and NGOs that work for or with indigenous peoples and local communities;80 
inviting indigenous peoples’ representatives to nominate representatives to form part of “Friends of 
the Chair” groups, or co-chair or co-facilitate sub-working groups;81 and bringing the panel 
discussions formally into the IGC’s proceedings by using them to provide the IGC with information 
and advice on a specific theme identified by the IGC at a previous session.82 The IGC went as far as 
carrying out a consideration of the practical, procedural and budgetary implications of these actions.83 
But at its following meeting the IGC merely “took note of and exchanged views” on the matter, 
without altering its procedure.84 
Linked to these frustrations, the IGC process has also been criticised for an ‘appalling lack of 
progress’ due to ‘stonewalling’ by developed countries seeking to ‘protect their commercial 
investments’.85 Negotiations have been protracted: the IGC’s mandate to produce a negotiated text 
was originally set to expire at the end of 2011,86 but it has had to be extended several times due to 
entrenched disagreement stemming from deep-seated political differences. As such, the IGC process 
may be losing its legitimacy in the eyes of indigenous peoples. Only four indigenous representatives 
attended the 30th meeting of the IGC in 2016;87 around eight attended in 2019.88 As Aroha Te Pareake, 
a keynote speaker at the 30th meeting, put it: ‘this surely represents a low point in this IGC process, a 
warning signal that the IGC may have lost credibility with many indigenous peoples because of the 
                                                             
77 ‘Statement of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities at WIPO IGC 19’, accessed at http://ip-
watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Indigenous-Peoples-Statement-IGC19. 
78 WIPO, ‘Matters concerning the IGC’ (2011) WIPO Doc WO/GA/40/7 [16]. 
79 IGC, ‘Draft Study on the Participation of Observers in the Work of the Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’ (2012) WIPO Doc 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/7 and Annex. 
80 Ibid [6]-[7], Annex [15]-[17]. 
81 Ibid [8], Annex [26]-[27]. 
82 Ibid, Annex [38]. 
83 IGC, ‘Draft Report on the Twenty-First Session’ (2012) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/21/7 Prov 2 [618]. 
84 IGC, ‘Draft Report on the Twenty-Second Session’ (2012) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/22/6 Prov 2 [514]. 
85 Solomon (2017) 225-226. 
86 WIPO General Assembly, ‘Report on the Thirty-Eighth Session’ (2009) WIPO Doc WO/GA/38/20 [217]; see 
also IGC, Report on the Fifteenth Session (2009) WIPO/GRTKF/IC/15/7 [79], [125] and [140]. 
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impasse and blockage that has occurred here and the lack of certainty over the recognition of 
indigenous peoples as rights holders’.89 It is unlikely, however, that greater participation in the 
process could assist with this. Indigenous peoples, even if granted the ability to co-chair negotiations 
and make proposals directly on the draft text without the endorsement of a state, cannot force states to 
come to an agreement. 
3.1.1 Motivations 
Statements made by both states and WIPO organs evidence recognition that indigenous peoples ought 
to be able to participate in matters affecting them at the international level.  
The IGC decided in 2005 that ‘there was a unanimous view that the participation of local and 
indigenous communities was of great importance’ for its work.90 The WIPO General Assembly has 
repeatedly ‘recogniz[ed] the importance of the participation of Indigenous peoples and local 
communities in the work of the IGC’ in the context of encouraging member states to contribute to the 
WIPO Voluntary Fund.91 In addition, the WIPO General Assembly decided in 2002 that states should 
‘be encouraged to include representatives of indigenous and local communities on their delegations’ 
to the IGC.92 The IGC itself considered in 2005 that states ‘should make every effort’ to include such 
representatives in their delegations.93 
Individual states, too, have repeatedly expressed the importance of indigenous peoples’ participation.  
According to New Zealand’s 2004 proposal, ‘the subject matter’ meant that ‘indigenous and local 
communities have a very high stake in the outcomes of its deliberations.’94 The submissions of 
member states to a 2011 consultation on observer participation also ‘underscored the vital importance 
of guaranteeing…the participation of indigenous peoples and local communities, as the holders of 
traditional knowledge…and traditional cultural expressions’.95 For instance, Colombia stated that the 
representation of indigenous peoples and local communities was ‘fundamental’;96 Pakistan 
encouraged ‘strengthening the capacity’ of observers to contribute to the process, citing their 
                                                             
89 Quoted in Solomon (2017) 226. 
90 IGC, ‘Report on the Fifth Session’ (2003) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/15 [206]. 
91 See e.g. WIPO, ‘Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, Fifty-Eighth Series of Meetings, Summary 
Report’ (2018) WIPO Doc A/58/10 [43]. 
92 WIPO, ‘Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, Thirty-Seventh Series of Meetings, General Report’ 
(2002) WIPO Doc A/37/14 [290(ii)]. 
93 IGC, ‘Report on the Fifth Session’, [206]. 
94 IGC, ‘New Zealand Proposal’, Annex, [1]. 
95 ‘Draft Study on the Participation of Observers in the Work of the Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’, Annex [3]. The submissions 
of states came from Colombia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States. Access to the 
original submissions is not available.  
96 WIPO Secretariat, ‘Note on Existing Mechanisms for Participation of Observers in the Work of the WIPO 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore’ (10 October 2011), Annex, Republic of Colombia, ‘Comments on mechanisms for participation of 
observers in the Twentieth Session of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore’, 1. 
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‘valuable inputs’;97 Russia expressed ‘strong support to all mechanisms for participation of 
observers’;98 and even the United States, while not countenancing indigenous peoples’ participation in 
negotiations, acknowledged the panel presentations as a ‘vital resource’.99 States have also made their 
support for indigenous peoples’ participation known in the course of IGC meetings. At the 35th 
meeting Switzerland, delivering a statement on behalf of Group B,100 acknowledged the ‘valuable and 
essential role’ of indigenous peoples for the work of the IGC.101 At the 36th meeting, Lithuania 
speaking for Central European and Baltic States commended the active and valuable contribution of 
indigenous peoples.102 At the 37th meeting, Brazil said that it would ‘not be desirable to continue 
without’ indigenous peoples’ participation, and South Africa stated that it was committed to 
increasing indigenous peoples’ participation.103 At the 38th meeting, Morocco stated for the African 
Group that the participation of indigenous peoples was important in legitimising the IGC’s work; El 
Salvador for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States stressed that indigenous peoples’ 
contributions were important for sharing information about their experiences and points of view; and 
Canada for Group B welcomed their engagement.104 
3.1.2 Opinio juris? 
One statement of the WIPO Secretariat may suggest that it accepts the participation of indigenous 
peoples as being required by international law. A ‘Practical Guide for Observers’ in the IGC 
published on the WIPO Secretariat website states:105 
Indigenous peoples and local communities in particular need to be able to participate, express their 
views and have their voices heard in the IGC decision-making process, in accordance with the 2007 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as the outcome of the IGC negotiations will 
affect their rights. 
This statement suggests that WIPO views the participation of indigenous peoples in the IGC as 
required by the UNDRIP. However, the question of whether this amounts to opinio juris depends to 
some extent on whether or not WIPO views UNDRIP as international law. As it is considered soft law 
by many states, it cannot be confidently concluded that reference to the UNDRIP is firm evidence of 
opinio juris. At minimum, it is acknowledgement that the participation of peoples is in line with 
persuasive authority.  
                                                             
97 Ibid, Comments of the Intellectual Property Organisation of Pakistan, 1. 
98 Ibid, Comments of the Russian Federation, 1. 
99 Ibid, Comments of the United States, 1. 
100 Group B consists of industrialised countries. 
101 IGC, ‘Report on the Thirty-Fifth Session’ [20]. 
102 IGC, ‘Report on the Thirty-Sixth Session’ [20]. 
103 IGC, ‘Report on the Thirty-Seventh Session’ (2019) WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/37/17 [35], [36]. 
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The practice of WIPO is emblematic of the complex picture that these empirical chapters aim to 
sketch. On one level, it contributes to evidencing the existence of the norm: the organization has 
altered its rules to allow the participation of indigenous peoples in a standard-setting process of great 
concern to them, over and above the default level of participation allowed in the organization as a 
whole. Submissions of states, as well as statements attributable to the organization, reveal that this 
practice is considered intrinsically important. However, the practice also reveals that states are 
unwilling to distribute power to affected indigenous over the outcomes, tightly circumscribing their 
role and voice. This can be seen in the limited funding arrangements: while WIPO created a 
mechanism to provide for the financing of participation, necessary for the right to be made effective, 
in reality states have been reluctant to contribute to the Voluntary Fund. The indigenous peoples 
panels at the beginning of IGC sessions further serve to placate and distract. While indigenous 
peoples can provide inputs into the process, states have not ultimately distributed power. 
3.2 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, despite having 
contributed very little to the problem: their lives and livelihoods are closely linked with lands and 
resources, they often live in regions particularly prone to the effects of climatic change, and they are 
systematically marginalised due to the ongoing processes and effects of colonisation.106 Climate 
change has already had, and will continue to have, extensive adverse impacts on indigenous peoples’ 
food systems, water, health, culture, and economies.107 Indigenous peoples are not only victims, 
however: their traditional knowledge, it is increasingly recognised, is useful for developing effective 
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, and they play an important role in the protection 
of forests and other carbon sinks.108  
The UNFCCC is the central institution in the global climate governance regime complex.109 Activities 
carried out under its auspices, aimed at fulfilling its objective of avoiding dangerous global 
warming,110 inherently affect indigenous peoples. However, for much of the UNFCCC’s history the 
formal participation of indigenous peoples has been extremely limited. Non-state actors can 
participate as observers in the UNFCCC through nine “constituencies”, informal voluntary groups of 
organisations representing various categories of stakeholders.111 Indigenous Peoples are one such 
constituency, participating on the same basis as NGOs and other civil society organisations: each 
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constituency is allocated a limited time (usually two minutes) to make formal interventions after the 
closure of a plenary session, and can provide written input into the negotiations process upon 
invitation by the Secretariat. Notwithstanding informal ways of influencing the process, such as 
lobbying state delegates and disseminating information, this level of participation is very limited, even 
tokenistic. There is no formal means by which observers can participate during meetings, and many 
state delegates leave the room after the closure of a session and before observer statements.112 Beyond 
the case of indigenous peoples, then, the UNFCCC can be criticised for its lack of provision for those 
most directly affected by climate impacts of an active voice in decision-making: the observer 
constituencies do not necessarily correspond with those most affected, the process of gaining observer 
accreditation takes years, observer participation is in any case extremely limited, at least in a formal 
sense, and affected communities are not necessarily represented by their respective states.113 
The UNPFII has repeatedly called on the UNFCCC to ‘guarantee the full and effective participation 
of indigenous peoples’,114 establish a working group on indigenous peoples to study and propose 
solutions to the ‘urgent situations caused by climate change’ that they face,115 and develop 
mechanisms for indigenous peoples’ participation in ‘all aspects of the international dialogue on 
climate change’.116 However, until recently the response of the UNFCCC has been limited. At its 20th 
session, the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (“SBI”), the organ tasked with managing the 
implementation of the Framework Convention,117 considered the UNPFII’s recommendations but held 
that full and effective participation of indigenous peoples could already be achieved through the 
existing observer mechanism,118 and ‘encouraged’ indigenous peoples’ organisations to ‘make full use 
of’ existing opportunities.119 While it acknowledged ‘the importance of an enhanced participation by 
indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Convention process’,120 the SBI merely invited states parties 
to ‘consider’ drawing on indigenous peoples’ organizations’ expertise when discussing matters of 
concern to them,121 encouraged parties to consider ways of enhancing the participation of indigenous 
peoples’ organizations in the UNFCCC,122 and invited the UNFCCC Secretariat and the chairs of 
relevant UNFCCC bodies to facilitate such participation to the extent possible.123 Although the SBI 
and the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) have more recently recognized that the effective 
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participation of indigenous peoples is ‘important for effective action on all aspects of climate 
change’,124 and the COP has requested the Secretariat to provide ‘meaningful and regular 
opportunities for the effective engagement of’ indigenous peoples,125 such sentiments have not been 
borne out in practice. 
3.2.1 UNFCCC Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform 
One recently created mechanism, however, is of interest for the purposes of this study: the Local 
Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (“LCIPP”, or the “Platform”), which aims ‘to 
facilitate full and effective participation of [indigenous peoples and local communities] in the 
UNFCCC process to help accelerate the global effort to mitigate and adapt to climate change in an 
integrated and holistic manner’.126 In 2015, in its decision accompanying the Paris Agreement, the 
COP ‘[r]ecognize[d] the need to strengthen knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local 
communities and Indigenous Peoples related to addressing and responding to climate change’, and to 
this end established ‘a platform for the exchange of experiences and sharing of best practices on 
mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner’.  127 As the COP did not further specify 
the Platform’s mandate or form, it fell to successive sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (“SBSTA”), the organ established by states parties to provide advice on 
scientific and technological matters,128 to operationalise the Platform. 
Indigenous peoples were involved at every step of the process of deciding how the Platform would 
work. Following informal consultations at COP 22 in 2016, in which some states included indigenous 
peoples’ representatives on their delegations,129 an open multi-stakeholder dialogue was convened 
during the 46th session of the SBSTA in May 2017, co-moderated by a representative of indigenous 
peoples’ organizations and a state party, to discuss the LCIPP’s functions, and possible ways and 
modalities of fulfilling those functions, in an inclusive discussion among states parties, indigenous 
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peoples’ representatives and others.130 Subsequently, submissions were sought from states, indigenous 
peoples’ organizations, IGOs and other observers.131 
As a result of this process, in 2017 the COP decided at its 23rd meeting that the LCIPP would have a 
three-fold purpose:132 
to strengthen the knowledge, technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous 
peoples related to addressing and responding to climate change, to facilitate the exchange of experience 
and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned related to mitigation and adaptation in a holistic 
and integrated manner, and to enhance the engagement of local communities and indigenous peoples in 
the UNFCCC process. 
Pursuant to these purposes, the COP decided that the Platform would have three functions: knowledge 
sharing, capacity building, and with respect to climate policy and actions.133 On the first function, the 
COP decided that the Platform:134 
should promote the exchange of experience and best practices with a view to applying, strengthening, 
protecting and preserving traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local 
knowledge systems, as well as technologies, practices and efforts of local communities and indigenous 
peoples related to addressing and responding to climate change, taking into account the free, prior and 
informed consent of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices. 
Regarding the second function, the LCIPP should:135 
build the capacity of indigenous peoples and local communities to enable their engagement in the 
UNFCCC process and the capacity of Parties and other relevant stakeholders to engage with the 
platform and with local communities and indigenous peoples, including in the context of the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement and other climate change related processes. 
In terms of the third, the Platform should:136 
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facilitate the integration of diverse knowledge systems, practices and innovations in designing and 
implementing international and national actions, programmes and policies in a manner that respects 
and promotes the rights and interests of local communities and indigenous peoples. The platform 
should also facilitate the undertaking of stronger and more ambitious climate action by indigenous 
peoples and local communities that could contribute to the achievement of the nationally determined 
contributions of the Parties concerned. 
This mandate downplays any role for the Platform to give advice to or feed into other policy- or 
decision-making processes under the UNFCCC, contrary to the suggestions made by indigenous 
peoples’ organisations during the consultations on the Platform’s operationalization.137 The third 
purpose (enhancing the engagement of indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC) and the first part of the 
third function (facilitating the integration of indigenous knowledge in designing and implementing 
international and national climate policy) comes closest to providing for this. But the LCIPP’s 
mandate focuses on the softer functions of exchanging experiences and best practices, building the 
capacity of indigenous peoples to engage in the UNFCCC, and promoting climate action by 
indigenous peoples themselves so as to contribute to states achieving their national climate goals. 
While these are worthy goals, and although the Platform could subsequently be steered so as to 
advocate for stronger forms of participation in the UNFCCC process, the extent to which it can do so 
remains to be seen.  
Notwithstanding this, the notable feature of the Platform is the sui generis mechanism it provides for 
the participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives. The decision of COP 23 provided that the 
operationalisation of and processes under the Platform should take into account the full and effective 
participation of indigenous peoples, the equal status of indigenous peoples and states parties, 
‘including in leadership roles’, the self-selection of indigenous peoples’ representatives in accordance 
with their own procedures, and the need for adequate funding from the UNFCCC Secretariat and 
states parties.138 In December 2018, the COP took a further decision to establish a Facilitative 
Working Group for the LCIPP, with the objective of further operationalizing the Platform and 
facilitating the implementation of its functions’.139 The Facilitative Working Group is composed of 14 
individuals: seven representatives of states parties, and seven representatives of indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, appointed by indigenous peoples through their focal points.140 The roles of the Co-
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Chairs and Vice Co-Chairs of the group are, similarly, equally split between states and indigenous 
peoples.141 Meeting twice a year and making decisions by consensus, the sessions of the Working 
Group are open to states parties and observers, but not to indigenous peoples’ organizations and 
representatives that do not qualify, or have not qualified, for admission as observers.142  
At its first meeting in June 2019 alongside the 50th meeting of the SBSTA, the Working Group 
discussed its plans for activities during 2020 and 2021.143 At SBSTA 50 three activities also took 
place under the LCIPP: an informal dialogue on the development of a web portal dedicated to the 
Platform; a partnership-building dialogue on work relevant to the LCIPP taking place outside of the 
UNFCCC; and an informal open dialogue between representatives of constituted bodies under the 
UNFCCC on the three functions of the Platform.144 The Working Group is due in November 2019 to 
propose a two-year workplan for implementing the functions of the LCIPP.145 Its mandate initially 
lasts for three years and will be reviewed in 2021.146 
The LCIPP, then, has engendered unprecedented space for indigenous peoples within UNFCCC 
processes. It represents a partnership whereby power is distributed between states and indigenous 
peoples. In light of the Platform’s limited mandate, it remains to be seen to what extent it allows 
indigenous peoples to participate in processes affecting them elsewhere in the UNFCCC. If the 
Platform does become a way in which indigenous peoples can have voice in wider UNFCCC 
processes, it is likely that this would meet the level of participation required to fulfil the right: 
indigenous peoples are far from the only ones affected by climate change impacts. Marginalised 
people everywhere are more prone to suffer the first and worst consequences. While there could be a 
case for enhanced participation of all those particularly affected by climate change impacts in, for 
instance, discussions on loss and damage,147 it is not obvious that indigenous peoples ought to have a 
greater role than that of other affected individuals and groups.148 Thus, while the LCIPP could be 
criticised as a way for states to compartmentalise indigenous peoples’ participation in the UNFCCC 
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process away from shared power, the fulfilment of the right would not require anything more than an 
advisory role for the LCIPP. 
3.2.2 Motivations 
The submissions made by states in the process of the establishment of the LCIPP, as well as relevant 
COP decisions, provide evidence as to states’ intentions.149 There is a broad recognition that 
intrinsically speaking, the voices of indigenous peoples ought to be heard. For instance, Australia 
stated that because indigenous peoples ‘are directly affected by climate change’, the country is a 
‘strong advocate’ for their full and effective participation and is ‘supportive and encouraging’ of the 
LCIPP as ‘an avenue’ by which indigenous peoples can contribute to implementing the Paris 
Agreement.150 Canada stressed the need to operationalise the Platform so as to respect and recognise 
‘the importance [of] indigenous peoples to be self-represented, have a stronger voice, and enhance 
their participation’.151 Ecuador strongly underlined ‘the importance of an active, permanent role and 
involvement of’ indigenous peoples in ‘all relevant UNFCCC negotiations and decisions’, going so 
far as to say that they should be heard first, before states.152 New Zealand supported providing 
indigenous peoples with ‘a clear voice’ in decision-making in the UNFCCC and ‘an active role in 
helping to shape climate action’.153 
Second, states also tend to cite the instrumental value of indigenous peoples’ participation. In this 
vein, the preamble of decision 2/CP.23 emphasises the role of indigenous peoples in achieving the 
targets and goals set out in the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and the 2030 Agenda.154 Australia 
states that indigenous knowledge systems and practices are ‘important resources for adaptation to 
climate change’, constituting ‘unique’ and ‘highly valuable’ knowledge that can ‘help inform climate-
related decision-making at the UNFCCC’.155 Brazil emphasises the potential role of the LCIPP in 
strengthening and facilitating the promotion and integration of traditional knowledge into mitigation 
and adaptation action.156 Similarly Canada, when stressing its commitment to ‘enhancing the voices of 
Indigenous Peoples in the work of the UNFCCC’, underscores that states parties can ‘benefit greatly’ 
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from their participation in addressing climate change.157 The EU noted that the LCIPP would ‘help to 
create…more effective, coherent and inclusive climate policies’.158 
The submissions of other IOs tended to fall along the same lines. The FAO said that it ‘highly 
encourages the involvement of…indigenous peoples in the policy discussions that affect their lives’ 
and stressed the value of a Platform that would ‘ensure and channel their effective participation’ to 
guarantee that ‘climate change discussions are representative and owned by the very people whose 
livelihoods are affected by climate change’.159 Underscoring that indigenous peoples’ representatives 
should be directly involved in the design and leadership of the Platform and that their participation 
should be considered as distinct from rather than equivalent to that of civil society, the FAO stated 
that the Platform should be a way for indigenous peoples to influence policy.  160 The IFAD stated that 
climate action should be done ‘in collaboration with’ and while ‘listening to the voices of’ indigenous 
peoples, ensuring their full and effective participation in decision making.161  
3.2.3 Opinio juris? 
Some states, as well as the COP itself, appear to acknowledge that participation of indigenous peoples 
at the UNFCCC is aligned with the UNDRIP. Subject to the caveats outlined in Section 3.1.2, then,  
this could tentatively be considered evidence of opinio juris. The preamble of decision 2/CP.23 recalls 
the UNDRIP,162 as does that of decision 2/CP.24, which also emphasises that the purpose and 
functions of the LCIPP and the Facilitative Working Group will be ‘carried out consistent with 
international law’.163 In its report to the UNPFII, the UNFCCC highlights that the Platform ‘serves as 
an inclusive and participatory space…in a manner that abides by the principles based on the 
UNDRIP’.164  
States also highlight the UNDRIP. Australia states that the Platform should ‘take into account the 
broader developments’ related to indigenous peoples’ representation and participation, including the 
UNDRIP, the EMRIP and the UNPFII, and states that it ‘could support the collective rights enshrined 
in the UNDRIP’ including self-determination and FPIC.165 Australia also supported the consultation 
of indigenous peoples in the process of operationalising the LCIPP, noting that giving them a ‘strong 
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role in organisation and participation’ would be ‘[c]onsistent with the aims of the UNDRIP’.166 
Similarly, Canada referenced Article 41 of the UNDRIP (participation in matters affecting them at the 
UN), as well as the rights to self-determination and participation in decision-making affecting them as 
‘context’ which ‘reaffirm[ed] the importance of the Platform as a tool for enhancing and supporting 
the full and effective participation of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in the work of the 
UNFCCC’.167 The EU and New Zealand also recalled the UNDRIP in their submissions.168 The 
OHCHR, stressing the disproportionate negative impacts of climate change and mitigation and 
adaptation actions on indigenous peoples, as well as their role in supporting adaptation efforts, cited 
common Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants and the UNDRIP in support of the increased 
participation of indigenous peoples in the UNFCCC by way of the LCIPP.169  
In summary, the Platform is a mechanism whereby indigenous peoples participate in partnership with 
states on matters specifically pertaining to indigenous peoples. It may also provide for participation on 
an advisory basis in the wider work of the UNFCCC. This practice forms part of the widespread 
pattern constituting a legitimate expectation regarding the participation of peoples in global 
governance on matters concerning them. The motivations behind its creation are in part intrinsic, 
recognising the importance of peoples’ participation on matters concerning them, and in part 
instrumental, pointing to the value of participation for achieving the objectives of the UNFCCC. 
3.3 Convention on Biological Diversity 
Like the UNFCCC and WIPO, processes occurring under the CBD170 provide sui generis procedures 
for the participation of indigenous peoples in matters specifically concerning them.171   
The rules regarding participation of observers in the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and its 
subsidiary bodies are similar to those under the UNFCCC, except that observers may speak during, 
rather than after the closure of, sessions, and that they may make textual proposals with the support of 
at least one state party.172 On several occasions the COP has invited states to include indigenous 
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peoples’ representatives in their official delegations to CBD meetings;173 a few states have done so.174 
By Decision VII/16 the CBD established a voluntary funding mechanism to facilitate indigenous 
peoples’ participation,175 which unlike the equivalent WIPO fund appears to receive substantial 
contributions from states.176 In addition, it has called for capacity-building activities to support and 
ensure that indigenous peoples’ participation is effective.177 
3.3.2 Working Group on Article 8(j) 
As with the UNFCCC, under the CBD states have established a mechanism under which indigenous 
peoples have a higher level of participation on a matter specifically affecting them: the Ad hoc Open-
ended Working Group on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and related provisions (“Working Group 
on Article 8(j)”). Established by the COP in 1998, the Working Group is tasked with implementing 
Article 8(j) of the Convention (traditional knowledge).178 Its mandate is to provide advice on the 
application and development of legal and other protection for traditional knowledge relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, on the implementation of Article 8(j) and related 
provisions through inter alia the development and implementation of a work programme at national 
and international levels, and on measures and mechanisms to strengthen international cooperation 
among indigenous peoples and local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity.179 
Membership of the Working Group is open to all states parties and observers, including ‘in particular’ 
representatives of indigenous peoples and local communities ‘embodying traditional lifestyles 
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relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity with participation to the widest 
possible extent in its deliberations in accordance with the rules of procedure’.180 The COP specifically 
encouraged indigenous peoples to participate in the Working Group,181 in addition to calling for states 
parties to include their representatives on their delegations.182 
In practice, ‘the fullest possible participation’ of indigenous peoples occurs in the Article 8(j) 
Working Group, including in contact groups established under it.183 Indigenous peoples’ 
representatives are included as “Friends of the Co-Chairs” and “Friends of the Bureau”—small 
informal groups often formed during negotiations in order to reach agreement on specific issues—and 
are appointed as Co-Chairs of contact groups.184 However, the procedure is still ultimately restricted 
by the procedural rules in that, for instance, text proposals by indigenous peoples’ representatives still 
require the support of at least one state party.185 In this way, indigenous peoples participate on almost, 
but not quite the same basis as states—similar to that in the WIPO IGC. 
3.3.3 The Working Groups on Protected Areas, and Access and Benefit-sharing 
The enhanced participatory procedures of the Article 8(j) Working Group do not necessarily extend to 
other processes under the Convention that affect indigenous peoples. Despite a recommendation of 
the UNPFII, the Ad hoc Open-ended Working Group on Protected Areas does not provide for the 
participation of indigenous peoples except to the default level in Convention processes.186 
A lower level of participation was also provided for in the process of negotiating the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit Sharing,187 critical for indigenous peoples in terms of the protection of their 
traditional knowledge, innovations and practices associated with genetic resources, as well as the 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of such resources.188 The COP encouraged the 
participation of indigenous peoples in the work of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access 
and Benefit-sharing in which the Protocol was negotiated (Working Group on Access and Benefit 
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Sharing),189 requested the Working Group on Article 8(j) to collaborate with the Working Group on 
Access and Benefit Sharing in the fulfilment of its mandate,190 and invited the chair of the group to 
facilitate the effective participation of indigenous peoples representatives and to consult them as 
appropriate.191 In addition, there was a consultation on the proposed regime,  192 in which two members 
of the UNPFII and 20 representatives of indigenous peoples organisations were invited to provide 
recommendations.193 While the report of the consultation fed into the 5th meeting of the Working 
Group on Access and Benefit Sharing,194 it is unclear to what extent the recommendations were 
considered or incorporated.195 Moreover, indigenous peoples representatives constituted 7 of 15 
observers to the 30-member Expert Group on Traditional Knowledge Associated with Genetic 
Resources, established to assist the Working Group with legal and technical advice.196 
This corresponds to Arnstein’s notions of consultation and placation. Although indigenous peoples 
were given the opportunity to provide feedback at one stage of the drafting, and participated as 
observers to a body that gave expert advice to the negotiation group, they did not participate on the 
same level as that in the Article 8(j) Working Group.197 This limited participation appears to have had 
affected the result, as the Protocol has been criticised for not sufficiently respecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples.198 The statement of the Executive Secretary of the CBD in a 2010 speech to the 
UNPFII that ‘the effective participation of indigenous and local community representatives…[had] 
been a unique feature of the process’199 can therefore be questioned. 
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3.3.4 Other participatory practice 
Further, ad hoc examples of practice have occurred under the auspices of the CBD. In 2008 its 
Secretariat facilitated a global consultation of indigenous peoples on Reducing Emissions through 
Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation (“REDD”).200 That year it also ensured the 
representation of indigenous peoples at an expert meeting on biodiversity and climate change.201 In 
2009 it solicited views and experiences of indigenous peoples regarding the impacts of 
geoengineering on biodiversity, which fed into a meeting of one of the Convention’s subsidiary 
bodies.202 
3.3.5 Motivations 
Statements made by representatives of the CBD suggest that it views the participation of indigenous 
peoples as important for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Convention, as well as for intrinsic 
reasons. In a 2007 statement to the UNPFII, the Executive Secretary of the CBD highlighted that the 
‘new enhanced phase of the implementation of the Convention…require[d] the active engagement of 
indigenous and local communities’, which was ‘more than ever crucial’ to the success of the 
Convention’s implementation.203 In this regard, he referred to the establishment of the Voluntary Fund 
and the participation of indigenous peoples in the negotiations on access and benefit sharing.204 In a 
speech to the indigenous peoples consultation on access and benefit sharing, he underscored that the 
participation of indigenous peoples was ‘essential…to achieve the goals of the Convention’.205 The 
Conference of the Parties has repeatedly stressed the importance of indigenous peoples participation 
in the Article 8(j) Working Group and in other processes under the Convention.206 
3.3.6 Opinio juris? 
Like the WIPO and the UNFCCC, there is some evidence to suggest that the CBD and its parties have 
recognised that the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in its work is in line with the 
UNDRIP. In Decision IX/8, the COP noted the UNDRIP and recognised the need for participation in 
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the work on protected areas.207 In a statement on the adoption of the UNDRIP, the CBD Executive 
Secretary said that states parties were ‘committed to the participation of indigenous peoples in issues 
affecting them’, consistent with articles 40 and 41 of the UNDRIP .208  
In summary, the practice under the Convention on Biological Diversity is mixed. While it has 
established specific procedures to allow indigenous peoples to participate on nearly the same footing 
as states in the Article 8(j) working group, other processes concerning indigenous peoples have not 
seen the same level of participation. While indigenous peoples are not the only stakeholders affected 
by those other groups, their vital interests and rights are at play. I suggest that fulfilling the right to 
participate would have required a higher level of participation, that is, systematic consultation, in the 
Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing. The practice appears to be fuelled by the notion that 
the participation of indigenous peoples allows the CBD to better fulfil its objectives, although there 
may also be a belief that it is required by, or at least consistent with, the UNDRIP. 
3.4 The Food and Agriculture Organization 
The FAO is another site of relevant practice regarding the participation of indigenous peoples in 
standard-setting affecting them. Constituted with the objective of improving agricultural productivity, 
raising levels of nutrition, bettering the lives of rural populations, and contributing to the growth of 
the world economy,209 the FAO is a forum through which states set standards and devise national 
policies, legislation and strategies. Indigenous peoples are one group among several who are 
specifically affected by the work of the FAO, as they face unique challenges in terms of food 
security.210  
3.4.2 The 2010 Policy, the Committee on Food Security, and subsequent practice 
Recognising this, the 2010 FAO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples addresses indigenous 
peoples’ participation in policy-making and standard-setting activities affecting them.211 Itself 
prepared through consultations with indigenous peoples’ representatives and the UNPFII, among 
others,212 the Policy recognises the right of indigenous peoples to full and effective participation ‘at 
every stage of any action that may affect them directly or indirectly’,213 and further states:214 
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FAO will facilitate the direct and effective participation of indigenous peoples in current and future 
FAO programmes and activities that affect indigenous peoples. It will support enabling environments 
to foster inclusion of indigenous peoples in the design, execution and evaluation of policies and 
programmes that concern and/or affect them. 
The Policy envisages that this will be implemented, firstly, by way of ‘policy dialogue’ between the 
FAO and indigenous peoples ‘in order to communicate effectively what can be done for and with 
them as stipulated by FAO’s mandate and operational boundaries’.215 Noting the need for a 
representative body of indigenous peoples with which to engage, it notes that indigenous peoples’ 
representatives at the Civil Society Forum at the World Food Summit in 2010 discussed forming a 
committee, stating that if such a body were established, FAO would ‘consider it a counterpart through 
which partnership and dialogue can move forward’.216 However, it does not appear that the envisaged 
committee was subsequently established, and this represents a gap in the FAO’s engagement with 
indigenous peoples. This aspect of the Policy can also be criticised for its focus on one-way 
communication from the FAO to indigenous peoples; the Policy speaks of ‘clarifying’ to indigenous 
peoples ‘what can be realistically expected’.217 Similar emphasis is not placed on the potential role 
policy dialogue could play in conveying indigenous peoples’ concerns and views to the FAO. 
Secondly, the Policy envisages the participation of indigenous peoples through multi-stakeholder 
consultations with member states, research institutions, UN agencies, private sector organisations and 
CSOs,218 as well as in FAO committees, conferences and regional conferences through FAO’s internal 
civil society liaison or via its internal private sector cooperation group.219 
This latter part of the policy appears to have been carried out. With respect to the participation of 
indigenous peoples in multi-stakeholder consultations, for instance, FAO mentions in its reporting to 
the UNPFII that it supported the participation of indigenous peoples in a regional and global 
consultation on farmers’ rights, the outcomes of which were presented at the 7th meeting of the 
Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.220 
In addition, the participation of indigenous peoples in FAO committees through the civil society 
mechanism, according to the FAO, has occurred.221  
In addition to the Policy, the FAO’s Committee on Food Security demonstrates relevant practice.222 
Reporting to the ECOSOC as well as the FAO Conference, it develops policy recommendations and 
                                                             
215 Ibid 16. 
216 Ibid 16-17. 
217 Ibid 16. 
218 Ibid 17. 
219 Ibid 17. 
220 FAO, ‘2017 Report to the UNPFII’ (2018) https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-
content/uploads/sites/19/2018/02/FAO-Questionnaire-to-Agencies-UNFPII-2017.pdf (“2017 Report”) 12. 
221 2018 report to UNPFII 6. 
222 FAO Constitution, Article IV.9; General Rules of the Organization, Rule XXXIII. 
128 
 
guidance on food security and nutrition. Unlike the FAO’s other committees, in which states are the 
main actors, 2009 reforms saw the committee opened to a broader range of participants than just 
member states, including CSOs and NGOs ‘with strong relevance to issues of food security and 
nutrition’ particularly organizations representing, among others affected by food insecurity, 
indigenous peoples.223 Participants may intervene in plenary and breakout discussions of the 
Committee to contribute to preparing meeting documents and agendas, submit and present documents, 
and make formal proposals.224 This is a higher level of participation than that of an observer, a status 
that the new rules preserves for other interested organisations.225 In its reports to the UNPFII, the FAO 
has highlighted its support for the participation of indigenous peoples in the Committee, including by 
ensuring the participation of the UNPFII Chair and representatives of indigenous youth.226 
One emerging practice that, in the future, could constitute an example of indigenous peoples’ 
participation at the FAO is the proposed Indigenous Youth Consultative Forum, which was suggested 
at a meeting between FAO and the Global Indigenous Youth Caucus to the UNPFII in April 2017.227 
Although FAO appears to have been supportive of the initiative, and hosted indigenous youth 
representatives again in October 2017 to advance work on its terms of reference,228 it appears that the 
forum is not yet operational.229 
It can be questioned whether participation in committees on the same footing as other civil society 
groups, and ad hoc participation in other work of the FAO, constitutes practice aligned with the right 
to be heard as set out in Chapter 2. The UNPFII evidently does not consider it sufficient to meet 
indigenous peoples’ rights: in successive recommendations to the FAO, it has suggested that it 
establish a dedicated mechanism for partnership with indigenous peoples, such as a working group,230 
and has requested FAO to enhance the participation of indigenous peoples in the work of the 
Committees on Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, World Food Security, and Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture.231 On one hand, indigenous peoples are not the only non-state actors affected 
by the work of the FAO: to include their organisations in the Committee on Food Security on the 
same basis as organisations representing smallholder family farmers, artisanal fisherfolk, herders and 
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pastoralists, the urban poor, and agricultural and food workers, who evidently have a stake in its 
discussions, is fair. Forms of participation on the higher levels of Arnstein’s ladder, such as 
partnership, are clearly not appropriate here, where consultation in the present forms can be said to be 
sufficient to fulfil the right. On the other hand, indigenous peoples are not always constituted as 
NGOs and they may find it difficult to gain accreditation as such (as discussed in Chapter 6). As such, 
a separate status for indigenous peoples, or less stringent accreditation criteria, would be appropriate.  
3.4.3 Motivations 
The FAO’s own discourse reveals a three-fold motivation behind its policies and practices. The first is 
the imperative to achieve its own mandate. In the introduction to its Policy on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples, the FAO states that ‘[t]he fight against hunger cannot be won without [indigenous peoples]’, 
who may ‘bring novel solutions’ to the table.232 Thus it considers indigenous peoples ‘an undeniable 
stakeholder in a development agenda shaped by such a mandate’.233 In this way, the engagement of 
indigenous peoples is framed as a means by which the organisation can better achieve its ends.234  
Second, the FAO evidently recognises the importance of indigenous peoples being heard on matters 
affecting them. The document outlining the reforms to the Committee on Food Security highlights the 
importance of ensuring that the ‘voices of all relevant stakeholders are heard in the policy debate on 
food and agriculture’.235 The FAO Strategy for Partnerships with Civil Society Organizations states 
that ‘the increasing participation of indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities in public policy 
debates and fora is an important step towards strengthening their rights and improving their 
situation’.236 A statement made by Brazil on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean 
Countries, similarly, recognises that ‘it is important to listen to the voices of those who are actually 
suffering from hunger and involve them in democratic and transparent for a involving the most 
vulnerable populations, indigenous peoples, family farmers’.237  
The 2010 Policy also cites Article 41 of the UNDRIP, suggesting that FAO sees the policy as aligned 
with, and perhaps required by, international (soft) law.238 
In conclusion, the practice of the FAO provides further evidence of the existence of a norm whereby 
indigenous peoples participate on matters concerning them in IOs and global governance. As 
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elsewhere, the motivation for the establishment of the practice appears to be at least in part related to 
the organisation’s mandate. The idea is that the participation of indigenous peoples will help the 
organization achieve its goals. The practice could be critiqued on the basis that the participation is at a 
relatively low level, but on the other hand the FAO has many stakeholders to take into account, of 
which indigenous peoples are only one group.  
3.5 The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNESCO, as explained in Chapter 2, sets standards relevant to indigenous peoples’ rights, and has 
recently adopted a policy regarding the participation of indigenous peoples.239  
3.5.2 UNESCO Policy on Engaging with Indigenous Peoples 
The 2018 UNESCO Policy on Engaging with Indigenous Peoples240 is a recent example of practice 
relevant to the formation of a legitimate expectation regarding the participation of indigenous peoples 
in matters affecting them. Itself developed through a process of meetings and workshops between 
indigenous peoples and UNESCO staff,241 the policy sets out provisions of the UNDRIP of specific 
relevance to UNESCO’s work. It states that with respect to UNESCO’s work in the field of culture, 
UNESCO, ‘[i]n line with all relevant articles of the UNDRIP…commits to respect, protect and 
promote’ indigenous peoples’ rights to ‘full and effective participation in matters affecting their lives 
and cultures’, and to ‘take part in the development of policies concerning their cultures, cultural 
expressions and heritage, including through effective participation in relevant consultative bodies and 
coordination mechanisms’.242 In addition, the Policy provides that UNESCO will ‘[i]mprove 
participation of indigenous peoples’ organizations through promoting official partnerships between 
their organizations and UNESCO’,243 and ‘promote dialogue and participatory mechanisms between 
indigenous people[s], Member States and UNESCO that allows the collection of information on the 
implementation of activities relevant for indigenous peoples and within the framework of the 
policy’.244  
Much will depend on how this policy is to be implemented, which is not yet known. The few isolated 
examples of the participation of indigenous peoples in UNESCO’s activities to date—in a workshop 
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on indigenous knowledge and climate change in October 2017;245 in the preparatory process for the 8th 
World Water Forum in March 2018;246 in a high-level policy forum and international conference on 
language and education in 2019;247 and in sessions of the Open Science Forum for Latin America and 
the Caribbean in 2018248—may be a promising beginning, but are far from the more systematic 
participation that is envisaged in the Policy. Time will tell as to whether the policy is implemented in 
a way that provides for the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples on matters affecting 
them.  
3.5.3 State practice 
The submissions of states to the consultation on the Engagement Policy represent instances of state 
practice regarding the obligation to promote the participation of indigenous peoples. For instance, 
Canada’s submission expressly supported the possibility of UNESCO establishing formal partnerships 
with indigenous peoples’ organizations to improve the participation of indigenous peoples in 
UNESCO’s activities.249 Chile supported a ‘dialogue and participation mechanism’ between 
indigenous peoples, states and UNESCO to ‘allow the collection of information on policy 
implementation’.250 Colombia supported, in order to ensure that indigenous peoples benefit from and 
are not harmed by UNESCO’s activities, their ‘full and effective participation and inclusion leading to 
empowerment’ at all levels, ‘including the decision-making and strategic levels’ and at all stages 
‘including planning, programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation’; this should include 
‘continued and direct dialogue and interaction with indigenous peoples through their freely chosen 
representatives’.251 In making this submission, Colombia referred explicitly to Article 41 of the 
UNDRIP. Denmark suggested UNESCO consider adding an advisory body of indigenous peoples’ 
representatives, highlighting that this would ‘ensure that the voice of indigenous peoples is heard, and 
taken into account by UNESCO on a systematic basis’.252 Canada, Chile, Colombia and Denmark, 
then, can be said to have complied with their obligation to promote the participation of indigenous 
peoples in the affairs of IOs concerning them. In addition, there are a limited instances of the 
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inclusion of indigenous peoples’ representatives on state delegations, which can also be viewed as 
exemplary of state practice regarding the obligation to enable peoples to participate.253 
3.5.4 Motivations 
UNESCO has justified its 2018 Policy on the basis of achieving its mandate. The Policy states that 
indigenous peoples’ concerns are ‘also the heart of the concerns of UNESCO’s mandate’, as they are 
living manifestations of cultural diversity, the stewards of rare languages, and ‘essential partners in 
building knowledge societies and achieving the 2030 Agenda’.254 Past statements of senior UNESCO 
officials reinforce the idea that indigenous peoples are important to UNESCO’s mandate. In 2010, 
then Director-General Irina Bokova, lamenting that indigenous peoples were ‘still not the real 
designers and drivers of their own development initiatives’ and recognising that major challenges 
‘simply cannot be addressed without the participation of indigenous peoples, called upon governments 
and the international community to ‘promote equity by fully respecting the rights of indigenous 
peoples, and engaging them on equal terms in all decisions regarding their future’.255 
Mandate-related motivations aside, other statements evidence a recognition by UNESCO that 
indigenous people should be heard on matters affecting them. In 2012, Bokova noted indigenous 
peoples’ valuable sustainability knowledge, and challenges faced due to discrimination and 
marginalisation, stating that ‘sustainable development must be inclusive’ and ‘[a]ll voices must not 
only be heard but listened to’.256 That same year, the Chief of UNESCO’s Small Islands and 
Indigenous Knowledge Section and the organization’s focal point for indigenous peoples stated that 
‘the active participation of Indigenous peoples within the framework of UNESCO is extremely 
important’.257 In 2015 Bokova, in an address to an international conference on indigenous peoples and 
climate change, said UNESCO was ‘the house of all peoples’ and stressed the importance of ensuring 
‘the voices of indigenous peoples are heard’ in combating climate change due to the impacts of 
climate change on indigenous peoples.258 
3.5.5 Opinio juris? 
Is there acceptance as law? The Policy states that it is a means by which ‘UNESCO reaffirms its 
commitment to implement the [UNDRIP]’.259 Referring to Articles 18 and 41, it recognised that the 
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governing bodies of UNESCO’s conventions, such as the WHC, ‘can play an important role in 
developing relevant standards, guidance and operational mechanisms to ensure full and effective 
participation and inclusion of indigenous peoples in the processes of these instruments.260 As 
mentioned above, it discusses the right to participation—which it links to self-determination and free, 
prior and informed consent—in stating that UNESCO should include indigenous peoples in the 
development of policies concerning them. 
Statements made by UNESCO senior officials bolster the notion that the Policy was adopted in part 
with an acceptance that it was required by the UNDRIP. In a message on the occasion of the 
International day of the World’s Indigenous People in 2008, then Director-General of UNESCO, 
Koïchiro Matsuura, emphasised the importance of translating the—then newly-adopted—UNDRIP 
into ‘concrete policies that will enable indigenous peoples to participate fully and equally in the 
national and international life’, and expressed hope that the Declaration ‘will serve as a platform for 
genuine dialogue between indigenous and non-indigenous partners’.261 The next year Matsuura, after 
noting the UNDRIP, called on the international community ‘to engage in genuine dialogue with 
indigenous peoples’, and, noting that indigenous voices had ‘remained largely on the sidelines’ of 
international debates on climate change despite indigenous communities facing the first and worst 
impacts, drew attention to a UNESCO-launched internet forum providing ‘a space for local and 
indigenous voices to contribute to decision-making’ in the lead-up to the 2009 UN Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen.262 In 2018, Director-General Audrey Azoulay ‘reaffirm[ed]’ UNESCO’s 
‘full commitment’ to the UNDRIP.263 In 2019, Azoulay underscored that UNESCO was ‘committed 
to…enabling [indigenous peoples] to participate fully and equally at national and international levels’, 
highlighting their knowledge ‘crucial’ for achieving the SDGs and drawing attention to several 
UNESCO programmes relevant to indigenous peoples.264 
In summary, UNESCO’s recent policy is an example of practice contributing to the emergence of a 
norm regarding the participation of peoples in matters affecting them. However, it is unclear as to 
whether the implementation of the policy will be sufficient to fulfil the right. As in other 
organizations, there is substantial evidence to show that the policy was adopted in order to further the 
mandate of the organization, but there are also indications that the organization views the policy as in 
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line with the UNDRIP, which could show evidence of opinio juris subject to the caveat that it is 
unclear whether UNESCO perceived the UNDRIP as law. 
3.6 Negative examples  
The above examples should not be taken to show that the participation of peoples in standard-setting 
activities affecting them is universal. Notable counter-examples exist. Two will be explored here: the 
ISA and the IMO.   
3.6.2 The International Seabed Authority 
Established under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)265 and the 1994 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS,266 the ISA organises and controls 
activities for the exploration and mining of minerals in the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (“the Area”).267 
Rules, regulations and procedures relating to prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the Area, 
including on the equitable sharing of benefits deriving therefrom, are adopted by the ISA’s Council—
its executive organ, composed of 36 member states—and approved by the Assembly, the supreme 
organ representative of member states which meets annually.268 These regulations are developed by 
the Legal and Technical Commission, a subsidiary body of the Council composed of 15 members 
acting in an expert capacity, which is also tasked with preparing assessments of the environmental 
implications of activities in the Area and making recommendations to the Council on the protection of 
the marine environment.269 
The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (“UNPFII”) has called for the ISA to ‘ensure respect 
for and recognition of’ the UNDRIP, including to ‘pay immediate and special attention to the right of 
indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making in all matters that affect their rights’, and has 
recommended that the ISA ensure ‘meaningful participation, such as dedicated indigenous 
representation…and regard for indigenous peoples’ world views’.270  As a special report prepared by 
Valmaine Toki, UNPFII member, put it, the ISA should provide a place for indigenous peoples in its 
policy-making processes ‘so as to allow indigenous peoples to meaningfully contribute to decisions 
that affect their lives and environment’,271 and free, prior and informed consent is required for ‘any 
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activity, such as seabed mining, that takes place within their traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied and used lands’.272  
Yet, while NGOs and IGOs can participate as observers in the Assembly and the Council with the 
right to make oral and written statements, membership of the ISA is confined to states parties to the 
UNCLOS, and there is no provision for participation by indigenous peoples or non-independent 
territories.273 In practice, no indigenous peoples’ organisations, not even those that could technically 
be admitted as NGOs, hold observer accreditation.274 In addition, the Legal and Technical 
Commission does not allow observer participation.275 Nor does there appear to have been any 
consideration by any of the ISA’s organs of indigenous peoples’ concerns. 
The ISA, then, has not recognised nor fulfilled the proposed obligation to hear peoples on matters 
affecting them. As an example of a lack of practice, it must be taken into account in the overall 
analysis. 
3.6.3 International Maritime Organization 
The IMO is another organization in which indigenous peoples are affected,276 but in which no rules or 
mechanisms exist to enable their participation. Its organs include the Assembly (general body of 
member states),277 the Council (forty member states with delegated authority),278 the Secretariat,279 
and various Committees and Sub-Committees.280 The Marine Environment Protection Committee 
submits recommendations and guidelines, and proposals for regulation, to the Council for approval—
many of which concern coastal and Arctic indigenous peoples. While the Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee provide for the participation of ‘liberation movements’ as observers, alongside other types 
of observer organizations, they do not provide for the participation of indigenous peoples.281 
Several representatives of Arctic indigenous peoples have attended IMO meetings as members of the 
Canadian delegation and as members of NGO delegations, beginning in 2016 at the 70th meeting of 
the Marine Environment Protection Committee.282 At that session they participated in a panel 
discussion and met with the Secretary General and staff of the IMO, as well as several member state 
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delegations.283 A proposal submitted by Friends of the Earth on behalf of Arctic indigenous peoples at 
that session invited the Committee to note indigenous peoples’ concerns regarding threats to food 
security from increased Arctic shipping, and propose corresponding safeguards;284 the Committee did 
not accede to this request. At a 2019 meeting of the Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and 
Response concerning heavy fuel oil, the Vice-President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council spoke 
during the opening plenary.285 However, these forms of participation, while evidencing the beginnings 
of a recognition by the IMO and its member states that indigenous peoples are affected by its 
activities and should be heard on relevant matters, are clearly insufficient to fulfil the right of 
indigenous peoples to participate. As such, Arctic indigenous peoples have called for ‘permanent 
status’ at the IMO ‘so that they can be party to decisions that are affecting their livelihoods and their 
food security’.286 The UNPFII, too, has requested that the IMO ‘facilitate indigenous peoples’ 
participation in [its] processes’.287 The IMO, in summary, can be viewed as a negative example 
whereby peoples do not participate in standard-setting matters concerning them to the requisite 
degree.  
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has canvassed the practice of IOs and states regarding the participation of indigenous 
peoples in standard-setting matters affecting them, covering the process leading to the adoption of the 
UNDRIP and standard-setting processes under the UNFCCC, CBD, WIPO, UNESCO, and FAO. It 
has been seen that there exists a widespread practice whereby IOs create sui generis mechanisms and 
procedural rules to enable indigenous peoples to participate in relevant matters, although in nearly all 
cases there is more that could be done to fulfil the right. In addition, IOs and states commonly justify 
this practice by reference to the UNDRIP, suggesting that opinio juris could exist, although this is 
uncertain due to the fact that the UNDRIP is regarded by many as “soft law”, albeit of a highly 
persuasive nature. Because of this uncertainty, it is difficult to argue that there is practice 
accompanied by law for the purposes of the formation of a rule of custom. However, the widespread 
practice, taken together with that explored in the following chapters, points to the emergence of a 
norm regarding the conduct of IOs and states, corresponding to the right and obligations set out in 
Chapter 2. In almost all cases, it can be seen that the practice is fuelled by the idea that the 
participation of affected peoples can assist the organization in fulfilling its mandate, or states in 
fulfilling the objectives of a treaty, respectively.  In addition, there is widespread acceptance that 
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peoples ought to be heard on matters affecting them. The pattern of practice is not universal, 
demonstrated by the ISA and the IMO, but these can be viewed as exceptions that reinforce the 






CHAPTER FIVE: Participation in Decision-Making 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will consider ways in which IOs and states enable the participation of indigenous peoples 
in decision-making affecting them. As in Chapter 4, four threads will run throughout it. The first 
regards the existence of a norm corresponding to the right proposed in Chapter 2: there are numerous 
examples of practice, indicating that peoples have a legitimate expectation to fully and effectively 
participate in decision-making processes affecting them at the international and global levels. This is 
examined here with regard to IOs that make discrete decisions regarding funding, field programmes, 
and other matters with the potential to affect indigenous peoples. Practice is not wholly consistent and 
the level of participation varies and in some cases is not up to the required standard; however, there is 
a reasonably consistent practice. It will also be seen that there is a strong norm whereby indigenous 
peoples participate in the making of policies on their participation in decision-making. Second, it is 
difficult to discern the existence of practice accepted as law: opinio juris is even more elusive here 
than in the previous chapter. However, third, evidence regarding the motivations of IOs abounds, 
indicating that a crucial reason for the inclusion of peoples relates to the imperative of IOs to fulfil 
their mandates.  
The chapter is divided according to the means by which indigenous peoples participate. Section 2 of 
this chapter considers indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent to decisions of IOs 
affecting them. Section 3 considers participation in the form of membership of, or observer status to, 
decision-making committees and boards. Section 4 examines participation in the form of advisory 
bodies to decision-making institutions. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Free, prior and informed consent 
IOs typically require FPIC—or, at minimum consultations to obtain FPIC—of indigenous peoples 
before making a decision to invest in, or carry out, development projects with the potential to affect 
them. This is grounded in, and informed by, the law of FPIC as discussed in Chapter 3. However, 
unlike that law, which applies as between states and peoples, this practice concerns IOs and peoples. 
In some instances, the organization delegates the task of obtaining or consulting in order to obtain 
FPIC to the state in which the proposed activity is to be carried out; in these cases, it can still be said 
to be practice of the organization as opposed to that of the state because the FPIC is a material and in 
most cases necessary factor in whether the organization decides to pursue the investment or project. 
The state is effectively acting as an agent of the IO.  
It will be seen that FPIC policies abound that are in many ways consistent with the standard of FPIC 
contained in the UNDRIP and the decisions of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, 
introduced in Chapter 3. Under that standard, consultations must be conducted in good faith, without 
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pressure or coercion, with the disclosure of sufficient information, respecting the customs and 
traditions of the peoples concerned, with the objective of reaching agreement. There is a sliding scale 
approach whereby the greater the potential impacts on a people, the greater the level of participation 
required: if the decision could result in a substantial impact on a people’s fundamental rights, consent 
will be required, not merely “consultation in order to obtain consent”. The FPIC policies examined in 
this section broadly fit these contours, although the practice is not uniform and some of the policies 
deviate from the standard. In addition, in many cases IOs consulted indigenous peoples on the 
policies’ contents, which are additional data points supporting the existence of the norm of the 
participation of peoples in policy-making or standard-setting affecting them.  
This chapter considers the FPIC requirements of international financial institutions, UN agencies that 
carry out field programmes, and the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (“WHC”). In addition to 
financing decisions, IOs have instituted FPIC requirements when it comes to decisions about field 
projects and programmes potentially affecting indigenous peoples. The specific organizations 
considered are the World Bank, the IFAD, the GEF, the GCF, the UN-REDD Programme, the EU, the 
UNDP, the UNEP, the UNIDO, and the FAO. 
2.1 World Bank 
The policies and practices of the World Bank regarding the participation of indigenous peoples have 
developed significantly since a 1982 policy document entitled “Tribal People in Bank financed 
Projects” outlined procedures for protecting the rights of “tribal people”, recognising that they were 
more likely to be negatively impacted than helped by development projects.1 The 1982 policy did not 
provide for the participation of such peoples in the development process; like the early ILO 
Convention 107, it was premised on the integration of indigenous peoples into Western society.2 
Beginning in 1991, however, with the Bank’s adoption of Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous 
Peoples3 a participatory approach began to take shape. With a view to ensuring that indigenous 
peoples would not be subject to adverse effects during the development process and would receive 
‘culturally compatible social and economic benefits’,4 the policy provided that ‘the strategy for 
addressing the issues pertaining to indigenous peoples must be based on the informed participation of 
the indigenous peoples themselves’.5 Operational Directive 4.20 further provided that mechanisms 
should be established for indigenous peoples’ participation ‘throughout project planning, 
implementation and evaluation’, noting the existence of indigenous peoples’ organizations ‘that 
provide effective channels for communicating local preferences’ and that ‘traditional leaders’ should 
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be brought into the planning process. It also recognised that due concern should be given to ensuring 
‘genuine representation’ and that no ‘foolproof methods’ exist for guaranteeing full participation at 
the local level.6 It called for the borrowing country to prepare an Indigenous Peoples Development 
Plan in projects affecting indigenous peoples, with their participation.7 In practice, this was mainly 
done through consultations.8 
The implementation of the Directive was imperfect. A 2003 internal review found that there was a 
‘marked increase’ in indigenous peoples’ participation in the design and implementation of projects 
where the directive was applied, but their participation in decision-making and financial management 
was low, in part due to national regulations controlling the use of public funds. Moreover, in 33% of 
projects where indigenous people were affected, the Operational Directive was not applied, and in 
those cases the participation rates were much lower.9 
The current regime is set out in Operational Policy 4.10, which replaced Operational Directive 4.20 in 
2005,10 and the 2016 Environmental and Social Framework (“ESF”) which contains an Environmental 
and Social Standard (“ESS”) on Indigenous Peoples and Sub-Saharan African Historically 
Underserved Traditional Local Communities.11 Applicable whenever indigenous peoples ‘are present 
in, or have collective attachment to a proposed project area’,12 the ESS has the objective of ensuring 
that indigenous peoples ‘are fully consulted about, and have opportunities to actively participate in, 
project design and the determination of project implementation arrangements’.13 
The policies set out requirements that correspond to the accepted principle of FPIC. Operational 
Policy 4.10 requires the borrower to engage in a process of consultation on all projects potentially 
affecting indigenous peoples.14 The ESS requires ‘stakeholder analysis and engagement planning, 
disclosure of information, and meaningful consultation, in a culturally appropriate and gender and 
inter-generationally inclusive manner’.15 It also requires that consultation must involve indigenous 
peoples’ representative bodies and organizations, provide sufficient time for their decision-making 
processes, and allow for their effective participation in the design of project activities or mitigation 
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measures that could potentially affect them.16 Free, prior and informed consent is to be established 
through good faith negotiation, in a mutually accepted process to be documented by the borrowing 
country, but does not require unanimity amongst an affected indigenous people, rather ‘collective 
support’.17 
In addition, the World Bank’s policies reflect the accepted standard by which the degree of 
participation corresponds to the level of potential impacts on the affected peoples, and provide for 
differing levels of participation where indigenous peoples are the only affected groups as opposed to 
where they are one group among others. The ESS provides that the ‘scope and scale’ of consultation 
and participation will be ‘proportionate to the scope and scale of potential project risks and impacts’ 
that may affect indigenous peoples.18 Where indigenous peoples are the sole beneficiaries of a project, 
it requires the borrower to ‘proactively engage’ to ensure their ownership and participation throughout 
the project cycle.19 Where indigenous peoples are not the sole beneficiaries, the policy requires 
‘meaningful consultation’.20 Operational Policy 4.10 states that the Bank will finance a project only 
when free, prior and informed consultation results in ‘broad community support to the project by the 
affected indigenous peoples’,21 notably stopping short of recognising the right to free, prior and 
informed consent in all cases.22 The ESS further provides that the borrowing country must obtain the 
FPIC of the affected indigenous peoples where the project will (a) have adverse impacts on land and 
natural resources subject to traditional ownership or under customary use or occupation; (b) cause 
relocation of indigenous peoples from such land and natural resources; or (c) have significant impacts 
on indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage that is material to their identity or cultural, ceremonial or 
spiritual aspects of their lives.23 Read in conjunction, these policies require consent when the impacts 
on indigenous peoples would be substantial; in cases of lesser impacts, consultation resulting in 
‘broad community support’ will suffice. While the scope of the situations where consent is required 
does not precisely correspond to that in the UNDRIP,24 the broad contours of the law of FPIC are 
reflected in the World Bank’s policies. 
The consultation process surrounding the adoption of the policies is also relevant to the broader study. 
The Operational Policy 4.10 was adopted following consultations with indigenous peoples’ 
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organisations.25 The ESF, too, was developed in a process involving extensive consultation with 
governments, IOs, experts, civil society groups and indigenous peoples.26 The consultation proceeded 
in three phases. First, the Bank prepared a paper on its approach to the new safeguards and opened it 
up to public consultation,27 part of which consisted of 16 dedicated dialogues with indigenous 
peoples.28 In its second phase, the Bank released a proposal document for consultation, and held eight 
consultation meetings with indigenous peoples.29 The third phase involved a three-month consultation 
on a revised draft of the proposed ESF, which focused on feedback from borrower countries.30 This 
process evidences the World Bank’s recognition that because indigenous peoples are especially 
affected by its activities and the ESF has the potential to better protect their interests, they should 
participate in the ESF’s development. The final decision-making was done by the Development 
Committee of the World Bank, and the draft was approved by its Board of Executive Directors.31 
Although a seemingly promising procedure, often the notice given for consultations was short, 
documents were not circulated in sufficient time, translation for local languages and facilities for 
disabled persons were lacking, and some major indigenous organizations were not aware of the 
consultations in their countries.32 In addition, several important changes to the final ESF were made 
without the consultation of indigenous peoples: for instance, the addition of the ‘Sub-Saharan African 
Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities’ terminology.33 The structure of the third 
phase of consultation meant that borrower countries had the most input into the final outcome 
document, and indigenous peoples were not able to participate to defend their rights at the point where 
it mattered most.34 
In summary, the policies of the World Bank contributes to the pattern of practice that constitutes a 
norm regarding the participation of peoples in matters affecting them. The consultation and FPIC 
policies broadly reflect accepted principles, and correspond to the theory whereby the degree of 
participation should be higher where the level of affectedness is greater. Evidence of the motivations 
of the World Bank, including any opinio juris, is sparse; for instance, the ESF does not contain any 
reference to the UNDRIP. Further, it is not possible to say on the basis of the available information 
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whether the Bank’s participation policies were adopted with the purpose of allowing it to better fulfil 
its mandate.  In addition, the consultations in the process of adopting the ESF and the Operational 
Policy further contribute to the norm, although the ESF processes demonstrate the limitations of 
consultations without shared power in decision-making and the need for sufficient notice periods and 
for consultations to be conducted in local languages.   
2.2 The International Fund for Agricultural Development 
The policies of the IFAD also reflect the contours of FPIC laid out above. By way of background, the 
IFAD’s main decision-making body is the Governing Council, consisting of representatives of its 177 
member states,35 but decisions on whether to approve projects and programmes are made by the 
Executive Board composed of 18 member state representatives.36 The IFAD Policy on Engagement 
with Indigenous Peoples37 sets out principles of engagement for IFAD to follows in its work with 
indigenous peoples in the formulation of country strategies, in policy dialogue, and throughout the 
project cycle.38 Aiming ‘to enhance IFAD’s development effectiveness in its engagement with 
indigenous peoples’ communities in rural areas, and especially to empower them to overcome poverty 
by building on their identity and culture’,39 the policy itself was developed in consultation with 
indigenous peoples’ representatives and the UNPFII.40 It lists FPIC as one of nine fundamental 
principles.41  
On FPIC, the Policy states that IFAD, when working with member states on projects targeting or 
affecting indigenous peoples, shall support ‘the participation of indigenous peoples’ communities in 
determining priorities and strategies for their own development’.42 The Policy states that “consultation 
to obtain” FPIC is a criterion for approving a project.43 IFAD has detailed policies on how 
consultations are to be carried out, broadly mirroring accepted principles.44 Consultations should be 
carried out through indigenous peoples’ freely chosen representatives and institutions, without 
coercion, intimidation or manipulation, with sufficient time and information, and with the expected 
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outcome of consent.45 Consent is clearly required when a project would result in physical 
displacement or impacts on access to land or other resources.46  
The Policy also provides for the participation of indigenous peoples at earlier stages in the IFAD’s 
work. Before specific projects are carried out, IFAD works with a country receiving funds to create a 
“country strategic opportunities programme” that defines priority objectives and presents concepts for 
projects, providing a framework for IFAD’s work in the country.47 For countries where indigenous 
peoples and ethnic minorities are relevant to issues of rural poverty, IFAD’s Policy provides that 
IFAD ‘will’ invite indigenous peoples’ representatives to be part of the team that prepares the country 
strategic programme.48 In addition, the Policy provides for the participation of affected indigenous 
peoples later in the project cycle: IFAD will invite representatives to participate in the country project 
management team or in the preparation of the project.49 Arrangements for implementing a project 
‘should facilitate a direct role by indigenous peoples in managing resources’, including capacity-
building measures where needed to enable affected indigenous peoples’ organizations to ‘assume 
effective control over the resources to be invested in their communities’.50 
While one reason for IFAD’s adoption of practices regarding the participation of indigenous peoples 
in activities of the Fund which affect them, as evidenced by its publicly available documents and 
statements, is to better fulfil its own mandate and bolster its own legitimacy, there is also evidence to 
suggest that it is doing so in the belief that the UNDRIP requires it.  
Regarding the former, the Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples begins with the 
acknowledgement that reaching indigenous peoples with agricultural development—recognised by the 
Fund as an important part of fulfilling its mandate—‘requires tailored approaches that respect their 
values and build upon their strengths’.51 It goes on to express the aim of enhancing IFAD’s 
development effectiveness in its engagement with indigenous peoples’ communities in rural areas.52 
The Policy further states that a participatory approach can ‘better address complexity and diversity’ 
and make programmes more ‘responsive to local problems and to the goals and visions of indigenous 
peoples’.53 The Strategic Framework 2016-2024 further supports this view, stating that because of its 
responsiveness to the needs and priorities of indigenous peoples ‘IFAD’s interventions, and their 
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targeting will be improved’.54 In a speech to the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, the 
President of the Fund stated that working with indigenous peoples as equal partners through inclusive 
processes was necessary to fulfilling development objectives.55 
However, there are also reasons to believe that IFAD’s practices are partly motivated by the belief 
that they are required by the UNDRIP, which the Fund may regard as being part of international law. 
The Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples states that it was developed in response to 
‘rapidly evolving national and international normative frameworks on the rights of indigenous 
peoples’, including the adoption of policies on indigenous peoples by other international financial 
institutions,56 and cites the international legal framework on indigenous peoples’ rights including ILO 
169 and the UNDRIP, which it says ‘promotes [indigenous peoples’] full and effective participation in 
all matters that concern them’.57 In addition, in 2017 the President of IFAD stated in a speech that 
IFAD had ‘become a role model for how institutions can build relationships with indigenous peoples 
based on inclusive and horizontal partnerships, in line with UNDRIP’s article on self-determined 
development’.58 Similarly, in a speech to the UNPFII in 2019, a representative of IFAD stated that 
‘giving Indigenous Peoples the driving seat’ was ‘in line with the principles of UNDRIP’.59 At the 
World Conference on Indigenous Peoples in 2014 the President emphasised Article 18 of the 
UNDRIP.60 In another speech the President stated that the Fund wants ‘to support [indigenous 
peoples’] efforts to make yourselves heard in the defence of your rights, which are established by 
international conventions and declarations’.61 On another occasion, the President said that the Forum 
was established ‘within the framework of’ the UNDRIP.62 The repetitive reference to the UNDRIP in 
the course of outlining IFAD’s procedures for indigenous peoples’ participation strongly suggests that 
IFAD views such processes as in line with UNDRIP, and that IFAD views UNDRIP as at least highly 
persuasive legal authority. IFAD officials have repeatedly emphasised the Fund’s commitment to 
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ensuring that indigenous peoples’ voices are heard on the global stage, stressing that its Engagement 
Policy represents ‘[t]he right thing to do’.63 
In summary, IFAD has established a Policy, which has largely been adhered to in practice,64  relating 
to the participation of affected indigenous peoples in decision-making regarding the allocation of 
finance, as well as throughout the development and implementation of projects affecting them. The 
Policy largely mirrors the accepted principle of FPIC, and is thus in line with the fulfilment of the 
right to participate. The Policy is motivated by the belief that it is required by UNDRIP, in addition to 
the recognition that it enables the organisation to better carry out its functions. The repetitive 
references to the UNDRIP may suggest a belief that the instrument is international law. As the Policy 
was drafted by a group of IFAD staff and approved by the Executive Board—which is not 
representative of member states—it can be regarded as an act of IFAD as an IO, rather than as 
reflecting the collective will of its members.65 As such, its contents can evidence the practice and 
potentially the opinio juris of IFAD itself. 
2.3 The Green Climate Fund 
The FPIC of indigenous peoples is also required by the GCF, an entity established by the UNFCCC 
COP with the objectives of making ‘a significant and ambitious contribution’ to global efforts to 
achieve international goals to combat climate change and to promote the shift toward low-emission 
and climate-resilient development, by providing funding to developing countries to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change.66 While it is accountable to, and functions under the guidance of the UNFCCC 
COP, it has its own international legal personality.67 The GCF is governed by a Board of 24 members 
with equal representation from developed and developing countries, that makes decisions about the 
Fund’s policies and funding allocation.68 Its founding document provides that the Board will develop 
mechanisms to promote the input and participation of indigenous peoples, among other stakeholders, 
to the design, development and implementation of activities financed by the GCF.69  
The Environmental and Social Policy of the GCF provides that, as a guiding principle, all activities it 
finances will ‘support the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples’, and the design and 
implementation of activities will be guided by the UNDRIP including the right to FPIC, which is 
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noted as being ‘of particular importance’.70 Further, the GCF requires that activities are screened for 
potential impacts on indigenous peoples, that borrowers facilitate the participation of indigenous 
peoples in risk screening and assessment, and that any plans will be developed with their full and 
effective participation ‘through a process of meaningful consultation tailored to them’ and ensuring 
their FPIC.71 
Further to this, the GCF’s 2018 Indigenous Peoples Policy, developed with the participation of a wide 
range of indigenous peoples’ organizations,72 sets out requirements for participation, consultation and 
FPIC that are consistent with the UNDRIP and, indeed, are on the more stringent side of the policies 
examined in this chapter. In terms of consultation and participation, the Policy requires the GCF’s 
accredited entities—the third parties that it delivers funds through, which include international 
financial institutions and UN agencies—with the participation of potentially affected indigenous 
peoples, to prepare a consultation strategy and identify how the affected indigenous peoples will 
participate in the design and implementation of activities, and share in their benefits.73 Further, when 
the only beneficiaries of proposed activities are indigenous peoples, the accredited entities and 
executing entities (the third parties who carry out projects) are required to proactively engage with the 
relevant peoples ‘to ensure their ownership, buy-in and participation’ in the entire life-cycle of the 
activities.74 When indigenous peoples are not the only beneficiaries, their concerns must be addressed 
through ‘meaningful consultation’ including a process to seek FPIC.75 Measures to minimise, mitigate 
and compensate for any adverse impacts to indigenous peoples, as well as to mitigate environmental 
and social risks and impacts, must also be determined with the full and effective participation of the 
affected indigenous peoples.76 Consultations are required to be proportionate in scope and scale to the 
potential risks and impacts on indigenous peoples.77 
On FPIC, the 2018 Policy requires that GCF will ‘ensure and require’ evidence of ‘the effective 
consultation and application of free, prior and informed consent’ when activities are being considered 
that would affect indigenous peoples’ lands, territories, resources, livelihoods and cultures or require 
their relocation.78 Although this wording is ambiguous—what does it mean to “apply” FPIC?—a later 
provision clarifies that the GCF will require consent.79 The policy thereby appears to support consent 
                                                             
70 GCF, ‘Environmental and Social Policy’ (2018) Decision B.19/10, GCF Doc GCF/B.19/06 [8(p)]. 
71 [47]. 
72 GCF, ‘GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy’ (2018) GCF Doc GCF/B.19/05 (“2018 Policy”) [8]. 
73 Ibid [37]. 
74 [42]. 
75 [44]. “Meaningful consultation” is defined at [9(m)]. See further requirements at [51]-[53]. 






in a wider range of situations than is strictly required, going over and above the spectrum-based 
approach. The policy further requires that consent must be given:80  
on the basis of indigenous peoples’ own independent deliberations and decision-making process, based 
on adequate information to be provided in a timely manner, in a culturally appropriate manner, in a 
local language that is understood by them, and through a process of transparent and inclusive 
consultations, including with women and youth, and free of coercion or intimidation. 
Recognising that indigenous peoples may need support to be able to participate, it provides that the 
Fund will support capacity-building programs for indigenous peoples to ensure their full and effective 
engagement with the GCF.81  
In summary, the GCF’s policies on participation and FPIC align with the general principles and 
provide further support for the establishment of the norm. Information on the GCF’s motivations is 
sparse. From the 2018 Policy, it can be inferred that one reason for its adoption was to contribute to 
the ultimate aims of the UNFCCC as well as the GCF’s own mandate. The objectives of the 2018 
Policy include promoting indigenous peoples’ positive contributions to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation and ensuring more effective, sustainable and equitable climate change results, outcomes 
and impacts.82 However, references to the UNDRIP in the Policy suggest that the latter was also 
considered necessary to align the GCF’s activities with the UNDRIP’s requirements. 
2.4 The UN-REDD Programme 
The UN-REDD Programme is a joint initiative of FAO, UNDP and UNEP that gives support to 
developing countries for nationally-led REDD+ processes.83 Its Operational Guidance on Engagement 
of Indigenous Peoples & Other Forest Dependent Communities, developed in consultation with 
indigenous peoples,84 provides that FPIC ‘must be adhered to’ as well as the full and effective 
participation of indigenous peoples in policy-making and decision-making in UN-REDD Programme 
activities.85 The Operational Guidance suggests that all this is required under the UNDRIP.86 Further, 
its 2013 Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent set out specific requirements for FPIC that 
correspond to the accepted principle in terms of the manner in which consultations are to be carried 
out, and in terms of an acknowledgement that while consent will not always be required, it will be 
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under certain circumstances.87 The Guidelines state that FPIC is a ‘legal norm under international law’ 
while also acknowledging that it is ‘essential to the success of REDD+’.88 This is evidence of a dual 
motivation: the fulfilment of the Programme’s objectives, as well as a belief that the participation of 
affected peoples in terms of FPIC is required by law. 
2.5 The Global Environment Facility 
The GEF, an IO that serves as the financial mechanism to five multilateral environmental agreements, 
provides new and additional grant and concessional funding to assist developing countries in meeting 
the objectives of the conventions it serves.89 Like the World Bank and the IFAD, the GEF has adopted 
policies regarding participation and FPIC. Unlike other organisations, however, it requires FPIC 
before deciding to finance a project only for countries that have acceded to ILO Convention No. 169, 
or that are required to seek FPIC under another domestic or international legal obligation.90 Its 2012 
Principles and Guidelines for Engagement with Indigenous Peoples merely ‘recogni[se] the 
recommendation from Indigenous Peoples that FPIC be applied to GEF-financed activities on, or 
significantly impacting, their traditional and user rights on their land, territories and resources, 
consistent with the [UNDRIP]’.91 The policy further provides that the GEF will ensure the full and 
effective participation of indigenous peoples in GEF activities that may impact them or infringe upon 
their rights, meaning that indigenous peoples should be identified in a timely manner and participate 
in impact assessments and in the identification, development, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of relevant projects.92 In other words, the GEF does not require that UNDRIP be complied 
with, but sees it as a non-binding recommendation. In cases where the country is not required to seek 
FPIC, the GEF merely requires consultations resulting in ‘broad community support’ for the project, 
rather than consent.93 
While it falls below the requisite standard of participation, the 2012 Principles and Guidelines suggest 
that this practice was nonetheless adopted in the belief that it would allow the GEF to better fulfil its 
mandate, as well as to realise the UNDRIP. In that document the GEF acknowledges ‘the important 
role’ of indigenous peoples in GEF’s activities, ‘both as valuable contributors in the project 
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development stages, and as potential partners and stakeholders in the identification, development, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation stages’.94 It acknowledges the importance of indigenous 
peoples’ efforts in ‘fulfilling [the GEF’s] mandate to protect the global environment,95 and states that 
it ‘acknowledges’ the UNDRIP and ‘supports’ the realisation of its provisions.96 In a separate 
document, the GEF similarly states that it supports, through its operations and policies, the realisation 
of the UNDRIP.97 
The practice of the GEF, in summary, falls below the standard of other financial institutions as well as 
that of the UNDRIP, and is lower than that required to fulfil the right. This represents a variation from 
the norm—an exception which highlights the existence of the general rule.  
2.6 European Union development cooperation 
The EU, in providing financing to developing countries, has set requirements regarding participation 
and FPIC of indigenous peoples. In addition, it has consulted with indigenous peoples more generally 
about their development priorities. 
In a 1998 resolution on indigenous peoples and development cooperation, the European Council took 
note of international instruments on indigenous peoples,98 and acknowledged the importance that 
indigenous peoples attach to their “self-development”—which the resolution defines as ‘the shaping 
of their own social, economic and cultural development and their own cultural identities’.99 In 2002 
the European Council set out principles to be applied in EU strategies and financing instruments, 
including the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples at all stages of the project cycle, 
and the importance of building the capacities of indigenous peoples’ organisations.100 This brief 
statement was further developed in 2017 Council Conclusions:101 
The Council underscores the crucial importance of further enhancing opportunities for dialogue and 
consultation with indigenous peoples at all levels of EU cooperation, including in EU funded 
programmes and projects under all aid modalities to secure their full participation and their free, prior 
and informed consent in a meaningful and systematic way, and to inform and underpin EU external 
action policy and its implementation worldwide. 
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A 2002 report of the European Commission detailed efforts undertaken by the Commission to consult 
widely with indigenous peoples to identify their priorities for development, the results of which were 
to feed into project design and implementation as well as the EU’s wider development cooperation 
strategy.102 Further, it highlights ‘practical mechanisms’ set up by the Commission to ensure the 
consultation of indigenous peoples in policies and activities which affect them.103 
Part of the 2017 Conclusions suggests that the Council sees participation and FPIC as required by the 
EU’s commitments to the UNDRIP and under the Outcome Document of the WCIP.104 But the 
Commission has also stated that ‘building partnerships with indigenous peoples is essential to fulfil 
the objectives of poverty elimination, sustainable development, and the strengthening of respect for 
human rights and democracy’.105 As in other cases, indigenous peoples’ participation is both 
instrumentally useful to the EU in terms of fulfilling its objectives and, it seems, accepted as a 
requirement of the UNDRIP. While detail is lacking as to what the Council means by FPIC—does it 
require consent in all circumstances, for instance—this is nonetheless an example of practice going to 
the establishment of the norm. 
2.7 The UN Development Programme 
The UNDP provides for the participation of indigenous peoples in its field programmes and projects, 
including FPIC in a way that conforms with the established standard. The foundation for this was laid 
in a 2001 policy developed as a result of consultation with indigenous peoples’ organisations.106 The 
policy recognised that UNDP needed to develop its own capacity to enable indigenous peoples’ full 
participation in the design and implementation of UNDP projects and programmes.107 The policy went 
on to state that UNDP ‘promotes and supports’ the right to FPIC regarding development projects and 
programmes affecting indigenous peoples, ‘[c]onsistent with United Nations conventions such as ILO 
Convention 169’.108 It highlighted that consultation should include representatives from indigenous 
peoples’ organisations, and the need for the use of culturally appropriate consultation methods and 
respect for indigenous peoples’ concepts of time.109 It encouraged UNDP country offices to develop 
their own strategies for engaging with indigenous peoples, including building the capacity of 
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indigenous peoples’ organizations to participate in the design of development activities affecting 
them.110 
Building on this, UNDP’s 2014 Social and Environmental Standard on Indigenous Peoples aims to 
ensure that projects that may impact indigenous peoples are designed ‘in a spirit of partnership with 
them, with their full and effective participation’ and with the objective of securing their FPIC where 
their rights, lands, resources, territories, or traditional livelihoods may be affected.111 It requires that 
mechanisms be identified and implemented to guarantee their meaningful, effective and informed 
participation on all matters throughout the project cycle.112 Further, it requires that ‘culturally 
appropriate consultation’ is carried out with the objective of achieving agreement, and that FPIC is 
obtained on any matters affecting them before any project activities are carried out.113 It emphasises 
that FPIC is required for any relocation of indigenous peoples.114 In addition, it requires the 
development of a plan in accordance with their effective and meaningful participation, to avoid, 
minimise and mitigate any adverse effects of any project affecting indigenous peoples.115 
There is evidence for the presence of mandate-related motivations, as well as a belief that the practice 
is required by law. UNDP often points to the importance of indigenous peoples’ participation for the 
organisation’s objectives.116 Its 2001 Policy highlights that ensuring participation is ‘critical in 
preventing and resolving conflict, enhancing democratic governance, reducing poverty and 
sustainably managing the environment’.117 Similarly, remarks delivered to the UNPFII by the 
Associate Administrator of the UNDP highlighted that improving indigenous peoples’ participation 
was ‘crucial’ for generating inclusive development.118 There is also evidence that UNDP perceives its 
participation policies as required by international law: the 2001 Policy states that it is ‘informed and 
underpinned by the international human rights framework’, as well as by ‘the international 
conventions, declarations and programmes of action that recognize indigenous peoples’ rights’.119 
2.8 The UN Environment Programme 
The 2015 Environmental, Social and Economic Sustainability Framework of the UNEP includes a 
standard that applies whenever indigenous peoples are or may be present in an area affected by a 
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project supported by UNEP.120 It provides that when indigenous peoples may be affected, UNEP and 
its implementing and/or executing partners will prepare a plan in conjunction with indigenous 
peoples, assessing potential socioeconomic impacts and risks, and will apply the principle of FPIC 
with full consideration given to options preferred by the affected peoples.121 Further, it provides that 
when it is impossible to avoid restricting indigenous peoples’ access to legally designated parks and 
protected areas, UNEP will ensure that the affected indigenous peoples ‘fully and effectively 
participate’ in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of area management plans.122 
The purpose of the standard is to ensure that UNEP projects respect indigenous peoples’ rights, and 
taken into account their views and needs to avoid any harm and promote opportunities to improve 
their livelihoods.123 The earlier Policy Guidance on Indigenous Peoples explicitly states that 
participation is in line with the UNDRIP, as well as being important for achieving the objectives of 
UNEP.124 The Policy Guidance goes on to quote Article 41 of the UNDRIP on ways and means of 
ensuring participation of indigenous peoples at the UN.125  
In summary, UNEP also requires FPIC of indigenous peoples on matters affecting them, although its 
policy contains less detail than those of similar organisations. There is evidence that it considers such 
practice as being important for fulfilling its mandate, as well as considering it to be consistent with the 
UNDRIP.  
2.9 The UN Industrial Development Organization 
The UNIDO, a specialized agency that promotes industrial development for poverty reduction, 
inclusive globalisation and environmental sustainability,126 has adopted Environmental and Social 
Safeguards similar to those of the UNDP and UNEP discussed above.127 In the safeguards, UNIDO 
commits to ‘undertake prior consultations with affected indigenous people to ascertain their broad 
community support for projects affecting them and to solicit their full and effective participation’ in 
designing, implementing and monitoring measures to ensure their positive engagement in projects, 
avoid, minimise, mitigate or compensate for adverse effects, and tailor benefits in a culturally 
appropriate way.128 Where a project affects indigenous peoples, a plan must be developed with the full 
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and effective participation of the relevant indigenous peoples.129 This is clearly below the standard, as 
it does not refer to the FPIC of affected peoples, and thus represents another deviation from the norm. 
In addition, it is unclear to what extent this policy was adopted with the motivation of advancing the 
organisation’s mandate or in the belief that it was required by law.  
2.10 The Food and Agriculture Organization  
The FAO, in addition to its standard-setting function discussed in Chapter 4, also carries out field 
programmes and projects. In doing so, it is guided by organisational policies providing for indigenous 
peoples’ participation and FPIC. The 2010 FAO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples emphasises 
that FAO is required to ‘facilitate the direct and effective participation’ of indigenous peoples in 
programmes and activities affecting them, and support enabling environments to foster their 
inclusion.130 Further, it will:131 
establish measures to collaborate with indigenous peoples and discourage ventures that will have an 
adverse impact on their communities. When there is a direct impact or relation to indigenous peoples’ 
issues, it will follow the provisions of the [UNDRIP] that relate to free, prior and informed consent. 
Elaborating on FPIC, the Policy provides that the FAO will seek FPIC when its projects directly affect 
indigenous peoples.132 It clarifies that FPIC must be obtained before adopting and implementing 
projects affecting them, that there must be no act of coercion, intimidation or manipulation, and that 
indigenous peoples should be included as ‘competent and legitimate stakeholders’ in projects 
affecting them.133 Building on this, the FAO Environmental and Social Management Guidelines 
clarify the FAO’s requirement that before implementing projects and programmes that may affect 
indigenous peoples’ rights, lands, natural resources, territories, livelihoods, knowledge, social fabric, 
traditions, governance systems, or culture or heritage, FPIC is required ‘in all cases’.134 Environmental 
and Social Standard 9 provides that in the process of obtaining FPIC, complete information must be 
disclosed to the indigenous peoples in a timely manner, with sufficient time for them to carry out 
internal deliberations, in accordance with their traditions and customs, in their local language, and in 
an environment and in ways to which the indigenous peoples can relate.135 Where FPIC is given, the 
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Standard requires that a plan be prepared in full consultation with the affected peoples to avoid, 
minimise, mitigate or compensate for any adverse impacts.136 
With regard to the FAO, here too it is unclear to what extent the participation policies were adopted in 
the belief that they were required by law, or under a motivation to enable the organisation to better 
fulfil its mandate. Nevertheless the FAO’s policy, like that of the GCF, is aligned with the principle of 
FPIC and indeed exceeds it in respect of requiring consent in all circumstances.  
2.11 FPIC in decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee 
In addition to the FPIC requirements of IOs making decisions regarding financing and field projects, a 
specific example will be explored in relation to UNESCO’s decision-making activities relating to the 
protection of natural and cultural heritage. Despite the potentially serious impacts of decisions to 
place a site on the World Heritage List (“the List”),137 affected indigenous peoples have historically 
been overlooked by the World Heritage Committee (“WHC”), which consists of 21 representatives of 
states parties to the World Heritage Convention and holds annual sessions to decide on whether 
nominated sites are to be inscribed on the List, examine reports on the state of conservation of listed 
properties, and make other decisions on the implementation of the Convention.138  
The GA,139 the UNPFII,140 the EMRIP,141 the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples,142 the ACHPR143 and the IUCN144 have all expressed concern about the lack of participation 
of indigenous peoples in the nomination, inscription and management of World Heritage Sites. A joint 
statement from indigenous peoples’ organizations to the UNPFII in 2011 emphasised that:145 
There are numerous examples of Indigenous sites on the World Heritage List that have been inscribed 
without the free, prior and informed consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned. In many cases 
Indigenous peoples were not even consulted when their territories were designated as World Heritage 
sites, although this designation can have far-reaching consequences for their lives and human rights, 
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their ability to carry out their subsistence activities, and their ability to freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development in accordance with their right of self-determination. 
The joint statement named three nominations under consideration by the Committee at the time that 
had been prepared without the meaningful involvement or consultation of affected indigenous 
peoples; all three were subsequently inscribed on the List although the concerns had not been 
resolved.146  
In 2015, the Committee changed the Operational Guidelines of the Convention to include indigenous 
peoples in a list of potential ‘partners in the protection and conservation of World Heritage’, and 
encourage states to obtain their FPIC when nominating sites for the List.147 However, FPIC was a 
recommended practice rather than obligatory, and as indigenous peoples were referred to as 
stakeholders rather than rights-holders.148 
The Guidelines were further updated in 2019,149 and now encourage states parties to ensure ‘a wide 
variety of stakeholders and rights-holders’, including indigenous peoples,150 to prepare their tentative 
lists of sites for nomination with their ‘full, effective and gender-balanced participation’.151 Further, in 
cases of sites affecting the lands, territories or resources of indigenous peoples, states parties are now 
required to ‘consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain’ FPIC before the sites can be included on the list of 
properties that the state party is considering nominating to the List.152 At the nomination stage, the 
guidelines provide that states parties ‘‘shall’ demonstrate, as appropriate, that the free, prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples has been obtained, through, inter alia making the nominations 
publicly available in appropriate languages and public consultations and hearings’.153 Thus, despite 
the language of “consult in order to obtain consent”, the consent of affected indigenous peoples seems 
now to be required before the WHC makes a decision to inscribe a property on the List. 
2.12 Conclusion 
In conclusion, FPIC has become a widely used standard as a means of participation in the decision-
making of IOs on matters with the potential to affect indigenous peoples. There are exceptions in 
which the policy falls well below the international standard as contained in the UNDRIP, as with the 
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GEF and UNIDO, and others where the standard is exceeded, such as the GCF and FAO. However, 
the overwhelming trend fits with the contours of the general principle by which consent is required—
that is, power is distributed to indigenous peoples—where fundamental rights could be affected, 
whereas in less serious cases “consultation in order to obtain consent” suffices, a lesser form of 
participation. In some cases, such as the GCF and the World Bank, it is expressly acknowledged that 
for participation to be meaningful in some cases capacity building may be required. Furthermore, 
there is a strong norm as to the participation of affected indigenous peoples throughout the cycle of a 
project or programme—its design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It is frequently the 
case that the motivation for pursuing these policies is in part mandate-related, but there are also many 
cases where the UNDRIP and ILO Convention 169 are cited as influence, and two cases—the UN-
REDD Programme and the UNDP—where there is arguably opinio juris. 
3. Membership of, and participation in, decision-making bodies 
A second means by which indigenous peoples participate in decisions affecting them is direct 
participation in the decision-making body, whether as a member or observer. This can be seen at the 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (“FCPF”), the IFAD Indigenous Peoples’ Assistance Fund 
(“IPAF”), the Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(“FILAC”), the UN Indigenous Peoples Partnership (“UNIPP”) and the UN-REDD Programme. In 
some cases—the UNIPP, the IPAF, and the FILAC—by reference to Arnstein’s typology, indigenous 
peoples have delegated power over funding decisions concerning them. In the case of the FCPF and 
the UN-REDD Programme, Arnstein would categorise the participation as placation, in that 
indigenous peoples have a minority of seats on the decision-making board or have only observer 
status. This does not necessarily mean that such participation is not up to the standard required to 
fulfil the right; in the following discussion, such matters will be considered in light of each 
organisation’s practice. In these cases, opinio juris and other evidence as to the motivation of the IOs 
is not generally available except where already explored in relation to the IFAD.  
3.1 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
In 2007 the World Bank established the FCPF to assist its borrowing member states located in sub-
tropical and tropical areas in their efforts to achieve emissions reductions from deforestation and 
forest degradation by providing technical and financial assistance for capacity building, and to pilot a 
performance-based payment system for emissions reductions from REDD+ activities.154 One of the 
FCPF’s operating principles is that it shall comply with the World Bank’s operational policies and 
procedures, ‘taking into account the need for effective participation of Forest-Dependent Indigenous 
Peoples and Forest Dwellers in decisions that may affect them, respecting their rights under national 
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law and applicable international obligations’.155 In addition, its Charter provides that representatives 
of “forest-dependent indigenous peoples and forest dwellers” may be invited by the FCPF to attend its 
annual meetings as observers, along with representatives of relevant IOs, NGOs, and private sector 
entities,156 and provides for one seat as a non-voting observer in the Participants Committee,157 the 
FCPF’s main functional body consisting of 14 donor state and 14 borrower state representatives.158 
Affected indigenous peoples, then, have a voice in decision-making at the FCPF, albeit not at the 
same level as member states. The level of participation falls short of delegated power or partnership; it 
may be characterised as placation. However, such a level is appropriate in this case, as indigenous 
peoples (and forest dwellers) may not be relevant to every project, and in any case the FPIC policies 
of the World Bank will apply. 
3.2 The IFAD Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility 
IFAD enables the participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making affecting them through the 
IPAF, which gives small grants of US$20-30,000 to indigenous and tribal peoples.159 While a small 
funder by comparison to large international financial institutions, the Facility is not insignificant: it is 
disbursing a total of US$5 million from 2017 to 2020, supporting up to 35 projects,160 and as of 2019 
it had supported a total of 127 projects in 45 countries with about US$3.6 million.161 
The board of the IPAF, which makes decisions about which proposals to finance, consists in majority 
of indigenous peoples’ leaders: four representatives of indigenous peoples’ organizations from 
different regions, as well as one representative each of the UNPFII and IFAD. 162  The Policy on 
Engagement of Indigenous Peoples describes the IPAF as a ‘listening and learning instrument’ on the 
needs, solutions and innovations of indigenous peoples.163 Thus, indigenous peoples have delegated 
power over some decisions of the IFAD that directly affect them.164 As decisions on larger proposals 
are taken by the Executive Board, where indigenous peoples cannot participate,165 it may be 
questioned as to whether indigenous peoples’ ownership over the IPAF is merely a token gesture 
intended to placate indigenous advocates and enhance the IFAD’s perceived legitimacy. It is unlikely 
that that is the case, however, due to the IFAD’s FPIC policies explored above; in addition, 
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indigenous peoples would not be affected by every funding decision made by the IPAF. The IFAD 
IPAF is another data point supporting the emergence of the norm. 
3.3 The Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean 
The FILAC166 is an IO established in 1992 under an agreement signed at the Second Ibero-American 
Summit.167 With the objective of supporting indigenous peoples’ self-development,168 it provides 
funding for projects and programs organised by indigenous peoples in the region.169 The supreme 
organ of FILAC is its General Assembly, made up of representatives of each of the 22 member states 
and 18 representatives of indigenous peoples, one from each of its Latin American and Caribbean 
member states.170 Indigenous peoples’ representatives are elected by indigenous peoples themselves, 
in processes beginning at the local level and culminating in national assemblies of indigenous 
peoples.171 Decisions are taken by a majority both of member states and indigenous delegates.172 
Indigenous peoples are also permitted to attend as observers or guests, and may speak during the 
meetings.173 FILAC’s Council, which carries out governance activities, is composed of six member 
state representatives and six indigenous peoples’ representatives.174 FILAC, then, is another example 
of power-sharing between states and indigenous peoples, giving indigenous peoples control over 
decision-making affecting them. FILAC’s motivations are unknown, including the extent to which it 
views these procedures as required by law.  
3.4 The UN-REDD Programme’s governing bodies 
The body of the UN-REDD Programme that governed the Programme from 2008-2015, the Policy 
Board, reserved four seats for indigenous peoples, alongside representatives of donor countries, 
recipient countries, civil society and UN agencies: one for the UNPFII chair as a full member along 
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with three observer seats for indigenous peoples’ representatives from the three regions in which the 
Programme operates.175  
As of 2017, the governance structure of the Programme has changed so that it is now controlled by an 
Executive Board coupled with a Programme Assembly. The Executive Board, which is responsible 
for operational guidance, decision-making and general oversight, no longer provides for full member 
participation of indigenous representatives: rather, indigenous peoples have one seat as a “permanent 
observer”.176 Indigenous peoples do have representatives on the Programme Assembly, but this is 
only an advisory forum whose role is to share best practices, discuss challenges and lessons learned, 
recommend actions to improve its performance and impact, promote collaboration with other 
initiatives, and to discuss developments in the international REDD+ processes and initiatives.177 
While the former practice of UN-REDD clearly provides for a higher level of participation than the 
current practice, both can be said to be placation in the sense that they do not provide for power over 
the outcome. This is appropriate, though, as not all decisions will affect indigenous peoples, and the 
UN-REDD policies provide for FPIC where that is the case. 
3.5 The UN-Indigenous Peoples Partnership Policy Board 
The UNIPP is a multi-donor trust fund, set up by several UN organizations, that mobilises and 
manages funding to facilitate the implementation of international standards on indigenous peoples’ 
rights.178 Decisions on funding projects as well as strategic direction and governance are made by a 
10-member Policy Board composed of equal representation from participating UN organisations and 
indigenous peoples’ representatives and experts.179 A 2017 report of the UNIPP states that it was 
developed to promote indigenous peoples’ rights at the national level by, among other things, 
providing and supporting consultative and participatory processes and mechanisms ‘based on the 
rights enshrined in Article 41 and 42 of UNDRIP and ILO Convention No. 169’,180 implying that the 
UNIPP sees its Board structure, in addition to the participatory processes it supports at the national 
level, as required by law. Here, too, there is partnership between indigenous peoples and states 
whereby the power is shared to make decisions that affect indigenous peoples.  
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International financial institutions have displayed an consistent pattern of practice regarding the 
inclusion of indigenous peoples’ representatives on committees making funding decisions affecting 
them. For boards that make decisions solely on funding to indigenous peoples, power is shared with 
indigenous peoples such that they have control over decision-making; in Arnstein’s terminology, the 
level of participation is partnership or delegated power. This is seen in the IFAD IPAF, the UNIPP, 
and the FILAC. In funds which are more general in nature, making decisions that may impact upon 
indigenous peoples and others, the level of participation is lower—placation, in Arnstein’s terms—
seen in the UN-REDD Programme’s decision-making bodies, as well as in the World Bank FCPF, 
both of which have FPIC policies for cases where indigenous peoples are affected. Such a division 
corresponds well to the theory developed in Chapter 2: where indigenous peoples are the only ones 
affected, their representatives are granted a higher level of participation; whereas where they are only 
one affected group among several, the level of participation is lower. Evidence of opinio juris, or 
other motivations, is scarce to be found here except possibly in the case of the UNIPP. In general, this 
practice contributes to evidence of a norm corresponding to the proposed right.  
4. Advisory bodies to decision-making entities 
Advisory bodies are a third mechanism seen in the practice of IOs by which peoples may participate 
in decision-making affecting them. However, in most cases the extent to which these bodies feed into 
decision-making processes is unclear. They provide for a low level of participation—“consultation”, 
in Arnstein’s terms—which is appropriate where the organization makes decisions affecting a range 
of individuals and groups, not just indigenous peoples, and where the organization also provides for 
the FPIC of affected peoples. This section discusses the IFAD Indigenous Peoples Forum, the 
Indigenous Peoples Advisory Groups to the GEF and the GCF respectively, the World Bank Inclusive 
Forum, and the prospect of an advisory group to the UNESCO WHC.  
4.1 IFAD Forum 
In addition to the IPAF and FPIC requirements, IFAD supports the participation of indigenous 
peoples in matters concerning them through its Indigenous Peoples Forum (“the Forum”). Since 2013 
IFAD has convened a biennial Forum alongside meetings of its Governing Council.181 It is a ‘process 
of dialogue and consultation between representatives of indigenous peoples, IFAD Staff and Member 
States’ with the objectives of discussing the assessment of IFAD’s engagement with indigenous 
peoples, consulting on rural development and poverty reduction, and promoting the participation of 
indigenous peoples’ organizations in IFAD-supported activities at national, regional and international 
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levels.182 Each meeting of the Forum is preceded by a series of regional workshops with indigenous 
peoples’ representatives.183 The Forum itself is guided by a steering committee composed of seven 
indigenous peoples’ representatives from different regions, as well as one representative each from 
the IPAF, the UNPFII and the IFAD.184 In addition, the process of establishing the Forum involved 
indigenous peoples.185  
The Forum presents recommendations to the IFAD,186 but it is not clear as to how these 
recommendations are considered and integrated into the Fund’s work. A synthesis is presented to the 
Governing Council following each meeting of the Forum, but it does not appear that member states 
engage in any discussion or otherwise acknowledge the recommendations.187 In addition, at the 
conclusion of the Forum, a representative of IFAD’s management responds to the recommendations, 
and has at past Forums expressed an intention to implement them,188 but there is no information 
available on how the recommendations are followed up.   
The Forum was widely welcomed by indigenous peoples.189 However, given the lack of formality as 
to how the Forum feeds into the rest of IFAD’s work, as well as the lack of representation of 
indigenous peoples in Governing Council and Executive Board meetings,190 it may be questioned as 
to whether the Forum really contributes to the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples. 
In the light of the FPIC requirement, however, the Forum seems unnecessary to provide for the 
fulfilment of the right in relation to participate in decision-making affecting them.  
4.2 The GEF Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group 
In another instance of practice, the GEF has established an Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group 
(“IPAG”) with the purpose of enhancing coordination between the Facility and indigenous peoples.191 
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It is tasked with providing advice to the GEF on the operationalisation and reviewing of the 2012 
Principles and Guidelines for Engagement with Indigenous Peoples, particularly on the appropriate 
modalities to enhance dialogue among indigenous peoples, the GEF and its partner agencies, and 
others, modalities for enhancing indigenous peoples’ capacity to engage in GEF projects and 
processes, resources and tools that can be used to enhance implementation of the Guidelines, and the 
identification and strengthening of financial arrangements to support indigenous peoples’ efforts to 
protect their rights and effectively manage their resources through existing and new projects and 
programs.192 
Membership of the GEF IPAG consists of seven experts serving in their individual capacity: three 
indigenous persons chosen from a pool of candidates self-selected by indigenous peoples, with 
consideration for geographic balance, one chosen from the GEF NGO Network’s indigenous peoples’ 
representatives, one independent expert, one representative from GEF partner agencies, and the GEF 
indigenous peoples focal point.193 
A 2017 review of the IPAG found that beyond its original mandate, it had also provided a vehicle for 
indigenous peoples’ input into the programming strategy for the GEF’s sixth cycle, and had 
‘[f]ostered the inclusion of an indigenous women’s perspective in GEF’s gender discussions’, as well 
as contributing to discussions on the GEF’s stakeholder engagement policy.194 However, the review 
also noted that the IPAG was constrained due to its low capacity and the fact that its business was 
conducted in English.195 Hence, the IPAG seems to be a means by which indigenous peoples can be 
heard at the GEF, and as such contributes to the emergence of the norm, but also demonstrates the 
ways in which a mechanism that appears promising on paper might be limited in practice. Its 
representativeness could also be questioned: the indigenous members are chosen by the GEF from a 
pool. However, this could be considered appropriate in the case of an expert body rather than a 
representative body. 
4.3 The GCF Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group 
The GCF’s 2018 policy stated that the organisation would establish an indigenous peoples advisory 
group ‘to enhance coordination’ between the GCF, the entities that carry out the projects and 
programmes it finances, states, and indigenous peoples.196 Constituted of one indigenous peoples’ 
representative from each of the four regions in which the GCF funds activities, selected by indigenous 
peoples,197 the key functions of the advisory group will be to provide advice on GCF-financed 
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activities affecting indigenous peoples, review the implementation of the 2018 Policy particularly on 
the appropriate modalities to enhance dialogue between indigenous peoples and the GCF, and provide 
such other advice to the Executive Board as may be requested.198 Further, the policy stated that the 
Facility would ‘support the work of’ such a group and ensure that its recommendations were 
effectively conveyed to the latter entities.199 It does not appear that the IPAG has yet been established. 
Time will tell as to whether it provides a means for the full and effective participation of indigenous 
peoples in matters concerning them at the GCF. 
4.4 The World Bank Inclusive Forum 
Similarly, the World Bank has stated that it is establishing an Inclusive Forum for Indigenous Peoples, 
‘which will serve as a platform to identify and share good practices across regions and deepen the 
understanding of initiatives to advance the integration of Indigenous Peoples’ issues in development 
efforts’.200 As of writing, however, little information exists about how this Forum will work and to 
what extent it will give indigenous peoples a voice at the Bank.  
4.5 Towards an advisory body at the UNESCO World Heritage Committee? 
Successive attempts by indigenous peoples to gain an advisory mechanism to the Committee have 
proved unsuccessful. At its 24th and 25th sessions in 2000-2001 the WHC considered a proposal, 
submitted by a forum of indigenous peoples, for the establishment of a World Heritage Indigenous 
Peoples Council of Experts (“WHIPCOE”) as a consultative body to the Committee.201 The forum had 
proposed that, given the ‘lack of involvement of Indigenous peoples in the development and 
implementation of laws, policies and plans…which apply to their ancestral lands’202 a WHIPCOE 
should sit alongside, and ‘add value [to] rather than displace’,203 the Committee’s existing advisory 
bodies.204 It would provide ‘expert Indigenous advice on the holistic knowledge, traditions and 
cultural values of Indigenous Peoples relative to the implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention’, including on ‘the appropriate identification, evaluation and management of ‘mixed’ 
properties and ‘cultural’ properties with indigenous associations and the identification, management 
and possible renomination of properties listed for their ‘natural’ World Heritage values that may also 
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hold indigenous values’.205 The proposal stated that it was designed as a ‘means of giving Indigenous 
people greater responsibility for their own affairs and an effective voice in decisions on matters which 
affect them’.206 
Although the proposal was initially ‘warmly received’ by the WHC and the World Heritage Centre 
conducted a feasibility study on the proposal including developing draft terms of reference with the 
assistance of the indigenous representatives who had made the proposal,207  the Committee ultimately 
did not approve the request, owing to ‘a number of legal concerns and issues relating to the funding, 
legal status, role and relationships (with the States Parties, Advisory Bodies, World Heritage 
Committee and World Heritage Centre)’, as well as the fact that ‘[s]ome members of the Committee 
questioned the definition of indigenous peoples and the relevance of such a distinction in different 
regions of the world’.208 
The creation of an advisory body of indigenous peoples would be well within the Committee’s 
capacity. Article 10.3 of the World Heritage Convention provides that it may create ‘such consultative 
bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions’. Regardless, and despite repeated 
calls from the UNPFII209 as well as organs and officers of UNESCO itself,210 the Committee has not 
done so.  
In 2017 indigenous peoples’ organizations set up the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on 
World Heritage (“IIPFWH”) as a ‘standing global body aiming to engage with the WHC during its 
meetings, in order to represent the voices of indigenous peoples with regard to the World Heritage 
Convention’.211 The WHC ‘noted the establishment’ of the IIPFWH ‘as an important reflection 
platform on the involvement of Indigenous Peoples in the identification, conservation and 
management of World Heritage properties’,212 but so far it has not resulted in any changes in 
indigenous peoples’ participation in the Committee, which ‘continues to be marginal’.213 This is 
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211 See IIPFWH, ‘International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage’ (n.d.), www.iipfwh.org. This is 
not an official advisory body to the WHC. 
212 WHC, ‘State of Conservation of the Properties Inscribed on the World Heritage List’ (2017) Decision 41 
COM 7. 
213 IWGIA (2019) 664. 
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despite the fact that UNESCO has presented the launch of the IIPFWH to the UNPFII as a ‘major step 
in engaging indigenous peoples’ and as ‘well-received by the World Heritage Committee’.214 Given 
that UNESCO also said that the World Heritage Centre is ‘continuously liaising with the forum 
regarding the next steps’,215 it may be that this is a quickly changing area, and that enhanced 
participation of indigenous peoples in the work of the Committee will soon ensue. For now, the 
UNESCO WHC may be noted as an example of an organisation that does not provide for the 
participation of indigenous peoples via an advisory body, a prospect that remains ‘perpetually 
deferred’.216   
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that IOs that make decisions affecting indigenous peoples enable them to 
participate in the decision-making processes via requiring their FPIC, via their inclusion in decision-
making committees, and via advisory groups to decision-making committees. While there are 
exceptions to each of these, and all three are not necessarily required to fulfil the right, the chapter has 
demonstrated a broad pattern of practice which, when combined with that in other chapters, serves to 
indicate the emergence of a norm corresponding to the right and obligations as outlined in Chapter 2.  
The practice supports the notion that a higher level of affectedness justifies a higher degree of 
participation. The practice regarding FPIC generally supports the international standard whereby 
matters with a more substantial impact require consent, whereas those with less serious impacts 
require merely consultation in order to obtain consent—and the exceptions to this serve to highlight 
the existence of the standard. With regard to board membership, where indigenous peoples are the 
only third parties affected by the decisions of a given body they generally hold distributed power 
(partnership or delegated power, in Arnstein’s typology) over the result, whereas where they are only 
one among several potentially affected groups, a minority of seats or observer participation 
(placation) is the norm. The advisory bodies, similarly, represent a low level of participation. 
In many cases—the IFAD, GCF, UNDP, UN-REDD Programme, GEF, EU, and UNEP—there is 
evidence that the practice is motivated by the organisation’s drive to fulfil its mandate. Instances of 
the participatory practice being carried out in the belief that it is required by law are rarer, and could 
only be said to exist in the case of the IFAD, UNDP, UNIPP, and UN-REDD Programme. As such, 
only these latter four cases could be said to contribute to the formation of a rule of custom. 
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CHAPTER SIX: Participation in the General Affairs of an 
International Organization 
1. Introduction 
This chapter considers general forms of participation of peoples in IOs. As opposed to the 
participation in specific instances of activity that affect a people, such as the standard-setting and 
decision-making activities considered in Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter is the first to examine 
participation in a more general sense. In these cases, the fulfilment of the right does not often require 
peoples to exercise a level of participation going beyond “consultation” or “placation”, in Arnstein’s 
terminology. However, it may require a separate status or accreditation procedure from that applicable 
to NGOs to ensure that participation is meaningful. The chapter is also the first that considers practice 
relating to the participation of peoples other than indigenous peoples.   
The first two sections of this chapter examine the UN system. Section 2 assesses the participation of 
non-self-governing territories and national liberation movements, as well as that of Palestine. It will 
be seen that “peoples” in this sense have been enabled to participate in matters affecting them, via 
associate member status and institutionalised participation in relevant UN bodies. 
Then, in Section 3 the discussion will cover the participation of indigenous peoples in the UN system: 
following on from the process of adoption of the UNDRIP outlined in Chapter 4, this section will 
consider the UNPFII, the EMRIP, the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (“WCIP”), as well as 
the ongoing discussions on enhancing the participation of indigenous peoples in the UN system. 
Section 4 will examine on example of a regional organization, the Arctic Council.1 The Arctic 
Council is an especially intriguing case whereby the indigenous peoples of the region hold 
“permanent participant” status which grants them nearly the same rights as those of states: an example 
of “partnership” in the Arnsteinian sense.  
Similar trends will be observed here as have been pointed out previously. The case studies in this 
chapter serve to further evidence the emergence and acceptance of a norm regarding the participation 
of peoples in global governance. The case of non-self-governing territories shows that this practice is 
by no means new: its genealogy dates back to the early days of the UN. Second, in many instances 
here, too, IOs and states are motivated by the idea that such participation will help a given 
organization to better fulfil its mandate and objectives. However, here too, evidence of opinio juris is 
scarce, meaning that the practice examined here is unlikely to contribute to the emergence of CIL. 
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2. Non-self-governing territories and national liberation movements in the UN system 
The peoples of non-self-governing territories have so far taken up less space in the empirical part of 
this thesis. However, that is not for a lack of relevant data. They have been enabled to participate in 
decolonization processes under the UN, as well as in the more general affairs of several UN 
specialized agencies and regional commissions. Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, the participation 
of representatives of non-self-governing territories and national liberation movements in the UN 
system was provided for via associate membership, as well as participation in relevant committees 
such as the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, the Committee of 
Twenty-Four, and the Trusteeship Committee. Relevant GA resolutions indicate that such 
participation was viewed by the international community as helpful to enable the UN to fulfil its 
objectives under Chapter XI of its Charter. In addition, national liberation movements were 
increasingly given voice throughout the 1960s and 1970s in relevant UN bodies. This section will 
consider these matters before turning to the special case of Palestine. 
2.1 Associate Member status 
Several UN system entities provide for the participation of the peoples of non-self-governing 
territories by way of Associate Membership, a status invented to assist the UN in achieving its 
objectives. The first recognition by the GA of this form of participation is found in GA resolution 
566(VI) of 1952, which considered that the direct involvement of non-self-governing territories in the 
work of the UN and its specialized agencies was an effective means of ‘promoting the progress’ of 
their peoples.2 The GA commended the practice of including, in the constitutions of specialised 
agencies and regional commissions, provisions permitting the admission of non-self-governing 
territories as associate members.3 In a subsequent resolution, the GA invited administering states to 
arrange for the participation of representatives of non-self-governing territories in the work of the 
appropriate UN organs, and further invited them to propose to specialised agencies and regional 
economic commissions to provide for the participation of non-self-governing territories as members 
or associate members.4 
Several UN agencies and regional organizations provide for non-self-governing territories to become 
Associate Members, including the FAO,5 IMO,6 UNESCO,7 the UN Economic Commission for Latin 
                                                             
2 GA res 566(VI), preamble, fourth recital.  
3 Ibid [1]-[2]. 
4 GA res 1539(XV) [2]-[3]. See also GA res 1466(XIV) [1]-[2]. 
5 FAO Constitution, Article II. 
6 IMO Convention, Articles 8, 9, and 77. 
7 UNESCO Constitution, Article II; UNESCO res 41.2 on Rights and Obligations of Associate Members (1951) 
UNESCO Doc 6 C/Resolutions, 83 (“UNESCO res 41.2”). 
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America and the Caribbean (“ECLAC”),8 the UN Economic Commission for Africa (“ECA”), 9  and 
the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (“ESCAP”).10 Typically, for a 
territory to gain status requires an application to be made on behalf of the state having responsibility 
for the international relations of the territory.11 Associate Members do not have voting rights, but 
otherwise can participate on the same basis as member states.12 In relation to UNESCO, for instance, 
Associate Members can participate equally with member states, except without voting rights, in the 
deliberations of the General Conference—UNESCO’s main governing body—and its commissions 
and committees, and in matters pertaining to the conduct of business of such meetings.13 They can 
propose items for inclusion in the provisional agenda of the General Conference, receive all notices, 
documents, reports and records that member states receive, and participate equally with member states 
in the procedure for convening special sessions of the Conference.14 Associate Members can also 
submit proposals to the UNESCO Executive Board and participate in committees established by it, 
although they are not eligible for Board membership.15 When the UNESCO General Conference 
convenes intergovernmental conferences under Articles IV.3 and IV.4 of its Constitution, it may 
invite territories which are not Associate Members but are ‘self-governing in the fields covered by the 
terms of reference of the conference’ to participate, with the approval of the administering member 
state.16  
Associate Member status can sometimes lead to non-self-governing territories being invited to 
participate in wider UN processes, beyond the specific agency or regional commission. For instance, 
in the three global conferences on the sustainable development of small island developing states—
including the 2014 conference that resulted in the Small Island Developing States Accelerated 
Modalities of Action (“SAMOA”) Pathway,17 as well as the 2019 mid-term review of the SAMOA 
Pathway held under the auspices of the 74th session of the GA—the participation of associate 
members of ECLAC and ECA has been consistently enabled at the same level as that of observer 
organizations and states.18 Associate members participated in those meetings.19 This practice is 
                                                             
8 ECLAC, ‘Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure of the Economic Commission for Latin American and 
the Caribbean’ (2014) UN Doc LC/G.1403/Rev.8, Terms of Reference of the Commission [3]. 
9 ECA, ‘Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure of the Economic Commission for Africa’ (1994) UN Doc 
E/CN.14/III/Rev.8/Corr.2, Terms of Reference of the Commission, [6]-[8]. 
10 ESCAP, ‘Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific’ (ESCAP n.d.) [4]-[7]. 
11 See e.g. FAO Constitution, Article II; IMO Constitution, Article 8. 
12 See e.g. IMO Convention Article 9; UNESCO res 41.2. 
13 UNESCO res 41.2, [i]-[ii]. 
14 Ibid, [iii]-[v]. 
15 Ibid, chapeau. 
16 UNESCO, ‘Regulations for the general classification of the various categories of meetings convened by 
UNESCO’, in UNESCO Basic texts: 2018 edition (UNESCO 2018), Articles 11.1(c) and 21.1(b). 
17 GA res 69/15. 
18 GA res 57/262 [14]; GA res 67/207 [18]; GA res 72/307 [7]. 
19 For instance, the 2005 conference saw the participation of Anguilla, Aruba, French Polynesia, Guam, 
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands: GA, ‘Report of the 
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aligned with the theory set out in Chapter 2: the peoples of the non-self-governing territories that are 
associate members of ECLAC and ESCAP are peoples of small islands and as such are particularly 
affected by, and have a stake in, the discussions.20 
An examination of GA resolutions reveals that the GA considers the inclusion of non-self-governing 
territories as Associate Members to contribute towards the fulfilment of the objectives contained in 
Chapter XI of the UN Charter.21 In resolution 1539 of 15 December 1960, the GA stated that the 
direct participation of non-self-governing territories in the work of the UN and its specialised agencies 
was ‘an effective means of promoting the progress of those Territories and their people towards the 
attainment of’ the objectives of Chapter XI,22 that the direct participation of ‘duly qualified 
indigenous representatives of the dependent peoples’ was ‘essential at [their] present stage of 
development’,23 and that it had ‘proved a useful means of promoting the progress of the peoples of 
those Territories towards complete self government or independence’.24  
In summary, the records show that the peoples of non-self-governing territories have been enabled to 
participate in several UN specialised agencies and regional commissions as Associate Members, on 
substantially the same basis as states (albeit without voting rights). In addition, the Associate Member 
status can lead to participation in other UN processes that concern peoples. Furthermore, the GA 
resolutions demonstrate that a primary motivation for doing so was that it would better enable the UN 
to achieve one of its objectives: the self government or independence of all states on conditions of 
equality. There does not appear to be any suggestion that participation through such status was 
perceived as required by law; indeed, this practice occurred before the adoption of many of the key 
instruments regarding self-determination of peoples. Nonetheless, this is relevant practice for the 
purposes of establishing a norm, and provides another data point regarding the relevance of the 
mandates of IOs as providing impetus for such participation. 
2.2 Participation in the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories 
In addition to associate member status, in the early days of the UN non-self-governing territories 
could also participate directly on matters of decolonization in the Committee on Information from 
Non-Self-Governing Territories, which existed from 1946 to 1963 and was mandated to receive 
                                                             
International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States’ (2005) UN Doc A/CONF.207/11, 41, 52 -54. 
20 The Associate Members of ECLAC are Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, 
Curaçao, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Sint Maarten, Turks and Caicos Islands, US Virgin 
Islands, and French Guiana. The Associate Members of ESCAP are American Samoa, The Cook Islands, French 
Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong, Macao, New Caledonia, Niue, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The ECA does 
not have associate members. 
21 Article 73 (administering powers recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of non-self-
governing territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote their wellbeing). 
22 GA res 1539, Preamble, first recital. 
23 Ibid, second recital. 
24 Ibid, third recital. Also see GA res 566(VI), preamble, fourth recital. 
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information on non-self-governing territories.25 GA resolution 647(VII) of 10 December 1952, noting 
that from time to time, administering states had included representatives of non-self-governing 
territories in their delegations to the Committee on Information,26 considered it desirable that 
‘qualified indigenous representatives’ from non-self-governing territories participated in the 
Committee’s work, and invited administering member states to enable such participation.27 In 
resolution 744(VIII) of 27 November 1953, the GA invited administering states to include in their 
delegations indigenous representatives qualified to speak on economic, social and educational 
policies, in respect of non-self-governing territories that had ‘attained a large measure of 
responsibility’ for such policies.28 Thereby, peoples were able to exercise voice on the fundamental 
matter of their self-determination.  
As with associate membership status, this practice was carried out in the belief that it could contribute 
to the fulfilment of the objectives of the UN. The GA in resolutions 647(VII) and 744(VIII) 
recognised that the direct participation of non-self-governing territories in the work of the Committee 
on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories could assist in promoting the progress of their 
peoples towards the goals set out in Chapter XI of the UN Charter.29 
2.3 Participation in the Committee of Twenty-Four, the Trusteeship Committee, and the 
General Assembly 
The participation of peoples in the decolonization process was also seen in other venues. Throughout 
the 1960s, representatives of non-self-governing territories and national liberation movements 
appeared at the Fourth Committee as well as the Committee of Twenty-Four.30 For instance, in 1963 
the Vice-President of the African National Congress of South Africa appeared,31 and in 1964 
representatives from Oman and South West Africa were permitted to appear and speak—particularly 
remarkable in the case of the latter as it was not formally a trusteeship territory.32  
Participation became further institutionalised from 1974, when representatives of national liberation 
movements recognised by the Organization of African Unity were permitted to participate in the GA 
and its committees and subsidiary organs.33 In making this decision, the GA recognised the ‘positive 
results achieved’ in the UN bodies concerned ‘as a direct consequence‘ of the participation of 
                                                             
25 First established by GA res 66. Later subsumed by the Committee of Twenty-Four. On the mandate of the 
Committee on Information, see generally Sud (1965). 
26 GA res 647, preamble, fourth recital. See also GA res 744, preamble, sixth recital. 
27 GA res 647 [1]. 
28 GA res 744 [1]. 
29 GA res 647, preamble, third recital. See also GA res 744, preamble, second recital. 
30 The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.  
31 UN Doc A/SPC/SR.379 (1963). 
32 On Oman, see UN Doc A/C.4/643 (1965) and UN Doc A/C.4/641 (1965). On South West Africa, see GAOR, 
Fourth Committee, 1518th Meeting (5 October 1965) UN Doc A/C.4/SR.1518. 
33 GA res 3280 [6]; GA res 3412 [7]. 
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representatives of national liberation movements in the past.34 The GA also requested that other UN 
organs make the necessary arrangements to facilitate the effective participation of national liberation 
movements in their relevant proceedings.35 In addition, it requested all governments, specialised 
agencies and other UN organizations to ensure the representation of African colonial territories by 
their national liberation movements when dealing with matters pertaining to those territories.36 In 
1975 it stated that national liberation movements recognised by the Arab League or the Organization 
of African Unity should participate as observers at the GA, as well as conferences held under its 
auspices and in meetings of specialized agencies and UN organs.37 African liberation movements 
were invited to participate as observers in several UN conferences around this time.38 Rule 73 of the 
ECOSOC Rules of Procedure provides that the Council may invite any national liberation movement 
recognised by, or in accordance with, GA resolutions to participate on a non-voting basis in its 
deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.39  
This practice demonstrates that the international community has considered it important that peoples 
participate in UN processes concerning them, particularly on matters relevant to decolonization and 
self-determination, via the representatives of national liberation movements and non-self-governing 
territories. This constitutes practice evidencing the emergence and acceptance of a norm.  
2.4 The case of Palestine 
No discussion of the participation of peoples in IOs is complete without examining the case of the 
Palestinian people. Representatives of the Palestinian people have been participating in matters 
concerning them at the UN since its earliest days. Before 1948 the Arab Higher Committee, which has 
been described as ‘in some sense’ the PLO’s precursor,40 was invited alongside the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, the representative of the Jewish population authorised by the British mandatory power, to 
participate in the deliberations of the First (Political and Security) Committee on Palestine,41 and in 
the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question.42 
One of the first acts of the PLO following its establishment in 1964 was to claim representation for 
the PLO in matters relevant to the Palestinian people.43 In  1965 the Fourth Committee granted 
permission for a PLO delegation to attend its hearings and present evidence on Palestinian refugees, 
                                                             
34 GA res 3412, preamble, sixth recital. 
35 GA res 3280 [7]. 
36 GA res 3280 [10]. 
37 GA res 3247. 
38 See e.g. ibid. 
39 ECOSOC, Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council (1992) UN Doc E/5715/Rev.2. 
40 Silverburg (1977) 379. 
41 GA res 104, reaffirmed in regard to the invitation of the Arab Higher Committee in GA res 105 of 7 May 
1947.  
42 GAOR, Ad Hoc Committee (1947) 225. 
43 Silverburg (1977) 369, citing an article in the London Times of 30 May 1964. 
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on the request of the PLO and thirteen Arab member states,44 while not giving them formal 
recognition.45 In 1969 the GA first recognised the Palestinians as a “people”,46 and in 1974 invited the 
PLO to plenary deliberations on the ‘Question of Palestine’.47 Shortly afterward, the GA granted the 
PLO observer status at the Assembly, at international conferences held under its auspices, and at 
meetings conducted by other UN organizations.48 The following year the PLO was invited to 
participate, on an equal footing with other parties, in all ‘efforts, deliberations and conferences’ held 
on the Middle East under UN auspices, and the GA also requested the Secretary-General to take all 
necessary steps to ensure the PLO was invited to the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.49 
The PLO was also invited to participate in Security Council debates on matters concerning it in early 
1976.50 
Since the 1970s, the level of participation exercised by Palestine has been repeatedly increased. In 
1988, the GA re-titled the PLO “Palestine”; although this did not change its level of participation, it 
had a political effect.51 In 1998 Palestine was granted additional rights including the right to co-
sponsor draft resolutions on Palestinian and Middle East issues—although such resolutions were to be 
put to a vote only upon request from a member state—the right of reply, and the right to raise points 
of order related to proceedings on Palestine and Middle East issues.52 In 2012, Palestine was granted 
the status of “non-member observer State”, which did not entail any additional rights but again had 
political ramifications.53 The following year, the GA clarified that Palestine, in UN conferences, ‘may 
participate fully and on an equal basis with other States in conferences that are open to members of 
specialized agencies or that are open to all States’.54 In late 2018 the GA granted Palestine, in light of 
the latter assuming the position of chair of the Group of 77 and China—a key political bloc of 
developing UN member states—for 2019, the right to make statements, submit proposals and 
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47 GA res 3210. 
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amendments and introduce them on behalf of the group, to co-sponsor proposals and amendments, 
and to raise procedural motions.55 
Palestine is a highly unusual case. It participates in the UN on essentially the same footing as a 
member state. For several reasons it is unlike any other people referred to in this thesis: the highly 
political nature of the issues, its status as a “state”. However, before 2012 at least the people of 
Palestine were not formally recognised as a state, yet had a voice at the UN. The participation of the 
people of Palestine in the UN system—regardless of the question of its statehood—forms part of the 
patchwork tapestry of practice regarding the participation of peoples in global governance.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Representatives of non-self-governing territories, national liberation movements, and Palestine have 
participated in the UN by way of procedures and mechanisms sanctioned and encouraged by the GA. 
In a lot of this practice, a sense emerges that the international community has viewed the participation 
of peoples as being aligned with the objectives of the UN regarding decolonisation. Although there is 
no opinio juris, this practice contributes towards the formation of a legitimate expectation of peoples 
regarding participation in global governance. 
3. Indigenous peoples’ participation at the United Nations 
In addition to the peoples assessed in Section 2 of this chapter, indigenous peoples also participate in 
the UN system more generally. From the time of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
indigenous peoples have gradually gained greater voice. This section will consider two mechanisms 
for participation—the UNPFII and the EMRIP—as well as a one-off event, the World Conference on 
Indigenous Peoples (“WCIP”). It will also explore current developments regarding the potential 
creation of a separate status or other enhanced means for participation of indigenous peoples within 
the UN. 
3.1 The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
The UNPFII was established in 2000 by consensus resolution as a subsidiary body of the ECOSOC.56 
Its mandate is to discuss indigenous issues relating to economic and social development, culture, the 
environment, education, health and human rights, to (a) provide advice and recommendations on 
indigenous issues to the UN, (b) raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination of 
activities relating to indigenous issues within the UN system, and (c) prepare and disseminate 
                                                             
55 GA res 73/5. 
56 ECOSOC res 2000/22. For the procedural background to the establishment of the Forum, see Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, Part I, section II, [32]; GA res 48/163; Commission on Human Rights 
res 1994/28; ECOSOC, ‘Report of the Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Ad Hoc Working Group on a Permanent 
Forum for Indigenous Peoples in the United Nations System’ (1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/83; Commission on 
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information on indigenous issues.57 Under the UNDRIP, it is additionally tasked with promoting 
‘respect for and full application’ of the Declaration’s provisions and following up its effectiveness.58 
Made up of 16 members serving in a personal expert capacity, half of which are nominated by 
governments and the other half appointed on the basis of broad consultations with indigenous 
organizations including ‘local indigenous consultation processes’,59 the UNPFII holds annual two-
week sessions,60 and makes recommendations by way of annual report to the ECOSOC as well as 
other UN organs, funds, programmes and agencies.61  
The participation of indigenous peoples in the work of the UN through the UNPFII is thereby double-
layered: first, through the members of the expert council who are themselves indigenous; and second, 
through the participation of indigenous peoples’ organizations as observers. The same procedures 
applicable to the WGDD also apply to the UNPFII,62 so that indigenous peoples’ organizations do not 
first have to hold consultative status with the ECOSOC.63 In practice the UNPFII’s meetings are 
‘always full of indigenous activists from every corner of the globe’.64  
Unlike the WGIP, the UNPFII is established at the highest level within the UN at which a body can be 
established without constitutional reform;65 as such, it is a means by which indigenous peoples can 
exercise considerable influence over other organs and bodies of the UN system. The UNPFII is 
regularly invited to participate in the work of other UN bodies and specialised agencies, representing 
the interests of indigenous peoples.66 In this way, it has become the de facto representative of 
indigenous peoples in the UN. 
Indigenous peoples have broadly hailed the UNPFII as a ‘historic milestone’, being ‘the first body 
within the UN system in which indigenous peoples are represented with the same status as 
governmental representatives’.67 At the same time, there is a recognition that participation through the 
UNPFII is not ‘an end in itself or sufficient’, as the substantive work must be done in the UN agencies 
and programmes whose activities affect indigenous peoples.68 This danger—that indigenous peoples’ 
concerns might become siloed away from the rest of the system—is one reason why the existence of 
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61 Ibid [5]. 
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the PFII alone is not necessarily enough to fulfil the proposed right to participate. Additional means 
may be needed, as the ongoing process examined in Section 3.4 of this chapter aims to determine. 
3.2 The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The EMRIP is a subsidiary body of the Human Rights Council established to provide it with expertise 
and advice on the rights of indigenous peoples as set out in the UNDRIP and to assist states in 
achieving the ends of the Declaration through the promotion, protection and fulfilment of its rights.69 
Made up of seven independent experts,70 it prepares annual studies on the status of the rights of 
indigenous peoples, identifies, disseminates and promotes good practices and lessons learned, and 
provides technical advice to states on domestic legislation and policies and on the implementation of 
recommendations made by human rights treaty bodies.71 
The EMRIP follows a similar approach to accreditation of indigenous peoples’ organizations as that 
established under the WGDD. Meetings are open to the observer participation of, in addition to states, 
NGOs, IGOs and others:72 
…indigenous peoples’ organizations and non-governmental organizations whose aims and purposes are 
in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, based on 
arrangements, including Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996, and 
practices observed by the Commission on Human Rights, through an open and transparent 
accreditation procedure in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Human Rights Council, which 
will provide for timely information on participation and consultation with the States concerned. 
In practice, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights requests all non-State bodies to 
seek accreditation to the EMRIP, irrespective of any entitlement to accreditation under ECOSOC 
procedures.73 The EMRIP is thus another mechanism by which indigenous peoples can make indirect 
inputs into wider UN processes.  
The EMRIP has played a pre-eminent role in outlining and promoting the right of indigenous peoples 
to participate in international processes affecting them. In a 2010 report, it stated that the right to self-
determination is the ‘normative framework’ underlying the right to participation, and stressed that an 
‘appropriate goal’ was ‘the full and direct participation of indigenous peoples in all international 
processes on matters that particularly concern them’.74 The next year, it called for the establishment of 
‘a permanent mechanism or system for consultations with indigenous peoples’ governance bodies, 
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including indigenous parliaments, assemblies, councils or other bodies representing the indigenous 
peoples concerned, to ensure effective participation at all levels of the United Nations’.75 
There is nothing in its mandate, or the surrounding discussions, pointing to an acceptance as law of 
the practice. However, there is evidence of states’ recognition of the intrinsic importance of 
participation of peoples. During the 2016 review of the EMRIP’s mandate, Argentina and Chile 
highlighted the importance of ensuring the full participation of indigenous peoples, while Canada 
stated that space for ‘dialogue’ between states and indigenous peoples is ‘essential’.76  
3.3 The World Conference on Indigenous Peoples 
In addition to the institutional mechanisms of the UNPFII and the EMRIP, indigenous peoples had a 
voice on matters affecting them at the UN during the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples 
(“WCIP”), held by the GA in 2014.77 The WCIP was concerned with the implementation of the 
UNDRIP, and produced an outcome document which has fed into other processes.78 
The WCIP was arranged as three round-table discussions and one panel discussion, enclosed by 
opening and closing sessions.79 In the opening session, speaking slots were held by the Chair of the 
UNPFII and three indigenous peoples’ representatives, nominated by indigenous peoples, alongside 
the GA President, the Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, and heads of 
state.80 The round-tables and panel were each co-chaired by one indigenous peoples’ representative 
and one member state,81 demonstrating a high level of ownership by indigenous peoples over the 
process. Indigenous peoples participated in the discussions on the same footing as member states, as 
well as other observers, civil society organisations and national human rights institutions.82 The 
accreditation of indigenous peoples’ organizations was arranged ‘in accordance with the established 
procedure’ under the WGDD and EMRIP, whereby organisations ‘whose aims and purposes are in 
conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ were invited 
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to apply to the Secretariat for accreditation ‘through an open and transparent procedure’.83 In addition, 
indigenous peoples participated in the preparatory process leading up to the conference.84  
The case of the WCIP shows that by 2014, the UN and its member states regarded it as important that 
indigenous peoples participate in decision-making regarding the implementation of their rights on an 
equal basis with states. However, there is no indication in the relevant statements or resolutions that it 
was perceived as a legal requirement. Nonetheless, it is relevant practice to the determination of 
whether a norm has emerged regarding the participation of indigenous peoples in matters affecting 
them.  
3.4 Towards a separate status for indigenous peoples in the UN system 
Beyond indigenous peoples’ participation via the UNPFII and the EMRIP, there is a protracted 
process currently underway by which they seek an increased level of participation, including a 
separate status at the ECOSOC.  
The process began with a report of the Secretary-General, prepared pursuant to a resolution of the 
Human Rights Council, on the ways and means of promoting participation at the UN of indigenous 
peoples’ representatives on issues affecting them.85 In the report, the Secretary-General first outlined 
ways in which indigenous peoples’ representative organisations and institutions differ ‘qualitatively 
and functionally’ from NGOs:86 such organisations often represent indigenous individuals, collectives, 
families and extended families;87 membership in them can be hereditary and/or based on indigenous 
legal and cultural norms;88 they have often been recognised, whether constitutionally, legally, or 
politically, by the state concerned;89 and their purposes may include the public governance of their 
peoples and/or territories—that is, they are not “non-governmental” in nature.90 Accordingly, an 
indigenous peoples’ organisation might not choose to seek accreditation as an NGO under the 
ECOSOC rules even if technically eligible.  
Moreover, it is difficult for many indigenous peoples’ organisations to meet the criteria for 
consultative status at the ECOSOC.91 Often they will not be registered or even recognised by the state, 
have an executive officer, headquarters or the requisite documentation, nor be broadly representative 
of major segments of society in a large number of countries in different regions of the world.92  
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As a result, the Secretary-General explained, indigenous peoples can find themselves unable to 
participate in UN meetings of direct relevance to them.93 The report went on to outline four 
preliminary issues to be considered by states in partnership with indigenous peoples before deciding 
exactly how to fix the problem.94 What should the criteria be for eligibility for accreditation?95 Whom 
should decide who is eligible—what should be the nature and membership of such an accrediting 
body?96 What sort of information should a would-be indigenous peoples’ representative be required to 
submit?97 Finally, what measures, such as technical and administrative support and training, are 
required to ensure that participation is meaningful and effective?98 
The Secretary-General’s report was taken note of by the Assembly,99 and at the 2014 WCIP member 
states committed to consider ways to enable the participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives 
and institutions in meetings of relevant UN bodies on issues affecting them.100 
Subsequently, GA resolution 70/232 of 2015 requested that the President of the Assembly conduct 
consultations on the matter with member states, indigenous peoples’ representatives and institutions, 
and existing UN mechanisms, and prepare a compilation of the views presented, including existing 
good practices, to form the basis of a draft text to be adopted by the GA at its following session.101 
Consultations were carried out and the compilation of views duly presented.102  
However, contrary to expectations, and perhaps due to the changing geopolitical context, a final 
decision was not taken at the 71st session of the GA in 2017. Despite the fact that drafts of the 
resolution up until three months before the debate in the GA envisaged inviting indigenous peoples’ 
organisations to participate, on a non-voting basis, in the sessions and work of the GA and its 
committees affecting them,103 the resolution as adopted does not make any such moves, merely 
delaying any final decision.104 It requests the Secretary-General to produce a further report on 
‘achievements, analysis and concrete recommendations’ on ‘possible further measures necessary to 
enable participation’ by the 74th session of the GA,105 and asks the GA President to hold ‘informal 
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interactive sessions’ during the 72nd, 73rd and 74th sessions of the Assembly and to prepare summaries 
of these.106 The GA decided to continue its consideration of the matter at its 75th session in 2020.107 It 
remains to be seen whether the political will to enhance the level of participation of indigenous 
peoples in the UN system will be found on what will be a historic occasion for the UN—its 75th 
anniversary. 
Two of the three ‘informal interactive hearings’ have since been held.108 From the summaries, it 
appears that disagreements remain on issues including whether a new category of participation is 
required or whether existing mechanisms should be enhanced;109 whether participation of  indigenous 
peoples should be on the same level as that of permanent observers or states, or a lesser level like that 
of observers;110 whether indigenous peoples’ representatives should be self-identified or whether they 
require the recognition or “non-objection” of relevant states;111 who is “indigenous”;112 and on the 
composition of the body to accredit indigenous peoples’ representatives.113 
Of these issues, it is clear from Chapter 2 that indigenous peoples and their representatives should be 
self-identified, as is the established practice evident in the cases examined in this thesis. Owing to the 
difficulties of indigenous peoples’ access to existing categories of participation, a new category will 
be required. Indigenous peoples should have at least equal representation with states on any 
accreditation body, if not full delegated power.  
3.4.2 Practice and opinio juris of states 
The submissions and statements made by UN member states to the process constitute examples of 
practice—in terms of the obligation to promote the participation of peoples in matters affecting 
them—and also evidence a recognition that such participation is in line with the UNDRIP.  
For instance Sweden, in its submission to the consultation leading up to the Secretary-General’s 2012 
report, stated that it ‘saw merit’ in the notion of the GA adopting general procedures applying to the 
participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives at the UN, since they are not always organised as 
NGOs and that issues affecting them are not limited to human rights. Further, Sweden said, this would 
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be ‘in line with’ the UNDRIP.114 For another example, Mexico has exhibited active practice in 
promoting indigenous peoples’ participation. It co-presented, with Guatemala, the original Human 
Rights Council resolution, makes annual contributions to the Voluntary Fund, and supports a separate 
status for indigenous peoples at the UN.115 
Other Nordic countries have also demonstrated an acceptance of the right to participate as law. In a 
statement to the Assembly in 2014, Finland on behalf of the Nordic countries—Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway—stated that the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-
making in matters which would affect their rights, through self-chosen representatives, was 
recognised by ‘[i]nternational human rights law’ and the UNDRIP, and stated that the Nordic 
countries ‘look[ed] forward to’ further progress on the issue.116 
3.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the participation of indigenous peoples at the UN remains a work in progress. While 
indigenous peoples are able to participate in the protection of their own rights via the EMRIP and the 
UNPFII, and have been able to participate in the WCIP on the implementation of their rights on an 
equal footing to states, discussions on further improving their level of participation in general affairs 
of the UN are still continuing. In the meantime, in the course of these ongoing discussions some states 
have professed the belief that the participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making affecting 
their rights is required by law. It may be that any eventual decision by the GA is evidence of the 
formation of CIL. However, any eventual decision will need to provide for a separate status that does 
not pose unjustified barriers to participation, as well as provide for the self-identification of 
indigenous peoples and their representatives, if the right to participate as set out in Chapter 2 is to be 
fulfilled.  
4. The Arctic Council 
The Arctic Council, an organisation of somewhat ambiguous legal status, provides a glimpse of what, 
for many indigenous peoples, is an ideal scenario regarding participation in the general affairs of an 
organization. The Arctic Council is a ‘high level forum’ established to:117 
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(a) provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, 
with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on 
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic.  
(b) oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS on the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CATF); Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(EPPR). 
(c) adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program. 
(d) disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues. 
The Council’s work is carried out through (i) biennial ministerial meetings, (ii) working groups which 
carry out the technical and research work of identifying and analysing challenges to the Arctic 
environment, and (iii) meetings of senior civil servants—known as Senior Arctic Officials—occurring 
at least twice a year and serving as a liaison between the ministerials and the working groups.118  
Indigenous peoples’ organizations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference played an instrumental 
role in the Council’s creation.119 The Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council 
recognised in its preamble ‘the special relationship and unique contributions to the Arctic of 
indigenous people and their communities’ and noted states’ desire to ‘ensure full consultation with 
and the full involvement of indigenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of the 
Arctic’ in cooperative activities to address Arctic issues requiring circumpolar cooperation.120  
In addition to its eight member states, the Arctic Council creates a “permanent participant” status for 
Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples, which is intended to ‘provide for active participation and 
full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council’.121 Article 2 of 
the Ottawa Declaration grants such status to the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council, 
and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian 
Federation, while providing that permanent participant status is open to other Arctic organizations of 
indigenous peoples with majority Arctic indigenous constituency, representing either a single 
indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state, or more than one Arctic indigenous people 
resident in a single Arctic state, with the caveat that the number of permanent participants should be 
less than that of member states.122 Since its establishment, the Arctic Council has welcomed the Aleut 
International Association, the Gwich’in Council International, and the Arctic Athabascan Council as 
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additional permanent participants.123 Indigenous peoples are clearly distinguished from NGOs: an  
observer status, which entails fewer rights than permanent participancy, is open to NGOs as well as 
non-Arctic states, IGOs, and inter-parliamentary organizations.124 
Under the Council’s Rules of Procedure, permanent participants may participate in all meetings and 
activities of the Council, and may be represented by ‘a head of delegation and such other 
representatives as each Arctic State and Permanent Participant deems necessary’.125 The principle of 
active participation and full consultation with the permanent participants applies to ‘all meetings and 
activities’ of the Council,126 and while decision-making is by consensus of the member states,127 
permanent participants may propose agenda items for Ministerial meetings,128 and make proposals for 
cooperative activities.129  
Indigenous peoples thus have ‘almost equal participatory rights as the state members’.130 In practice, 
despite the stipulation that only states hold formal decision-making power, that the permanent 
participants must be fully consulted on decisions is ‘close to a de facto power of veto should they all 
reject a particular proposal’.131 Moreover, the ‘fluid manner in which many decisions are made in the 
council’s working groups and task forces’ means that ‘it is seldom clear when a formal decision is 
being taken’.132 Further, indigenous peoples’ organizations have in fact been highly influential. They 
played an active role in the negotiation of two legally binding instruments negotiated under the 
Council’s auspices—the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement and the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic—and in both cases managed to have 
their rights reflected in the text of the agreements.133 In addition, two proposals submitted by the 
Saami Council were chosen by ministers at the Iqaluit ministerial meeting for completion and 
implementation under the guidance of SAOs.134 Significant, too, is an element of institutional 
memory: many of the heads of delegation of the permanent participants ‘have been involved in the 
council much longer than their government counterparts’, enabling them to be ‘highly effective – and 
influential’ participants.135 
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The Arctic Council falls short of formal status as an IGO: states have not formalised Arctic 
cooperation through an international treaty, meaning that it is commonly described as a “soft law” or 
“informal” organization.136 However, the negotiation of internationally legally binding agreements 
under its auspices, as well as the establishment of a standing secretariat, has arguably transformed the 
Council from an inter-governmental forum into an IO.137 As Klabbers writes, ‘if an entity looks like 
an international organization, functions like one, and is treated by outsiders as one’, then it is likely 
that it is, appearances notwithstanding, an international organization.138 The Arctic Council’s initial 
façade of legal ambivalence thus seems a mere pretence. 
Even if the Arctic Council cannot be treated as an IO—for instance, for the purpose of establishing a 
rule of custom—it is relevant for the purposes of this study. First, it shows that states are willing to 
give voice, on a partnership basis, to indigenous peoples in IOs the activities of which affect them and 
in which they have relevant expertise to contribute. It evidences acceptance of the norm. The high 
level of participation—partnership, in Arnstein’s terminology—is justified as the regional cooperation 
primarily affects the area in which the indigenous peoples live. Although states clearly also have a 
stake in the governance of the region, this high level of affectedness distinguishes the Arctic Council 
from organizations of more general membership. Second, it provides an indication as to how the right 
may be implemented. It could thus ‘serve as a model’ for other global governance bodies, both formal 
and informal.139 Third, in a region of growing interest due its rapid warming and hence the potential 
for hitherto untapped resources and shipping routes, the Arctic Council is an increasingly powerful 
player with global economic relevance.140 Many non-Arctic states are attempting to become involved 
in Arctic governance,141 and the position of indigenous peoples as “insiders” rather than “outsiders” in 
this regime of “newfound celebrity”,142 in which status is grounded in localness rather than 
statehood,143 seems set to be increasingly consequential for their self-determination.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples aspiring 
to be independent during the decolonization period have been enabled to participate in matters 
affecting them, via associate member status and institutionalised participation in relevant UN bodies. 
In addition, indigenous peoples have been enabled to participate in the UN through the UNPFII and 
the EMRIP, and at the WCIP. The UN may yet further conform to the norm by way of the 
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establishment of a separate status for indigenous peoples. In the Arctic Council, the indigenous 
peoples of the region participate as partners with states. The case studies in this chapter serve to 
further evidence the emergence and acceptance of a norm regarding the participation of peoples in 
global governance. The case of non-self-governing territories shows that this practice is by no means 
new: its genealogy dates back to the early days of the UN. Here, too, IOs and states are motivated by 
the idea that such participation will help a given organization to better fulfil its mandate and 
objectives. However, the practice examined here is unlikely to contribute to the emergence of CIL as 






CHAPTER SEVEN: Participation at International Courts and 
Tribunals 
1. Introduction 
The final type of practice investigated in this thesis is that of, and in, international courts and tribunals 
(“ICTs”). Have ICTs, or states enabled peoples to participate in cases affecting them, and is any 
practice in this regard accompanied by a recognition that doing so is required by law? If it cannot be 
said that there is practice accepted as law, does practice nonetheless exist that further evidences the 
establishment of a norm whereby ICTs enable peoples to participate in matters affecting them?  
This chapter does not claim to be comprehensive in the sense of covering all ICTs.1 I focus on those 
in which there is relevant practice in relation to the participation (or distinct lack of participation) of 
peoples in cases affecting their rights and interests: the ICJ, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(“DSM”), and ISDS tribunals.2  
Section 2 will examine the practice of the ICJ; it will be seen, firstly, that ICJ practice has evolved 
from not allowing affected peoples to participate, to enabling them to do so via innovative means, 
and, secondly, that emerging state practice is occurring. Section 3 examines amicus curiae 
participation in trade and investment disputes. While some have hailed the rise of amicus participation 
in the proceedings of the WTO dispute settlement bodies and ISDS tribunals as a means by which 
peoples may gain a hearing in processes affecting them, it is unlikely that this constitutes practice 
contributing towards the emergence of a rule of CIL or towards the establishment of a norm. 
To fulfil the right does not necessarily require an affected people to have standing as a party in the 
proceedings, nor the ability to initiate proceedings. An ability to initiate proceedings is relevant where 
a people is attempting to review or correct the actions of a state at the international level; this may be 
appropriate in courts with relevant jurisdiction, such as international human rights courts, but not 
others. In addition, locus standi will be relevant to the right to access justice as against IOs 
themselves. However, for the purposes of the ICTs discussed in this chapter, the ability to initiate 
proceedings is not necessary for the fulfilment of the right. Rather, in light of the nature of ICTs, what 
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the fulfilment of the proposed right requires is for an affected people to be heard, and their position to 
be taken into account. Arnstein’s typology holds less relevance here. The proposed right entails an 
obligation of states parties to proceedings to enable the participation of affected peoples in 
proceedings—for instance, by including their positions in written submissions and including their 
representatives in state delegations to hearings. Evidently, states will not always be willing or able to 
do this; where they are not, the obligation of ICTs to enable the people to be heard by other means 
will come into play. 
2. The International Court of Justice 
It has been observed that the ICJ, ‘although sometimes called the World Court, is a Court for states’.3 
On the face of its Statute and Rules, there is no contemplation of the participation of “peoples” in 
either contentious or advisory proceedings. In contentious proceedings, only states can be parties or 
intervenors.4 Peoples do not have standing.5 While Article 34(1) of the Court’s Statute, on standing, 
has been criticised as ‘if not definitely outdated, somewhat disconnected’ from modern international 
law,6 to alter it would open the door to a much greater workload for the Court, and is unlikely to be 
politically feasible.   
Theoretically, in contentious proceedings information could be transmitted from an affected people to 
the Court by way of several mechanisms established under the ICJ Statute and its Rules. Under 
Article 34(2) of the Statute, the ICJ may request relevant information from IGOs;7 it could be 
contemplated that this mechanism be used to request information from the UNPFII if a case were to 
arise concerning indigenous peoples. Further, according to Article 50 of the Statute, the Court may 
instruct an individual or other entity to carry out an inquiry or give an expert opinion.8 In addition, 
under its rules the Court may call upon the parties to produce such evidence or to give such 
explanations as the Court may consider necessary to elucidate any aspects of the matters in issue, or 
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may itself seek other information for this purpose;9 this provision could be used to obtain evidence as 
to the views and wishes of an affected people. Finally, the Court may arrange for the attendance of a 
witness or expert to give evidence in the proceedings.10 In addition, the ICJ recognised in Nicaragua 
that information can come to it ‘in ways and by means not contemplated’ by its rules:11 regarding 
questions of law, it is ‘not solely dependent on the argument of the parties before it’,12 and in relation 
to disputed facts, it is ‘not bound to confine its consideration to the material formally submitted to it 
by the parties’.13 Although these provisions and statements were not made with the participation of 
affected peoples in mind and have not been used for this purpose, the Court if it were so minded could 
utilise them to fulfil the right. 
In advisory proceedings,14 the concept of being a “party” does not quite translate. Standing consists, 
instead, in the ability to submit written and oral statements—an ability that is granted to states and IOs 
under Article 66(2) of the Statute. Under that provision, the Registrar of the Court shall ‘notify any 
state entitled to appear before the Court or international organization considered…likely to be able to 
furnish information on the question’ that the Court ‘will be prepared to receive…written statements, 
or to hear…oral statements relating to the question’. Unlike under Article 34(2) where the scope of 
the term “international organization” is strictly limited to ‘public international organizations’, nothing 
in the Statute or the Rules of Court, nor in their travaux preparatoires, limits the application of Article 
66(2) to IGOs. In practice, however, the Court has largely interpreted “international organization” as 
so restricted, rejecting NGOs’ requests to participate under this provision.15 Practice Direction XII 
further restricts the scope of Article 66(2), providing that where an NGO submits a written statement 
on its own initiative, the statement is not to be considered part of the case file and will instead be 
placed in a designated location in the Peace Palace, where it may be consulted by states and IGOs.16 
The Statute does not provide for hearing witnesses and experts or receiving enquiries and opinions in 
advisory proceedings, although it does stipulate that the Court shall be guided by the provisions which 
apply in contentious cases ‘to the extent which it recognizes them to be applicable’.17 
Despite the rules’ restrictions, in practice the Court, as well as advocates representing states parties to 
proceedings, have increasingly found innovative ways to enable affected peoples to participate in 
advisory proceedings. While affected peoples struggled unsuccessfully to be heard in the South West 
Africa cases, in the Kosovo and Wall advisory proceedings the Court invited the affected people to 
                                                             
9 Rules of Court, Article 62(1). 
10 Rules of Court, Article 62(2). 
11 Nicaragua, [31]. 
12 Ibid [29]. 
13 Ibid [30]. Although these statements were made in the context of a case in which one party did not appear, it 
is submitted that this principle is subject to broader application. 
14 ICJ Statute, Article 65; UN Charter, Article 96. 
15 Paulus (2012) 1649-1650. 
16 ICJ, Practice Direction XII (2004) [1]-[3]. 
17 ICJ Statute, Article 68. 
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participate on the same footing as states. Moreover, in the Chagos proceedings there is state practice 
regarding the inclusion of representatives of an affected people on a state delegation—and, implicitly, 
practice of the Court in allowing such behaviour. 
The Court does not explicitly link its practice to the concept of self-determination, nor can evidence 
be found of the Court’s acceptance of the practice as law. Nonetheless, this practice can be understood 
as an implicit recognition by the Court that it ought to enable an affected people to be heard in 
relevant proceedings. Although these developments have taken place in advisory proceedings, it can 
be argued that if an appropriate contentious case were to arise, the court should use its information-
receiving powers, noted above, to enable an affected people to participate, building on statements 
made in separate opinions in the East Timor case whereby judges of the Court recognised that the 
voice of a people directly affected was missing in the proceedings.18 
As a caveat, the scope of cases considered here is restricted to those expressly concerning self-
determination. Although it is highly likely that other ICJ proceedings have had a direct impact on 
peoples’ rights,19 for instance, in territorial disputes where an indigenous people live along the 
disputed border region, these cases do not appear to evidence any relevant practice.20 As another 
caveat, in 1994 the Court ceased to publish its correspondence,21 so after this date it cannot be 
determined whether affected peoples have unsuccessfully attempted to access the Court.   
2.1 A Struggle to be Heard in the South West Africa cases 
A brief mention of earlier cases is useful in order to more fully appreciate the extent to which the 
Court’s practice has evolved.22 The people of Namibia—or the Territory of South West Africa, as it 
was then known to the international community—did not themselves participate in any of the five sets 
                                                             
18 As discussed in Chapter 3, section 2. 
19 As recognised by Shelton (2007) 142. 
20 While the ICJ in some cases pays regard to the interests of the inhabitants of disputed border regions such as 
nomadic peoples, this does not extend to the participation of those peoples; indeed, participation may not be 
required under the theory: see e.g. Burkina Faso/Niger [112]; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 
June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Provisional Measures, 
Order of 18 July 2011) [2011] ICJ Rep 537, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade [46], [62], [70]; 
Navigational Rights [14]; Pulp Mills [215]-[216], [219]. Boundary disputes in other international courts and 
tribunals are also pertinent in this respect. In the Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration, 19 October 1981, Court of 
Arbitration (Cahier, Simpson, Simmonds) (1993) 91 ILR 543, 639, where the Court emphasised the importance 
of a statement made by representatives of the Bani Qitab, the tribal people whose traditional lands were located 
in the disputed territory, stating which emirate they pledged allegiance to. However, the Court did not go so far 
as to consider that the Bani Qitab should participate in the proceedings. See also the Decision regarding 
Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia , 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 13 April 2002, 130 ILR 1, [7.3] (regard should be paid to the 
customary rights of the local people to access the river). 
21 As noted by Wiik (2018) 98. 
22 It may also be noted that the Sahrawi people did not participate in the Western Sahara advisory proceedings, 
perhaps because they did not consider the dispute relevant to them, as it concerned questions of a historical 
nature rather than the right to self-determination: Western Sahara [70], [162]. It could also be that the Sahrawi 
simply did not know of the proceedings or had no capacity to prepare a statement. 
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of proceedings brought concerning their decolonization.23 This was not entirely for lack of trying. The 
correspondence reveals a people’s struggle to be heard. On several occasions, the court received 
applications from various individuals and organisations who claimed to represent the people of 
Namibia and requested to participate in proceedings including via witness testimony, written 
statements, and oral statements. By and large, the court was not open to these requests, and the voices 
of the people of Namibia ultimately went unheard by the ICJ.  
By way of background,24 following World War I the League of Nations placed South West Africa, 
which had been a German colony, under a mandate held by Britain but in practice to be exercised by 
South Africa. Under the mandate’s terms, South Africa would have full power of administration and 
legislation as if South West Africa were an integral part of its territory. After the creation of the UN, 
the Charter of which did not automatically convert mandates into trust territories but rather required a 
trusteeship agreement,25 South Africa resisted bringing South West Africa into the trusteeship system. 
Furthermore, concerns had arisen about the way in which South Africa had discharged its role as 
mandatory power: it had allowed German settlers to keep their land, while refusing to restore 
indigenous lands, and placed South West Africa under the apartheid system.26 In 1947 South Africa 
had even proposed, to the GA, that it annex South West Africa.27 The GA, not inclined to acquiesce to 
this request, recommended that South West Africa be brought under trusteeship,28 a course of action 
that South Africa continued to resist for many years. It was not until 1966 that the GA placed South 
West Africa under direct UN responsibility,29 and South Africa continued to occupy Namibia even 
after it was formally required to leave in 1969.  
Against this background, the first set of advisory proceedings in the ICJ, in 1950, concerned whether 
South Africa continued to have obligations under the mandate, and if so, the content of those 
obligations; whether Chapter XII of the Charter applied to South West Africa; and who could modify 
the international status of South West Africa.30 The Court found that South Africa continued to have 
obligations under the mandate, but that there was no obligation to place South West Africa under 
trusteeship, and that South Africa could modify its international status only with UN consent.31 
The correspondence reveals two attempts to participate by individuals and groups purporting to 
represent the people of South West Africa. The first is in respect of a letter of 20 January 1950 from 
                                                             
23 International status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion [1950] ICJ Rep 128 (“South West Africa AO”); 
South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment [1966] ICJ Rep 6. 
24 For a fuller explanation of the historical situation, see Dugard (1973); Falk (1967); Clark (1981). 
25 UN Charter, Article 77. 
26 Yates and Chester (2006) 77. 
27 UN, Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48 (UN 1948) 205-208. 
28 GA res 65. 
29 GA res 2145. 
30 South-West Africa AO, 129. 
31 Ibid, 138-141. 
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RH Swale to the Secretary-General, where Swale requests to be heard as a witness in the ICJ 
proceedings:32 
I claim to be heard as a witness before the said Court because I am a chief of the Zulus in South Africa. 
Because I raised the natives of German South-West Africa in rebellion against the Germans in 1903 
known as the Herero rebellion. 
… 
Because I know more of the reasonable wants and wishes of the native population of the mandated 
Territory of South-West Africa than anyone else, I claim a right to be heard on their behalf. 
This is an attempt to represent the people of South West Africa in proceedings concerning them. 
Although it may be questioned whether Swale was a legitimate representative of the people—he was 
living in South Africa, and did not indicate his extent of involvement with the people of South West 
Africa after he had led the Herero rebellion 47 years previously—the Court did not reference any such 
concern in its rejection. Rather, by letter dated 17 April, the Registrar informed Swale that because the 
request for an advisory opinion involved only questions of law, the Court believed that it would ‘not 
be necessary to call witnesses’.33 
The second attempt originated from an organisation which, on its face, seems unlikely to have any 
claim to represent the people of South West Africa: the International League for the Rights of Man 
(“ILRM”), an NGO based in New York. However, when viewed in historical context, this request can 
in fact be seen as a people’s attempt to participate in the ICJ proceedings. 
The record of the correspondence shows that Robert Delson, a member of the Board of Directors of 
the ILRM, wrote to the Registrar requesting to submit a written statement under Article 66(2) of the 
ICJ Statute.34 The Court acceded to the request, notifying Delson that it would accept a written 
statement on legal questions within a certain time limit.35 Before the time limit had elapsed, the 
Registrar received a statement of facts and a statement of law from Gordon F Muirhead, who wrote 
that he had been requested to forward these to the Court on behalf of Reverend Michael Scott in his 
capacity as advisor to the ILRM.36 However, the Registrar refused to accept the statements: ‘I have no 
information to this effect from the League. This Organization has requested permission to submit a 
statement to the Court, and the Court has acceded to its request. Further communications in this 
                                                             
32 South-West Africa AO (Correspondence) [1950] ICJ Rep 320, 340-341. 
33 Ibid 342. 
34 Ibid 324.  
35 Ibid 327. 
36 Ibid 328. 
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matter should, therefore, emanate from the headquarters of that organization.’37 The ILRM later sent a 
written statement, but this was rejected for being outside the time limit.38  
This is commonly cited as an example of NGO participation: scholars tend to lament the failure of the 
ILRM to submit its statement within the time limit, opining that if it had, this could have set a 
precedent for further NGO participation under Article 66(2).39 Digging deeper, however, reveals that 
the ILRM’s involvement in the case was very much at the initiative of the Herero people of South 
West Africa, who had been repressed by South Africa and in 1946 had become concerned about South 
African moves to annex South West Africa including through a poorly conducted “referendum”.40 The 
connection is through Reverend Michael Scott, an Anglican priest in South Africa who later became 
an adviser to the ILRM and played a crucial role in bringing the situation in South West Africa to 
international attention.41  
The historical record shows that in 1946 Scott, who was living in Johannesburg, was asked to meet 
with Frederick Mahareru, the Paramount Chief of the Herero tribe, who then lived in exile in 
Bechuanaland, South Africa with 15,000 other Hereros.42 Mahereru explained his concerns about the 
South West African referendum and sent Scott to meet with Herero chiefs still in South West Africa, 
including Chief Hosea Kutako. Those chiefs had requested the South African administrator of the 
Territory to allow a UN commission to conduct the referendum, or in the alternative, to allow Herero 
spokespeople to attend the GA. Both requests had been declined; the Administrator informed the 
Hereros that they ‘had no right to go to the United Nations while they had not got their own 
government’.43 Scott worked with the chiefs to draft a petition to the UN asking for, inter alia,  the 
return of Herero lands and the return of Mahareru.44 As the South West African administration did not 
permit the chiefs to leave the country, they asked Scott to deliver the petition.45 So it was that in 1947 
Scott presented the petition to the Fourth Committee of the UN. Over the following years, Scott 
repeatedly advocated for the Herero chiefs, or himself in their stead, to be heard by the Trusteeship 
Council and the Fourth Committee.46 It was not until 1949 that Scott started to work with the ILRM, 
and it appears that the ILRM only became engaged in the South West African issue to the extent of 
Scott’s work.47  
                                                             
37 Ibid 329. 
38 Ibid 346. 
39 See e.g. Shelton (1994) 623-624; Hernandez (2011) 149. 
40 Yates and Chester (2006) 75-78; Scott (1958). 
41 Among other things, Scott was an early practitioner of non-violent direct action, and was the first white man 
to be imprisoned for protesting against South Africa’s apartheid system. See Scott (1958). 
42 Scott (1958) 219. 
43 Ibid 223. 
44 Ibid 224-225. 
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Following Scott’s intensive lobbying, in 1949 the majority of the committee agreed to grant a hearing 
to one or more representatives of the indigenous population of South West Africa who could provide 
evidence of their status by submitting suitable credentials.48 A subcommittee subsequently examined 
Scott’s credentials and unanimously found that they were in order and should be given ‘full faith and 
credit’,49 and the Fourth Committee agreed to give him a hearing.50 In his address to the Committee, 
Scott explained that he was representing the views of the Herero people, the Nama people and the 
Berg Damara people of South West Africa.51 He went on to detail South Africa’s breaches of its 
mandate regarding its efforts to incorporate South West Africa into its territory, its alienation of 
indigenous peoples’ land, and its denial of fundamental civil and political rights. He asked that the 
peoples for whom he spoke be given an opportunity to state their case before the UN or a commission 
appointed for that purpose, and that their lands should be returned to them and their territory brought 
under trusteeship. The Committee subsequently recommended to the GA that an opinion be sought 
from the ICJ as to the obligations of South Africa.52 
Scott had lobbied to allow the peoples of South West Africa to be heard by the UN, as their chosen 
representative. The Hereros could not have participated on their own behalf, as they were unable to 
leave the country. That the matter was brought before the ICJ was the result of Scott’s efforts on 
behalf of the Hereros and other peoples of South West Africa. In this light, then, the ILRM’s attempts 
to participate in the 1950 proceedings can be seen as a continuation of Scott’s work to allow the 
Hereros to be heard at the international level. Although there is no available evidence as to whether 
Scott was explicitly instructed by the Hereros to participate in the ICJ proceedings on their behalf, it 
seems likely that his requests to the Court—and those of the ILRM—were made on this basis. There 
is no indication that the ILRM was working on the South West Africa issue in any additional way to 
Scott’s work. Scott had gained a position with the League while lobbying at the UN as it had helped 
him gain accreditation and legitimacy within the process, but even though his official title was as 
advisor to the ILRM, ‘it was as a representative of the Hereros and other tribes that he spoke’.53 
The 1971 advisory proceedings saw a continuation of attempts to allow the people of South Africa to 
be heard.54 In 1966, the UN had terminated South Africa’s mandate for South West Africa, and 
assumed direct responsibility itself.55 However, South Africa continued to occupy South West Africa, 
now renamed Namibia.56 These proceedings concerned the legal consequences for states of the 
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continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. In its decision, the Court acknowledged that Namibia 
was affected by the proceedings: ‘the injured entity is a people which must look to the international 
community for assistance in its progress towards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted’.57 
The most notable of these attempts was a letter from Kuaima Riruako, Kanepure Mbaha, Veiue 
Mbaeva and Mburumba Kerina, on behalf of the South West Africa National United Front 
(“SWANUF”).58 Riruako et al wrote that they were ‘indigenous inhabitants of the international 
Territory of South West Africa (Namibia)’, and requested to be ‘heard as “petitioners” by the Court’. 
They referred to the people of Namibia as a ‘Namibia Nation’ and ‘a political and judicial entity’. 
They sought to provide legal backing for their claim to be heard, stating that their ‘right as indigenous 
inhabitants of South West Africa (Namibia) to petition’ had been established in the ICJ statute, the 
1956 advisory opinion and in GA decisions; the Registrar, when declining their request based on 
Article 66(2), roundly rejected this assertion.59 
SWANUF, it must be noted, was not exactly a central player in the Namibian liberation struggle. Two 
main rival Namibian liberation groups existed at the time,60 one of which would be recognised in the 
1970s as the ‘sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people’.61 In 1966, SWANUF was set 
up as an attempt to unify the divergent groups.62 However, although SWANUF was active at the UN 
it had no support base in Namibia, and both main groups opposed it; as a result, SWANUF remained a 
‘marginal’ player.63 Perhaps, then, it could be argued that the ICJ did not allow the participation of 
SWANUF because it was not sufficiently representative of the Namibian people. However, there is no 
evidence that the Court considered the degree of representativeness of the individual or entity 
purporting to represent the people of Namibia as a factor in its decisions to decline the various 
requests. The requests from Michael Scott, who was recognised by the UN as a legitimate 
representative of the Herero people, were declined in just the same manner. 
The ILRM again requested to participate through the making of written and oral statements.64 So too 
did the American Committee on Africa, another NGO.65 Both requests were declined on the basis that 
these organisations were not ‘international organizations’ within the meaning of Article 66(2).66 
Michael Scott also requested to participate on a separate basis: he wrote to the Registrar to ask 
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whether the Court would receive a written or oral statement from him.67 Scott noted that ‘[i]t was at 
the request of the Herero chiefs Frederich Mahareru, Hosea Kutako and others’ that he appealed to the 
UN in 1946 and conveyed their petition there in 1947, and that his credentials to represent the Herero 
people had been found to be ‘worthy of “full faith and credit”’ by a UN subcommittee. In a further 
plea, he stated that he had ‘received a renewed request from Chief Clements Kapuuo of the Hereros to 
represent them’.68 The Registrar declined Scott’s request, citing Article 66(2).69 
The South West Africa cases, then, reveal continued attempts by affected peoples to participate in the 
proceedings affecting them at the ICJ. However, the Court repeatedly declined to accede to these 
requests. The Court did not recognise any right of peoples to be heard in proceedings affecting them, 
and treated these requests in the same way that it had treated those by NGOs and individuals.  
2.2 Peoples as participants in the Wall and Kosovo advisory proceedings 
The Court on two occasions has allowed a people to participate in advisory proceedings concerning it, 
through the submission of written statements and comments and the making of oral statements.70 In 
the Wall advisory proceedings, representatives of the Palestinian people submitted written statements 
and comments and gave an oral statement at hearing.71 Similarly, in the Kosovo advisory proceedings 
the elected representatives of the Republic of Kosovo, who had declared its independence, submitted 
written statements and comments and gave an oral statement.72 
Taking these cases in turn, in the Wall proceedings the GA raised a question as to the legal 
consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. In the outcome, the Court found that the construction of the wall severely 
impeded the Palestinian people’s exercise of self-determination, and was therefore a breach of Israel’s 
obligation to respect that right.73 
By an Order of 19 December 2003 the ICJ decided that, taking into account Palestine’s observer 
status in the GA and that it had co-sponsored the draft resolution requesting the advisory opinion, 
Palestine could submit a written statement on the question and take part in the hearings. Palestine 
proceeded to submit a statement, and spoke first in the subsequent oral hearings.74 The order made no 
reference to Article 66(2), although this provision was undoubtedly the basis for the invitation.75 In 
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68 Ibid 676-677. 
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74 Ibid [12]. 
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one place in the majority opinion, the Court makes explicit reference to Palestine’s statements.76 The 
only clue in the judgment as to the reason for allowing Palestine to participate comes in the separate 
opinion of Judge Higgins, where she notes that ‘[t]he Court has regarded the special status of 
Palestine, though not yet an independent State, as allowing it to be invited to participate in these 
proceedings’.77 
The Kosovo advisory proceedings concerned a declaration of independence from Serbia by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. The question was whether this declaration of 
independence was adopted in violation of international law.78 The Court found it unnecessary to 
decide on the consequences of the right to self-determination in order to respond to the question 
before it. Importantly, in the advisory opinion the Court held that the authors of the declaration of 
independence ‘did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the 
Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as 
representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration’.79 The 
Court, by this statement, recognised the authors of the declaration as representatives of the people of 
Kosovo.80 This statement offers an interesting clue as to how the court thought of the authors of the 
declaration and, perhaps, why it invited them to participate. 
Similarly to the Wall case, the Court invited the people of Kosovo—via their representatives, the 
authors of the declaration of independence—to participate via an Order providing that, ‘taking 
account of the fact that the unilateral declaration of independence…is the subject of the question 
submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion’, the authors of the declaration were ‘considered likely 
to be able to furnish information on the question’. The authors of the declaration were therefore 
invited to make ‘written contributions’ to the Court,81 which they subsequently submitted.82 It is 
interesting to note here the term used in relation to the people of Kosovo’s written submission – 
“contribution” – while all submissions made by states were referred to, as in other cases, as 
“statements”.83 The Court gave no explanation for this difference in terminology, nor is it reflected in 
the wording of the ICJ Statute; the Court seems to imply a distinction between the status of the 
authors of the declaration and that of states.84 The Court also heard an oral statement made for the 
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authors of the declaration, which was the second statement delivered in the oral proceedings, directly 
after that of Serbia.85 Two of the judges explicitly refer to the Kosovar statements in their opinions.86 
There is no procedural basis for the participation of the representatives of Kosovo or Palestine in the 
ICJ Statute, nor in the Rules.87 Article 66(2) had previously been applied in a restrictive way so as to 
exclude the participation of, for instance, NGOs and individuals;88 thus, it cannot easily be argued that 
the provision should be interpreted permissively.89 Neither Palestine nor Kosovo were states entitled 
to appear before the Court at the time; neither meets the relevant definition under the ICJ Statute. Nor 
could Palestine or Kosovo be conceived of as “international organizations” within the meaning of 
Article 66(2).90 Yet Palestine and Kosovo were effectively granted the same participatory rights as 
states. 
Commentators have advanced various legal and pragmatic explanations for this discrepancy. Some 
argue that Kosovo and Palestine were “quasi-parties” to the respective “quasi-disputes” with Serbia 
and Israel, with a special interest in the outcome of the proceedings which justified their participation 
under the maxim audiatur et altera pars (hear the other side).91 Others argue that the Court allowed 
the participation in order to obtain useful information, which is the principal aim of Article 66(2).92 A 
variation on that argument is that the Court enabled participation because it was ‘essential to the 
administration of justice’.93 Still others explain the practice by saying that Kosovo and Palestine were 
“aspiring states” and the matter underlying the question before the Court was their external right to 
self-determination.94 Therefore, according to Ronen, a decisive factor in the Court’s willingness to 
allow participation is an underlying dispute over territorial status deriving from a claim of a quasi-
state recognised as entitled to exercise the right to self-determination.95  
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95 Ronen (2012) 101. 
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These arguments do not satisfactorily explain the practice. Any entity may have a “quasi-dispute” 
with a state; if the participation of Kosovo and Palestine was solely because of such a dispute, this 
would open the floodgates to a vast number of potential claims to participate. If the reason was simply 
the provision of information, it is hard to explain why NGOs with relevant expertise have not been 
similarly invited to participate. With respect to the “quasi-states” argument, Ronen fails to connect the 
dots by explaining why the Court might have assigned importance to the fact that self-determination 
was at issue in the case.  
The better view is that the Court’s invitations to representatives of the peoples of Palestine and 
Kosovo to participate in the respective advisory proceedings is that it implicitly recognised that 
peoples should participate in proceedings affecting them. While the ICJ’s practice cannot be justified 
on the basis of the wording of Article 66(2) and its established interpretation, I argue that the court 
implicitly construed the provision broadly in order to fulfil the right. A future case would not 
necessarily have to involve a quasi-state, or a quasi-dispute, for a people to have a right to be heard.  
In conclusion, although it is unlikely that the ICJ’s practice in the Wall and Kosovo advisory 
proceedings can be said to contribute to the emergence of a rule of CIL, as there is no indication that 
the Court viewed what it was doing as required by law, I argue that in effect it fulfilled the right of 
peoples to participate. This forms part of the emerging pattern of practice.  
2.3 State practice in the Chagos Islands proceedings 
The final example of practice to be examined here is that of the ICJ and Mauritius in the Chagos 
Islands advisory proceedings.96 It will be argued that Mauritius’ inclusion of Chagossians on the 
state’s delegation to the ICJ can be viewed as an instance of state practice regarding the obligation to 
enable affected peoples to be heard, as well as practice of the ICJ in allowing this to occur.  
First, the factual background. The Chagos Islands97 are an isolated archipelago in the Indian Ocean. A 
British colony since 1814, they were administered by the Crown as a lesser dependency of 
Mauritius.98 Prior to the independence of Mauritius in 1968, the UK separated the Chagos Islands 
from Mauritius and established a separate British colony that included the Islands, the British Indian 
Ocean Territory.99 A US military base was subsequently constructed on Diego Garcia, the largest 
island in the archipelago, in accordance with an agreement between the UK and the USA.100 From 
1967 to 1973, the UK government forcibly removed the entire population of the archipelago—around 
                                                             
96 Chagos AO. 
97 Here used interchangeably with the term “Chagos Archipelago”. 
98 Chagos AO [25], [27]-[28]. 
99 Ibid [32]-[33], [42]. 
100 Ibid [31], [36], [94]-[97]. 
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1,500 people101—and legislated to prohibit their return.102 Most of the inhabitants settled in Mauritius, 
although some emigrated to the UK. Since 1974, Chagossians103 have repeatedly sought to return to 
the islands, but have not been able to do so.104 
The question before the Court was two-fold: (i) whether the process of decolonization of Mauritius 
was lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968, following the detachment 
of the Chagos Archipelago; and (ii) what were the consequences in international law arising from the 
continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago by the UK, including with respect to the 
resettlement of Mauritian nationals, particularly those of Chagossian origin, on the Archipelago.105 
The ICJ found that, in respect of the first question, the process of decolonization had not been 
lawfully completed; under the law of self-determination that applied at the relevant time, the 
detachment of part of the non-self-governing territory of Mauritius was contrary to the right to self-
determination, as it was not based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the 
entirety of the territory.106 In relation to the second question, the Court held that the UK’s continued 
administration of the Archipelago constituted an unlawful act of a continuing character entailing 
international responsibility, it was under an obligation to bring its administration to an end as rapidly 
as possible, and that all UN member states were obliged to cooperate with the UN to complete the 
decolonization of Mauritius.107 The Court did not deal with the question of the return of the 
Chagossians except to note that it was an issue ‘relating to the protection of the human rights of those 
concerned’ and should be addressed by the GA during the completion of the decolonization of 
Mauritius.108 Thus, the court considered that the relevant self-determination unit was Mauritius, and 
did not find that the Chagossians were also a people with the right to self-determination. 
Statements in the separate opinions, however, suggest that some judges saw the Chagossians as being 
a people who ought to have been heard in the process of the detachment of the Archipelago from 
Mauritius. Judge Robinson referred to the Chagossians as ‘a people uprooted from their homeland’.109 
Judge Cançado Trindade mentioned the provisions of the UNDRIP on reparations for forced 
population transfer, which implies that he viewed the Chagossians as an indigenous people.110 Judge 
Sebutinde referred to the ‘Mauritian peoples, including the Chagossians’,111 and held that the right of 
                                                             
101 Oral statement of Mauritius – Prof Pierre Klein [13]. 
102 Chagos AO [43], [113]-[120]. 
103 Also known as Ilois or Chagos Islanders. “Chagossians” is used here as it was the term most commonly used 
in the ICJ proceedings. 
104 Chagos AO [118]-[131]. 
105 Ibid [1]. 
106 Ibid [160]-[161], [170]-[174]. 
107 Ibid [177]-[178], [182]. 
108 Ibid [181]. 
109 Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson [102]. 
110 Separate Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade [244]. 
111 Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde, [13], [47], [51]. 
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the Chagossians to self-determination entitled them to exercise a free and genuine choice regarding 
whether to return to the Archipelago.112 Similarly, Judge Gaja noted that:113 
The will of the peoples belonging to the non-self-governing territory did not play any significant role in 
the process that led to the separation of the Archipelago from Mauritius. The Chagossians were never 
consulted or even represented. The people of Mauritius were never given an opportunity to express 
their views on the separation of the Archipelago or on any issue relating to its future status. 
Judge Gaja urged the GA, in revisiting the issue, to ‘take into account the will of the Chagossians’, 
stressing the importance of their will ‘under the perspective of self-determination’.114 These 
statements suggest that Judge Gaya viewed the Chagossians to be a people, in addition to recognising 
the people of Mauritius. Along similar lines, Judge Abraham declared that the principle of territorial 
integrity could not preclude taking into account the freely expressed will of the different components 
of a population of a territory, noted that the British authorities did not consult the Chagossian people, 
and stated that if such a consultation had taken place ‘and the Chagossian people had expressed their 
free and informed will’ to have been separated from Mauritius, the question to the Court would have 
been different.115 These judges essentially recognised that there were two layers of self-determination 
at issue in the case: that of Mauritius, and that of the Chagossians. 
This recognition by judges of the Court that the Chagossians are a people, entitled to self-
determination which should have entailed their participation in decision-making as to the fate of the 
territory came in the wake of similar statements by counsel for Mauritius in oral argument.116 Counsel 
discussed the ‘immense suffering’ that the Chagossians were subjected to due to their forced 
displacement, highlighting ‘flagrant and ongoing breaches of their fundamental human rights, rights 
that are an inherent part of the principle of self-determination’.117 Further, counsel noted that 98% of 
Chagossian respondents to a recent consultation had expressed a wish to return to the Archipelago, 
stressing the importance of their right of self-determination.118 In this way, counsel appealed to the 
right of self-determination of the Chagossians themselves.  
It is in this context that the practice outlined next must be viewed. In an unprecedented move, 
Mauritius included several Chagossians on its delegation to the Court. Counsel for Mauritius 
repeatedly referred to these Chagossians in their oral statements.119 Moreover, as part of its oral 
                                                             
112 Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde [51]. 
113 Separate Opinion of Judge Gaja [2]. 
114 Ibid [6]. 
115 Declaration of Judge Abraham, 2. 
116 Other states, too, recognised the Chagossians as a people entitled to self-determination: Oral statement for 
Israel – Becker [5]; Oral statement for South Africa – de Wet [21]-[22]; Oral statement for the African Union – 
Gomaa [15]; Oral statement for Nigeria – Apata [11]. 
117 Oral statement of Mauritius – Prof Pierre Klein [13]-[14]. 
118 Oral statement of Mauritius – Philippe Sands [6], [9]. 
119 Oral statement of Mauritius – Prof Pierre Klein [13]; Oral statement of Mauritius – Philippe Sands [5], [4]: 
‘…may I record the presence in this Great Hall of three members of the Chagossian community, who have 
204 
 
statement, Mauritius included a video statement from one Chagossian woman, Marie Liseby Elysé.120 
Introducing her statement, counsel noted that it was said that ‘it is appropriate that the Court should 
hear the voice of the Chagossians directly’.121 Counsel clarified that her statement was ‘not offered as 
testimonial evidence, but simply as a member of the delegation of Mauritius – if you like – a 
statement of impact, what the continuation of colonialism really means for real people’.122 Contrary to 
Sands’ characterisation, however, Elysé effectively appears as a quasi-witness. Elysé, in her 
statement, outlined the trauma she suffered during and following her forcible removal from Chagos. 
She said, ‘I am happy that the International Court is listening to us today. And I am confident that I 
will return to the island where I was born.’123 Two judges referred to her statement in separate 
opinions.124  
It is argued that the inclusion of the Chagossians on the delegation of Mauritius constitutes practice by 
Mauritius fulfilling its obligation to enable an affected people to participate in proceedings concerning 
them. While it is unclear to what extent the individual Chagossians in attendance could be said to be 
representatives of the Chagossians as a whole, it is similarly unclear who the proper representative of 
the Chagossians would be. If Mauritius had not done this, the theory suggests that the Court would 
have been under an obligation to otherwise enable the Chagossians to be heard. In any event, the 
Court effectively discharged itself of a situation where it would have been under an obligation to hear 
the Chagossians, as it referred their circumstances back to the GA. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In summary, the practice of the ICJ has developed from a complete refusal to hear peoples affected by 
its decisions that are not represented by states parties, as shown in the South West Africa cases, to 
enabling affected peoples to be heard via innovative means, as seen in the Kosovo and Wall advisory 
proceedings. In addition, the Chagos proceedings represent emerging state practice with respect to 
promoting the participation of peoples in proceedings concerning them. Building on this practice, and 
enabled by its procedural rules, the Court can and should continue this practice in similar cases in 
future. 
 
                                                             
travelled a great distance from Mauritius: Mme Marie Liseby Elysé and M. Louis Olivier Bancoult, both from 
Peros Banhos; and M. Louis Rosemond Saminaden from Salomon Islands. Also in the Peace Palace are Mme 
Marie Janine Sadrien and Mme Marie Rosemonde Berthin, both from Salomon Islands, Mme Marie Mimose 
Furcy from Peros Banhos and finally, from Diego Garcia, M. Louis Roger Alexis, Mme Marie Suzelle Baptiste 
and Mme Marie Nella Gaspard’. 
120 Oral statement of Mauritius – Prof Pierre Klein [13]. 
121 Oral statement of Mauritius – Philippe Sands [4]. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Oral statement of Mauritius, 74-75. 
124 Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson [101]-[106]; Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade [228]. 
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3. Amicus curiae participation in trade and investment disputes 
The proceedings of ISDS tribunals and WTO dispute settlement bodies can affect peoples. Regarding 
the WTO, an indigenous people’s trade interests might be negatively impacted by a measure at 
dispute in the proceedings; alternatively, the disputed measure might have been adopted by a state to 
protect, or with the effect of protecting, a people’s rights, such that a finding of a violation of WTO 
law would place the indigenous people’s rights in jeopardy. In terms of investor-state disputes, a 
tribunal may be tasked with deciding whether a measure taken by a state to protect indigenous 
peoples’ lands or resources breached investor protections; as another example, an indigenous people 
might be an investor in a foreign state.125  
Such cases, of course, will be a small minority of trade and investment proceedings. Of the 855 
publicly known treaty-based cases of ISDS, as of 2018,126 indigenous peoples have filed applications 
to participate as amici in just four, and there are a handful of others in which indigenous peoples were 
arguably affected.127 In the WTO there are only two cases to date which could be argued to have 
affected indigenous peoples.128 
Under the theory advanced in Chapter 2, peoples have a right to participate in proceedings of WTO 
dispute settlement and ISDS that affect them; investor-state tribunals and the WTO panels and 
Appellate Body—collectively referred to in this introduction as “tribunals”—have correlative 
obligations to enable affected peoples to participate and hear them. In addition, states have an 
obligation to promote and enable such participation. In the implementation of the right, its limitations 
must be kept in mind. If a state has heard the people at the domestic level, for instance by cancelling a 
foreign investment project or changing domestic regulations at the behest of an indigenous people, it 
has incorporated the views and concerns of the affected people into its submissions to the 
international tribunal, it may not be necessary for the tribunal to provide for separate participation. If a 
people is only one among many affected third parties, its rights must be balanced against those of 
others. If a people is only tangentially affected, for instance because it has an ongoing dispute with 
one of the states involved on a point only marginally related to the trade or investment matter at issue, 
it may be that the tribunal is simply not the right place for the people to air its grievances due to its 
                                                             
125 See e.g. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations v USA (“Grand River”) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), Award, 12 
January 2011. 
126 UNCTAD (2018) 88, 91. 
127 See e.g. Glamis Gold v USA (“Glamis Gold”) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL), Award, 8 June 2009; Grand River; 
Chevron and Texaco v Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Procedural Order No. 8, 18 April 2011; Bernhard von 
Pezold v Zimbabwe and Border Timbers Ltd v Zimbabwe (“Border Timbers”), ICSID Case No ARB/10/25 and 
ICSID Case No ARB/10/15.  
128 EC—Seal Products, WT/DS400/R and WT/DS401/R and Add.1, (Panel) 25 November 2013 (“Seal 
Products”); US—Preliminary Determinations with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS236/R, (Panel) 27 September 2002 (“Softwood Lumber—Panel”).  
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limited jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the fundamental rights of peoples are at stake, states and 
tribunals are duty-bound to respect, protect and fulfil the right to participate.  
In theory, indigenous peoples are able to participate as amicus curiae in proceedings in both the WTO 
dispute settlement system and investor-state arbitration tribunals.129 Such participation has been 
welcomed by indigenous peoples’ advocates, and carries benefits including assisting a people to 
advance a cause on the international stage and to draw attention to rights violations by states. This 
section investigates whether the practice is sufficient to fulfil the right, and whether it is accompanied 
by opinio juris. It sets out the respective amicus participation procedures in ISDS and WTO dispute 
settlement, including cases where peoples have participated as amici, before turning to assessing 
whether amicus participation is sufficient to meet the obligation in each setting. Finally, it turns to the 
question of opinio juris.  
3.1 Amicus participation in investor-state arbitration and WTO dispute settlement 
Both ISDS and WTO tribunals have established procedures for amicus participation through which 
affected peoples can ostensibly participate. These will be examined in turn.  
3.1.1 Investor-state dispute resolution 
ISDS is set up so to allow a foreign investor to bring proceedings against a state in which an 
investment is located, if the rights of the investor are breached; it historically developed from the 
model of commercial arbitration and thus prioritised confidentiality and party autonomy.130 
Indigenous peoples do not have standing as claimants or interveners; a significant power asymmetry 
exists between peoples and tribunals.131 But the early 2000s witnessed a significant shift whereby 
tribunals constituted under the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the UN 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules began to allow non-
disputing parties to participate as amicus curiae.132 The tribunals in the leading cases based their 
reasoning on Article 15(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules—now Article 17(1) of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules—which grants a ‘broad discretion as to the conduct of [the] 
arbitration, subject always to the requirements of procedural equality and fairness’ towards the 
parties,133 and is intended to provide powers to facilitate a tribunal’s ‘process of inquiry into, 
                                                             
129 On amicus curiae participation in general, see Wiik (2018). 
130 Roberts (2012) 65. 
131 Vadi (2018) 728, 739; Perrone (2018) 16. 
132 Methanex v USA (NAFTA), Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici 
Curiae”, 15 January 2001 (“Methanex”); United Parcel Service v Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001 
(“UPS”). 
133 Methanex [26]. The current Article 17(1) reads: ‘Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that 
at an appropriate stage of the proceedings each party is given a reasonable opportunity off presenting its case. 
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understanding of, and resolving’ the dispute.134 The tribunals found that the power to accept amicus 
curiae submissions fell within this broad discretion.135 Tribunals in proceedings under the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules soon followed suit136 under the general procedural power in Article 44 of the ICSID 
Convention,137 setting out criteria on which the power to receive amicus submissions should be 
exercised.138 
The tribunals have been clear that allowing amicus participation is not equivalent to adding a party to 
the arbitration.139 The amicus does not acquire any rights, let alone those of a disputing party,140 and 
‘is not participating to vindicate its rights’: it is a matter of a discretionary power of the tribunal, 
rather than of a right of the third party.141 
This jurisprudence was subsequently reflected across the procedural rules of tribunals.142  
Representative of these rules is Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which provides:143 
                                                             
The arbitral tribunal, in exercising its discretion, shall conduct the proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary delay 
and expense and to provide a fair and efficient process for resolving the parties’ dispute.’ 
134 UPS [60]. 
135 Methanex [31]; UPS [61], [63]. 
136 The first attempt by would-be amici proved unsuccessful: Aguas del Tunari, SA v Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/3, Letter from the President of the Tribunal, 29 January 2003, 1. Two identically constituted tribunals 
held that they were entitled to accept written amicus curiae submissions: Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona SA, and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic (“Suez/Vivendi v Argentina”), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 
2005, 3-4; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas Servicios Integrales v Argentine 
Republic (“Suez/InterAguas v Argentina”), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to a Petition for 
Participation as Amicus Curiae, 17 March 2006, [14]. ICSID tribunals have subsequently received amicus 
submissions in numerous cases, see e.g. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, 2 February 2007; Piero Foresti & Others v South Africa, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/01, Letter from ICSID regarding non-disputing parties, 5 October 2009 (“Piero Foresti”); PacRim 
Cayman LLC v El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Procedural Order No. 8, 23 March 2011; Philip 
Morris v Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Procedural Order No. 3, 17 February 2015; Infinito Gold, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/5, Procedural Order No. 2, 1 June 2016 (“Infinito Gold”). 
137 Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States. ‘If any 
question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by 
the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.’ 
138 Suez/Vivendi v Argentina 7-8; Suez/InterAguas v Argentina [17]. 
139 In UPS, the amici had originally requested the ‘standing of parties’ to the arbitration, asking for amicus 
participation only in the alternative, as they alleged a ‘direct interest in the subject matter’ of the claim such that 
they might be ‘adversely affected by the award’: UPS, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Petition from the Canadian 
Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, 8 November 2000, [1]-[2]; Petition to the Arbitral 
Tribunal, Canadian Union of Postal Workers and of the Council of Canadians, 9 May 2001, [1]-[2]. 
140 Methanex [27], [30]; UPS [39], [60]. See also Suez/InterAguas v Argentina [14]. 
141 UPS [61]. Suez/Vivendi v Argentina [14]. 
142 NAFTA Free Trade Commission statement on non-disputing party participation, 7 October 2003. NAFTA 
will be superseded by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) (signed 30 November 2018)—
which has not yet been ratified by all parties; while the Rules of Procedure for panel proceedings under Chapter 
31 (dispute settlement) have not yet been established, Article 31.11(e) provides that the panel shall consider 
requests to submit written views from ‘non-governmental entities located in the territory of a disputing party’. 
Text accessed at https://www.ustr.gov/. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration (adopted 11 July 2013, entered into force 1 April 2014), Article 4(3). 
143 Rule 41(3) of the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, which apply in circumstances where only 
the State of the investor or the respondent State is a party to the ICSID Convention, is identical to Rule 37(2) of 
the Arbitration Rules. Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules (2017), Appendix III, Articles 3(3), 
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After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in 
this Rule called the “non-disputing party”) to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter 
within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, 
among other things, the extent to which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal 
issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is 
different from that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding. 
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly 
burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their 
observations on the non-disputing party submission. 
On the face of such rules, investment arbitration tribunals allow for the participation of affected 
peoples as amici. Indeed, indigenous peoples have participated in relevant cases on this basis. The 
first such instance was Glamis Gold v United States of America (“Glamis Gold”), in which a Canadian 
mining company proposing to build a mine on federal US lands challenged state environmental 
regulations requiring among other things the back-filling of open pit mines and steps to preserve 
Native American sites.144 The Quechan Indian Nation opposed the project as it would have been on 
the Quechan’s ancestral lands in an area with historic cultural associations and a high density of 
religious sites.145 The Nation sought to file written submissions, arguing that it had a significant 
interest in the arbitration due to its occupation of the region since time immemorial and the continuing 
ceremonial and religious values of the site, that its interests could not be adequately represented by 
either of the parties, that it would assist the tribunal in its determination by bringing a perspective and 
expertise unique to a tribal sovereign government, and that there was wide public interest in the 
subject-matter of the arbitration.146 The tribunal accepted the Quechan’s submission, finding that it 
satisfied the requirements of the rules.147  
The second case in which indigenous peoples participated via the amicus curiae mechanism was 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations v United States of America (“Grand River”), which was also 
brought under NAFTA and the UNCITRAL rules.148 This case was distinct from Glamis Gold in that 
                                                             
3(9); Singapore International Arbitration Centre Investment Arbitration Rules (2017), Rules 29.2, 29.3, 29.5, 
29.9, 29.10. Despite minor variations in wording, on the whole these rules further crystallise the practice of 
amicus curiae in international investment arbitration. 
144 Glamis Gold, Award [1]. 
145 Ibid [101]-[101], [105]; Application for Leave to File a Non-Party Submission, 4. 
146 Glamis Gold, Application for Leave to File a Non-Party Submission, 3-5. Corresponding to the requirements 
of the NAFTA FTC Statement. 
147 Glamis Gold, Decision on the Application and Submission by Quechan Indian Nation, 16 September 2005 
[9]-[13]. 
148 Grand River, Award, 12 January 2011. 
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the claimant cigarette manufacturing company, Grand River, was owned by members of indigenous 
peoples—the Canadian Haudenosaunee nations. The company was the ‘largest employer on the most 
populous aboriginal reserve in Canada’.149 The three individual claimants were all members of the 
Iroquois: two were controlling shareholders of Grand River, while one had a substantial importing 
business in the US.150 The claimants alleged that actions of the US government to settle litigation 
against domestic cigarette manufacturers breached NAFTA. The claimants emphasised that the 
tobacco business was a ‘traditional trade of the Six Nations peoples’, and alleged that the arbitration 
concerned ‘discrimination against a group of aboriginal investors, their traditions, businesses and 
livelihoods, and the expropriation of their markets’, the adverse effects of which had been felt not 
only by the claimants themselves, but by ‘all the members of the Six Nations’, whose livelihoods 
depended on the business.151 The case largely failed at the jurisdiction stage, as the company was 
based in Canada rather than in the US and the claimants could not establish that they had an 
“investment” in the US.152 Nevertheless, it shows that an indigenous people may be able to initiate 
ISDS proceedings as an investor.153 
Relevant for current purposes is an unsolicited letter from the National Chief of the Assembly of First 
Nations, in which the Chief expressed support for the claimants, citing the UNDRIP and ‘the 
customary international law principles [it] reflects’.154 The letter did not request to make written 
submissions as an amicus. Nevertheless, the tribunal noted that the letter should be dealt with 
according to the NAFTA rules on amicus participation,155 although it did not ultimately decide the 
issue, stating that the letter had been ‘read and considered’ in its context as a supporting exhibit to a 
claimant’s submissions, to which it had been appended.156  
3.1.2 World Trade Organization dispute settlement 
The WTO DSM was set up for states: under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), 
only WTO member states can be parties or third parties to a dispute.157 However, as in ISDS, WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body can, at their discretion, accept unsolicited amicus curiae briefs 
submitted by individuals, NGOs, and other non-state actors including industry organisations.158 In 
                                                             
149 Grand River, Statement of Claimants’ Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of 
the Allocable Share Amendments, 6 November 2006, 1. 
150 Grand River, Award [3]. 
151 Grand River, Statement of Claimants’ Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of 
the Allocable Share Amendments, 6 November 2006. 
152 Grand River, Award [5]-[6]. 
153 Although it is unclear here as to what extent the claimants were representatives of the Iroquois. 
154 Grand River, Letter to the Tribunal from Phil Fontaine, 19 January 2009; Award [60]. 
155 Grand River, Letter from the Tribunal to the Parties, 27 January 2009. 
156 Grand River, Award [60]. 
157 Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU), Annex 2 of the WTO 
Agreement, Articles 1(1), 10(2), and 17(4). US—Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, (AB) WTO Doc 
WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998) (“US—Shrimp”) [101]. 
158 For an overview of amicus participation in the WTO generally, see Lim (2005); Howse (2003). 
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US—Shrimp the Appellate Body held that under Article 11 DSU (right to seek information), panels 
have a discretion to accept unsolicited amicus curiae briefs from non-governmental sources as long as 
this does not unduly delay the process.159 The Appellate body read DSU Articles 12 and 13, taken 
together, as meaning that panels have ‘ample and extensive authority to undertake and to control the 
process by which it informs itself both of the relevant facts of the dispute and of the legal norms and 
principles applicable to such facts’,160 necessary for the panel to discharge its Article 11 duty to make 
an objective assessment of the matter.161 This means that ‘to any explicitly limiting or prohibitive 
provisions in the DSU, the real scope of the panel’s authority is defined by what is ‘indispensably 
necessary’’ to perform its Article 11 function.162 In addition, the Appellate Body held that any party to 
a dispute may attach the briefs, or any part thereof, to its own submission, upon which the panel is 
entitled to treat and take it into consideration just like any other part of the party’s submission.163 The 
Appellate Body itself can also accept unsolicited amicus curiae briefs.164  
There is one case in which an indigenous people has utilised the amicus curiae procedure. The 
Softwood Lumber dispute between Canada and the United States concerned the stumpage fees paid to 
Canadian provincial and federal governments by Canadian softwood lumber producers for the right to 
harvest trees on public land.165 The United States, alleging that the stumpage fee was lower than 
market value and therefore constituted a subsidy creating an unfair advantage for Canadian 
procedures over US producers, imposed countervailing duties on imported Canadian softwood 
                                                             
159 US—Shrimp [107]-[110]. Panels have subsequently accepted amicus briefs in e.g. Australia—Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Salmon—Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada WT/DS18/RW, 18 February 2000 
[7.8]-[7.9]; US—Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, 15 June 2000 [6.7]-[6.8]; EC—Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R, 18 September 2000 (“EC—Asbestos”); 
EC—Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, 30 October 2000 [6.1]. Also see affirmations by the 
panel of its authority to accept unsolicited amicus curiae briefs in e.g. US—Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS/138/R, 23 December 1999 (“US—Lead”) 
[6.3]; US—Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan WT/DS184/R, 28 February 2001 [7.5], [7.10]. 
160 Under Article 12, panel procedures are to provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure high-quality reports, 
while not unduly delaying the panel process. Under Article 13(1), a panel has ‘the right to seek information and 
technical advice’ from ‘any individual or body which it deems appropriate’, although a panel must inform the 
authorities of a member state before it seeks such information or advice from any individual or body within that 
state’s jurisdiction. Under Article 13(2) panels ‘may seek information from any relevant source and may consult 
experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter’, and may request an advisory report from an 
expert review group with respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a 
party to the dispute. 
161 [106]. In so ruling, the Appellate Body reversed an earlier panel decision which had read Article 11 narrowly 
so as to reject two amicus briefs: US—Shrimp [7.1], [7.8].  
162 Howse (2003) 498. 
163 US—Shrimp [109]-[110]. 
164 US—Lead [36]-[42] (Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 
2010) provides a basis for a broad discretionary authority, and Article 17(9) DSU provides for broad authority to 
adopt procedural rules which do not conflict with any rules or procedures in the DSU or the covered 
agreements). The Appellate Body is authorised to draw up its own working procedures under Article 17(9) of 
the DSU. The Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos adopted its own rules of procedure for accepting amicus curiae 
briefs, but subsequently rejected all 17 applications for leave to file following backlash from member states:  
EC—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001 [50]-[57]. 
165 Softwood Lumber, Panel. Also see the summary of prior proceedings in Carmody (2006). 
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lumber, which Canada claimed was inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement.166 
Three indigenous groups sought permission to participate as amici, two of which were rejected for 
lateness.167 One of the latter was the Meadow Lake Tribal Council, a representative organisation of 
indigenous peoples on Canadian lands which held an exclusive license for the right to harvest timber 
from its traditional lands, sought to participate as an amicus curiae presumably to defend its trade 
interest.168 Its arguments supported the Canadian position in the dispute, albeit for different reasons.169 
While it could be reasoned that the fulfilment of the right would not have required the hearing of the 
Meadow Lake Tribal Council, as its interests were already being represented by the Canadian 
government, the panel’s reasoning was rather based on lateness. 
The amicus brief accepted by the panel was submitted by the Interior Alliance, an organization 
representing five indigenous peoples, the Nlaka’pamux, Okanagan, Southern Carrier, Secwepemc and 
St’at’imc.170 The submission was made in the context of a long-standing land dispute between the 
peoples of the Interior Alliance, who have not ceded rights to their traditional lands, and the Canadian 
government.171 The Interior Alliance were concerned about the unsustainable large-scale exploitation 
of timber on their unceded lands with ‘a disastrous impact on their traditional territories and 
multifaceted use’,172 and on their livelihoods, spirituality and culture.173 They particularly objected to 
an argument made by Canada in the proceedings that the stumpage fee was not a “financial 
contribution” because the Canadian lumber harvesting companies had quasi-proprietary interests in 
the timber growing on public lands by virtue of their land tenures or licenses which conferred a 
property right to exploit the resource.174 The Alliance argued that as they had never ceded land rights, 
and were not remunerated for the harvest, the Canadian government could not have passed on limited 
ownership rights to companies.175 
                                                             
166 Article 1.1 provides that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist when a financial contribution confers a benefit. 
The panel held that although the lower-than-market value fees constituted the provision of a good, and therefore 
a “financial contribution” for the purposes of whether a subsidy existed under Article 1.1, the US had acted 
inconsistently with the Agreement in imposing a provisional countervailing duty without determining the 
existence and amount of the “benefit” conferred: Ibid [7.30], [7.79]. 
167 Ibid [7.2]. For details of those rejected, see Manuel and Schabus (2002) 13. The briefs themselves are not 
available, and secondary material is limited. Nothing is known about the submission of the Nishnawbe Aski 
nation, the other brief rejected for lateness. 
168 Gastle (2002) 33-34. 
169 Ibid. The Meadow Lake Tribal Council sought to rely on its treaty rights and customary aboriginal title to 
argue that no subsidy existed. 
170 Interior Alliance (2002) 14. See panel decision [7.2]. 
171 See Manuel and Schabus (2005) 227-229, 235-236; Ibid 3. 
172 Interior Alliance (2002) 15-16. 
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the Panel, which found that Canada was providing a “good” in the form of timber: [7.18]. 
175 Manuel and Schabus (2005) 247; Interior Alliance (2002) 6-7. 
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Although the brief was accepted, and the Alliance’s participation may have brought benefits including 
the dissemination of information about the Alliance’s dispute internationally, it is arguable that 
amicus participation was not necessary to fulfil the right. The underlying dispute between the Interior 
Alliance and Canada was not within the power of the panel to address. Although the Interior Alliance 
was tangentially affected by the outcome, and in particular the panel’s finding on the specific point of 
concern, it seems unlikely that the decision had a great effect.  
In the only other WTO dispute to date that can be said to have affected a people—the Seal Products 
proceedings—the affected people did not seek to participate.176 The case concerned the EU Seal 
Regime prohibiting the placing of seal products on the EU market except those from seals hunted by 
Inuit or other indigenous communities;177 despite the exception, the regime affected the economic and 
cultural self-determination of the Inuit of Canada and Norway.178 It is unclear why those peoples did 
not seek to participate.179 The panel and the Appellate Body did not recognise that affected peoples 
were going unheard and did not seek to use its discretionary powers to seek more information. 
3.2 The limitations of amicus curiae participation 
For many commentators these cases sparked optimism that the voices of affected peoples can be heard 
through amicus participation. For instance, amongst indigenous peoples the Softwood Lumber panel’s 
acceptance of the amicus brief was hailed as a ‘groundbreaking victory’.180 A closer examination 
reveals that, on the contrary, there are several reasons for caution. Even taking into account 
reasonable limitations on the implementation of the right, currently it cannot be said that it is being, or 
can be, fulfilled by amicus participation as practiced by WTO and ISDS tribunals, for the following 
reasons. Most of the reasons correspond to both the WTO and ISDS; a few relate to only one or the 
other.  
2.2.1 Oral submissions, hearing attendance, and disclosure of documents 
First, the scope of participation is substantially limited in practice: amici are not permitted to make 
oral submissions or physically attend hearings. In ISDS, tribunals have consistently refused such 
                                                             
176 EC—Seal Products. 
177 Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on 
trade in seal products, and Commission Regulation (EU) No. 737/2010 of 10 August 2010 laying down detailed 
rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on trade in seal products. For the exception, see Commission Regulation, Article 7. There were also other 
exceptions. 
178 Hossain (2013) 162-163; Cambou (2013) 390, 395-397, 399; Fakhri (2015) 287-291.  
179 Three amicus briefs were submitted: panel report [1.15]. On at least two separate occasions, the Inuit Tapirii t 
Kanatami—representative of Canadian Inuit—had brought proceedings against the European Parliament in the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, seeking the annulment of the Seal Regime regulations. Inuit Tapiriit 
Kanatami v European Parliament (Case T-18/10), Judgment of the General Court, 6 September 2011, OJ C 
319; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v European Parliament (Case T-526/10), Judgment of the General Court, 25 April 
2013. 
180 Interior Alliance (2002b); Davis (2005) 16-19; Manuel and Schabus (2005) 249-251. 
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requests by reason of the applicable arbitration rules. For instance, Article 28(2) of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that hearings shall be held ‘in camera unless the parties agree 
otherwise’; tribunals under theserules have consistently found that requests to attend hearings must be 
refused if the parties have not positively agreed such;181 they have not accepted arguments that the 
presence of an amicus would not necessarily cause proceedings to be any less in camera, in the sense 
of confidentiality.182 Under the ICSID Rules in principle a tribunal may allow attendance of amici at 
hearings, an objection by a party to the proceedings overrules.183 In the context of the right of peoples 
to participate, it could be argued that these restrictions are simply a justified limitation on the right, as 
participation at oral hearings would impose greater costs on the proceedings. However, it could also 
be argued that this cost would be balanced out by the added value and usefulness of the amicus to the 
tribunal. In addition, as affected peoples would have a direct interest in the dispute, rather than a 
merely informational role, this limitation is unjustified. 
A related issue is that the rules and practice on disclosure of documents are inconsistent; for 
meaningful participation, amici require access to case documents. Without such access, amici are 
rendered ‘if not totally blindfolded, at least myopic’.184 While public disclosure of documents is the 
rule rather than the exception under the 2014 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules,185 the ICSID rules are 
silent on the question of amici access to documents and the practice of tribunals on the matter has 
varied considerably.186  
In WTO proceedings, too, meaningful participation is significantly limited by transparency 
considerations. For instance, in Softwood Lumber, the Panel sent its notification of acceptance of the 
Interior Alliance’s brief to the states parties but not the Alliance, and the lack of transparency of 
proceedings meant that throughout the proceedings they were ‘forced to rely heavily on discussions 
and information being passed on by other parties, especially third parties’.187 
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183 Rule 32(2) ICSID Arbitration Rules; Rule 39(2) ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules. 
184 Simoes (2016). 
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187 Manuel and Schabus (2005) 250. 
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2.2.2 Jurisdiction stage 
In ISDS, another cause for concern is the uncertain potential for participation at the jurisdiction stage. 
While it may seem unlikely that peoples could be affected by jurisdictional issues, the proceedings in 
Chevron and Texaco v Ecuador illustrate otherwise.188 By way of background, Texaco, an American 
oil company later acquired by Chevron, was from part of an oil concession consortium that in 1967 
struck oil in Ecuador. The extraction site was near the territory of the Huaorani people; as a result, the 
Huaorani ‘lost their political sovereignty and sovereignty over their natural resources’, they were 
subject to displacement and appropriation of land, their means of subsistence was harmed, and their 
ability to carry on certain cultural practices relating to the environment was undermined.189 The 
consortium’s activities caused considerable environmental pollution.190 After exiting the concession, 
in 1992 Texaco carried out environmental remediation measures pursuant to a 1995 agreement with 
Ecuador.191 Subsequently, a coalition of indigenous communities and local farmers brought a class 
action in Ecuador’s domestic courts seeking damages for the impacts of the consortium’s 
operations,192 resulting in a large award for damages.193 Chevron and Texaco alleged that Ecuador’s 
conduct violated the Ecuador-US BIT by allowing the litigation to proceed,194 seeking remedies 
clearing them from liability and responsibility for the remaining environmental impacts.195  
An Ecuadorian NGO working on behalf of indigenous peoples, together with another NGO sought to 
participate as amicus, arguing that even the decision on jurisdiction would directly affect the rights 
and interests of the domestic plaintiffs as the claimants were asking the tribunal to order the 
Ecuadorian government ‘to politically interfere in, and effectively terminate’ a case it was not party 
to,196 as ‘part of an ongoing effort to preclude the indigenous peoples…from having any effective 
judicial remedies regarding their claim…for environmental damages’.197 
                                                             
188 Chevron and Texaco v Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Procedural Order No. 8, 18 April 2011. On the 
facts, see Chevron and Texaco v Ecuador, Notice of Arbitration [1]-[5]. For facts relating to the indigenous 
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189 Kimerling (2013) 44, 50-52. 
190 Ibid 60-61. 
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federal court by indigenous communities and local residents harmed by the pollution. Under the agreement, 
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Cir 2002). 
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195 Chevron and Texaco v Ecuador, Notice of Arbitration. 
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The tribunal rejected the application, noting parties’ agreement that the amicus submissions would not 
be helpful to the tribunal, and that neither side favoured participation during the jurisdictional phase 
‘in which the issues to be decided are primarily legal and have already been extensively addressed’ by 
the parties.198 While the construction of the right of peoples to participate developed in Chapter 2 
would not necessarily suggest that the NGOs ought to have been able to participate, as it is unclear the 
extent to which they legitimately represented the affected peoples, the tribunal did not refuse 
permission on this basis. Aside from Chevron v Ecuador, the practice of tribunals has been 
inconsistent.199 But the case of Chevron indicates significant reason for caution. A people should be 
able to participate at the jurisdictional stage if their rights are affected. 
2.2.3 The introduction of a requirement to be independent 
Again in ISDS proceedings, another issue is that the test for qualifying as an amicus in ICSID 
proceedings may have become considerably stricter, meaning that it will be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for affected peoples to qualify. Major new restrictions were introduced by the tribunal in 
the joined cases of Bernhard von Pezold v Republic of Zimbabwe and Border Timbers v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (“Border Timbers”). These proceedings concerned Zimbabwe’s land reform programme in 
favour of the black indigenous population, which the claimants alleged breached investment 
agreements with respect to their timber plantations.200 Four Zimbabwean indigenous groups, the 
Chikukwa, Nogorima, Chinyai and Nyaruwa peoples, filed a petition to submit an amicus brief 
together with a European NGO.201 The claimants’ plantations were located on the ancestral lands of 
the indigenous communities,202 who submitted that they had a significant interest in the outcome of 
the arbitrations due to their distinct cultural identities and social histories inextricably linked to the 
lands.203 
The tribunal denied the application and in doing so, reinterpreted Rule 37(2) so as to considerably 
limit the scope for future amicus participation including, and perhaps especially, by affected peoples. 
It did so by, first, introducing a new requirement and, second, by a strict reading of the rule. The chief 
innovation the tribunal made was to read an additional requirement into Rule 37(2): independence 
from the parties to the arbitration, which it found was implicit in Rule 37(2)(a).204 Because the 
indigenous communities had received support from a local NGO, the director of which had a dispute 
                                                             
198 Chevron v Ecuador, Procedural Order No. 8, [18], [20]. 
199 UPS, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, [71] 
(permission to make amicus statements on questions of jurisdiction declined); Infinito Gold v Costa Rica, [38] 
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200 Border Timbers, Award. 
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with the claimants and publicly supported the respondent’s land reform policies,205 the tribunal found 
that ‘legitimate doubts’ existed as to the petitioners’ ‘independence and neutrality’ and this was a 
sufficient ground to deny the application.206 
This reasoning can be subject to criticism in a number of respects. Contrary to the tribunal’s 
suggestion, a requirement of independence is not implicit in Rule 37(2)(a), which read together with 
the chapeau requires the tribunal to consider the extent to which the amicus submission would assist 
the tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceedings by bringing a 
perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties.207 
Independence and a diverse perspective are two different things, and the rule contains only a factor to 
take into account rather than a strict requirement.208 Moreover, the tribunal’s reasoning runs contrary 
to the decisions of previous tribunals.209 It is hard to imagine a case in which a would-be amicus 
would have a ‘significant interest’ in the proceedings—also required by the rules—while meeting the 
Border Timbers test of independence as neutrality.210 
The tribunal went on to examine the petition under each of the (a)-(c) factors in Rule 37(2), and its 
reasoning in this respect can also be criticised. It appears to have erred in treating each criterion as a 
minimum standard that must be met, whereas these are only matters that the tribunal is required to 
consider.211 Under the first criterion, it found that the petitioners’ submissions would not assist the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding; rather, they sought to submit on 
unrelated issues;212 the tribunal was not persuaded that its mandate allowed it to consider international 
human rights law.213 This reasoning can be criticised: the tribunal could have actually benefitted from 
more factual information about the indigenous communities and the impacts of the land reform, 
enabling the tribunal to better evaluate whether the respondent’s measures that formed the basis of the 
alleged expropriation served a public interest and were non-discriminatory.214  
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Regarding criterion (b), the tribunal found that for it to consider the submission, it would need to 
consider and decide whether the indigenous communities constitute “indigenous peoples” under 
international human rights law, which was ‘clearly outside’ the scope of the dispute.215 However, the 
tribunal arguably erred in dismissing the need for self-identification of indigenous peoples.216 On 
criterion (c), the tribunal found that the indigenous communities had ‘some interest’ in the land over 
which the claimants asserted title and, therefore, that the outcome of the proceedings might ‘have an 
impact’ on their interest.217 However, the tribunal stated that, regardless, the claimants would be 
unfairly prejudiced by the petitioners’ participation and that the petition should therefore be denied. 
On this last point, it is inevitable that an amicus submission will support the substantive arguments of 
one of the parties, so this factor alone should not be held to constitute unfair prejudice. In addition, in 
practice many tribunals have imposed procedural safeguards such as a limit on the length of 
submissions, which could have been utilised here.218 
In summary, not only does the reasoning appear to be incorrect, but if future tribunals follow this 
approach, a significant burden will thereby be imposed on any potential amicus in investor-state 
arbitration. While this is a high barrier for any non-disputing party, it is particularly so for affected 
peoples. An indigenous people has distinct rights and interests which are likely to be in conflict with 
either the investor or the state, or both, in a given proceeding, and will therefore necessarily make 
submissions opposing the positions of at least one of the parties. The tribunal’s decision therefore 
creates an irreconcilable paradox for indigenous peoples, whose “significant interest” necessarily 
causes them to lose “independence” in the eyes of the tribunal.  
It may be that the Border Timbers decision is simply an anomaly that future tribunals will disregard. 
There is no strict doctrine of binding precedent in investor-state arbitration.219 The 2016 decision in 
Bear Creek Mining Corporation v Peru may serve to indicate that tribunals will follow the bulk of 
prior jurisprudence rather than Border Timbers.220 In that case, brought under the Canada-Peru Free 
Trade Agreement, the claimant sought to hold Peru liable for revoking its silver mining concession 
following strong opposition, including violent protests, from the Aymara indigenous people. An NGO 
that had worked with the Aymara people, along with an individual jurist, sought to file an amicus 
brief.221 The tribunal made its decision on whether to accept the brief based on a provision of the 
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Canada-Peru FTA, worded substantially similarly to ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2).222 Applying these 
criteria, the tribunal made clear that the list is non-exhaustive, consisting of ‘only “criteria” and not 
conditions’; it had a discretion as to which of these criteria and which other matters it could into 
account.223 In finding that criterion (a) had been met because of the NGO’s local knowledge of the 
facts and because the jurist’s legal expertise might ‘add a new perspective that differs from that of the 
parties’, it held that it did not need to examine the other criteria.224 This interpretation clearly counters 
that of the Border Timbers tribunal. But it does not remove concern, as the decision was made with 
regard to an FTA rather than ICSID Rule 37(2). Border Timbers establishes a troubling precedent on 
which future ICSID tribunals could rely. It creates uncertainty about whether indigenous peoples can 
qualify as amici at all under the ICSID rules, and arguably constitutes a substantial and unjustified 
limitation on participation.  
2.2.4 A discretion of the tribunal 
In ISDS tribunals, as many tribunals have emphasised, all amicus participation occurs at the discretion 
of the tribunal. It is unlikely that this effectively protects the right to participate.225 Tribunals should, 
in the case of affected peoples, exercise their discretion so as to permit participation. 
In WTO proceedings, acceptance of an amicus brief is similarly discretionary. Indeed, amicus briefs 
are often rejected for no apparent reason. In a comprehensive analysis of all amicus submissions from 
1998 to 2014, Theresa Squatrito found that 30% were rejected with no reason given.226 While panels 
and the Appellate Body may have their own internal reasons for rejecting submissions, these are not 
clear to an external eye; rather, it gives the impression of being a lottery. Further, while panels have in 
many cases accepted amicus submissions, the Appellate Body hardly ever does,227 raising questions as 
to whether an affected people would be able to participate in a relevant Appellate Body proceeding. In 
addition, amicus briefs are in practice accepted on questions of fact only, rather than questions of 
law,228 which is a significant, unjustified limitation on the right to participate.  
2.2.5 Incorporation by a party 
Moreover, in practice WTO panels only accept amicus briefs where a state party to the dispute has 
endorsed the brief either by appending it to its own submission or otherwise by expressly supporting 
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its consideration.229 Such a practice enables the DSM to ‘shield itself politically’ by aligning itself 
with the preferences of the state(s) that benefit from the amicus submission, and thereby 
‘accommodate its political constraints’.230 These findings strongly suggest the conclusion that under 
the theoretical obligation, states parties to a dispute are obliged to append to their own submissions 
any submissions that an affected people wishes to make, or alternatively strongly encourage the 
tribunal to accept amicus submissions. There may be cases in which the interests of an affected people 
do not align with those of either party to the dispute, such that neither party is willing to append the 
people’s submissions to its own; this possibility highlights that the panels’ practice is not consistent 
with the right to participate.  
2.2.6 No indication that amicus submissions are taken into account 
Finally, questions may be raised about the extent to which admitted amicus submissions are actually 
considered and used by tribunals, and the extent to which they influence outcomes. Unlike the 
submissions of parties, tribunals are not required to address amicus submissions in their decisions. In 
ISDS proceedings, tribunals are not obliged to consider a submission once they have accepted it.231 
Butler shows, in an examination of ICSID proceedings until mid-2018, that out of 11 cases where 
amicus submissions were accepted232 in six cases the tribunal cited or made explicit reference to the 
submission, and in one case there was an indirect effect whereby an inspection of the submission and 
the award shows that the former influenced the latter.233 While this result is promising, the other side 
of the coin is that in nearly half of cases, amicus submissions, even once accepted, appear not to be 
taken into account by tribunals. This is a clear limitation of the potential of the amicus mechanism for 
fulfilling the right, which would require that submissions are taken into account. 
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In WTO proceedings it is similarly unclear to what extent a panel engages with an admitted brief 
substantively.234 Squatrito found that only around half of accepted submissions were taken into 
consideration.235 For instance, in Softwood Lumber, the submission was not mentioned at all in the 
panel’s decisions save for a brief note that it had been submitted.236 
2.2.7 No opinio juris 
The amicus procedures in WTO and ISDS proceedings were not developed with the rights of peoples 
in mind. Rather, as statements by ISDS tribunals show, one reason for allowing amicus participation 
was the broad public interest in the case.  237 Another reason was to enhance tribunals’ own legitimacy 
and credibility by allowing amicus participation.238 Tribunals are ‘inherently interested in fortifying 
their authority by making sure that the general public as well as prospective supervising or enforcing 
jurisdictions perceive the award as lawful’.239 Similarly, the initial decisions to admit amicus briefs in 
WTO proceedings must be viewed in the context of heightened public scrutiny and debate regarding 
perceived substantive and procedural failures of WTO dispute settlement.240 There has been nothing 
since to indicate that tribunals have admitted amicus briefs of indigenous peoples in the belief that 
such peoples ought to participate in cases that affect them, or in the belief that such a practice is 
required by law.  
2.3 Conclusion 
I have argued that while the amicus procedures may have allowed affected indigenous peoples to be 
heard, to a restricted extent, in certain instances of ISDS and WTO dispute resolution, the 
mechanisms ultimately cannot, at least in their current incarnations, fulfil the right to be heard. Amici 
have limited access to documents and hearings, and in ISDS cannot participate at the jurisdiction 
stage. In ISDS, the test for participation appears to have been considerably narrowed so as to prima 
facie exclude participation by affected indigenous peoples. In addition, whether to admit a submission 
is at a tribunal’s discretion, and in WTO proceedings nearly a third of briefs have been rejected for no 
reason. In practice, WTO panels only admit briefs where a party has already appended them to its 
submission. Even once accepted, in many cases there is no indication that tribunals take submissions 
into account. Active consideration of a brief is the exception, rather than the rule. The meaningful 
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participation of affected peoples therefore cannot be ensured by way of the amicus mechanism. There 
is only an ‘illusion of inclusion’.241 
Ultimately, the practice of accepting amicus briefs was designed with cases of broad public interest in 
mind, and amici have no protected legal interest underlying in the dispute. For this reason, some have 
proposed the establishment of an “intervention” mechanism for third parties with a legitimate interest 
in the outcome of existing proceedings and who are unrepresented by existing parties.242 Such a status 
would accord peoples, along with other affected third parties,243 the right to submit briefs with no 
length restrictions, attend and participate in oral hearings, access documents, cross-examine witnesses, 
and, in ISDS, challenge arbitral awards or the appointment of arbitrators.244 Intervener status would 
thus mean more extensive and meaningful participation, and is therefore arguably more appropriate 
for third parties with an interest in the outcome of the proceedings, such as affected indigenous 
peoples. An intervener status would fulfil the right of peoples to be heard—but is unlikely to be 
implemented in the near term. Unless and until such a status is created, tribunals should accept and 
take into account amicus submissions from affected peoples, even where such submissions have not 
been adopted by a party to the dispute. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the extent of practice corresponding to the right of peoples to participate in 
proceedings of international courts and tribunals affecting them. It has found that there is an emerging 
pattern of practice at the ICJ whereby the Court enables or allows affected peoples to be heard in 
relevant proceedings. This latter practice can be added to the emerging pattern which can be said to 
constitute a norm corresponding to the proposed right. In addition to the cases examined, further 
negative cases exist—for instance that the ethnic groups of the former Yugoslavia did not participate 
in the proceedings of the Arbitration Commission regarding self-determination.245 However, the 
amicus curiae participation of peoples in WTO and ISDS dispute resolution proceedings cannot be 
characterised as a fulfilment of the right of peoples to participate. To fulfil the obligation, WTO and 
ISDS tribunals should prima facie accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from peoples with 
an interest in the outcome of the dispute, and further should consider establishing a mechanism for 
intervention. It can be said, therefore, that the practice of international courts and tribunals regarding 
the participation of peoples is not particularly widespread, nor does it constitute practice accepted as 
law. 
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The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the idea that peoples are entitled, by virtue of the right 
to self-determination, to participate in matters concerning them at the global level. While this has been 
frequently asserted by, in particular, indigenous rights advocates, it had not been systematically 
assessed. 
The contribution of this thesis has been to show that this notion is supported in theory, and in practice 
corresponds to a norm that constrains the behaviour of IOs and states. Its main claim has been that 
peoples have a right, derived from the law of self-determination, to participate in global governance, 
which entails correlative obligations for states and IOs, and that this constitutes a standard of conduct 
to which there is a legitimate expectation of compliance. This claim built on an account of the law of 
self-determination as dynamic, multifaceted, relational and remedial. The law consists of a broad 
umbrella principle under which multiple specific legal rules are located, and the specific rules tend to 
emerge to remedy situations of domination or subjugation of peoples by others. The self-
determination of peoples is an ongoing process, and although the law has been concerned with 
remedying the domination of peoples by states, this account suggests that different remedies are 
justified when different relations emerge. 
After constructing the account of the law of self-determination, the thesis turned to consider the rise of 
IOs and other global governance bodies, and the relations that such entities have with peoples. It 
demonstrated that activities carried out at international and global levels can significantly and 
adversely impact on peoples, and also, conversely, benefit peoples by, among other things, providing 
them a means of appeal against violations of self-determination by states. It argued that IOs, and 
states acting collectively at the intergovernmental level, exercise dominance over peoples, in such a 
way as to justify a remedy according to the law of self-determination. On this basis, it argued that a 
right of peoples to participate in global governance derives from the law of self-determination. The 
thesis then turned to examine the scope and contours of the right, proposing that corresponding 
obligations are held by states and IOs. It examined the degree of participation required for the right to 
be fulfilled by reference to Arnstein’s typology of participation. The level of participation needed to 
fulfil the right depends on the situation, particularly on the extent to which the people is affected by a 
given matter, and on whether the people are the only third parties with a legitimate stake in the 
outcome. Participation does not necessarily require the sharing of power between states and peoples, 
although in some cases this may be needed. The contribution of this part of the thesis has been to 




The rest of the thesis was concerned with assessing whether and to what extent the theoretical 
construction of the right is consistent with the doctrinal law and the empirical practice of global 
governance. The positive law was considered first and it was explained how international instruments 
and the decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies provide some support for the notion that the law 
of self-determination contains a participatory element. The thesis also explained how the international 
law relating to indigenous peoples’ rights supports the conclusion that indigenous peoples have a right 
to participate in matters affecting them at the international level. The thesis found that a major area 
where the doctrinal law does not align with the right as constructed is with respect to the obligations 
of IOs: they are not members of relevant treaties, and it is unlikely that the law of self-determination, 
and by extension the proposed right, is peremptory in nature. The thesis argued that the obligations of 
IOs can be located in CIL, and that the practice of IOs can contribute to the formation of custom, and 
set out the considerations for determining whether the right has crystallised into a rule of custom. 
The empirical assessment found that it is unlikely that the right of peoples to participate in global 
governance has hardened into a rule of CIL. While it is difficult to assert this conclusion with 
complete certainty, owing to the difficulty and lack of clarity involved in the determination of a rule 
of custom, it is more likely to be true than not. While there was a widespread—albeit not universal 
nor uniform—practice, found in the conduct and policies of IOs and states, there was little to indicate 
that such practice was carried out in the belief that it was required by law. Although many instances of 
practice were accompanied by statements of an IO or states referring to the UNDRIP, owing to the 
soft law nature of this instrument it is unlikely that this constitutes evidence of opinio juris.  
Notwithstanding the lack of CIL, the thesis argued that the consistent pattern of practice whereby IOs 
and states enable peoples to participate in matters affecting them at the international level evidences a 
standard of conduct which is widely adhered to by IOs and states. This constructivist norm 
corresponds to the right and obligations and could in future evolve into a rule of CIL. To reach this 
conclusion, the thesis examined standard-setting and decision-making processes of IOs as well as 
states acting through intergovernmental fora, participation in more general processes of IOs, and the 
proceedings of ICTs. The thesis explained how this practice is often carried out in the belief that the 
increased participation of affected peoples will enable an organization to better carry out its functions 
and fulfil its mandated objectives. The functionalist approach to IOs, by which the functions assigned 
to an organization by its member states both enable and limit the organization’s activity, is thereby 
shown to be not necessarily incompatible with the idea that organizations should include and pay 
regard to non-state actors who their activities affect. While the ultimate extent to which participation 
may assist peoples to realise their substantive rights is unclear, this thesis shows that peoples have a 
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